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‘I think there is the recognition now, possibly in relation 
to climate change, that natural hazards aren’t being 
managed that well and effectively.’ 




 New Zealand is characterised by a high susceptibility to natural hazards. The last decade 
has been characterised by the Christchurch 2010 earthquake and devastating aftershock 
sequence that included the infamous ‘2011 Christchurch earthquake’ alongside the 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake have catalysed discussions around the state of the civil defence 
emergency management framework. In New Zealand, civil defence emergency management 
are managed under a framework that is fed by a range of different statutory legislation, 
including the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEMA) 2002 and the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) 1991. Combined with other non-statutory documents such as the 
newly developed National Disaster Resilience Strategy 2019 and international commitments 
to hazard and risk reduction such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Resilience 2015 – 
2030. The combination of the legislative devices named above, and others have combined to 
create the hazard and emergency management framework based on the ‘4R’s’ within the 
CDEMA; reduction, readiness, response and recovery. Considering the fundamental role that 
land-use planning has for hazard management, this research has analysed the lessons learnt 
from the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes and assess the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the current hazard and emergency framework. The research found 
significant issues within this framework that extend from tension and disconnection in the 
guiding legislation (RMA and CDEMA) leading to non-optimal development and management 
decisions, deeply ingrained resourcing issues that affect both central and local government 
with debilitating effects for the development and implementation of best practice and national 
and regional differences that call for increased centralisation to ensure greater levels of 
consistency of planning processes and outcomes. In order to overcome these issues in the 
framework, this research has suggested a number of pathways to help achieve best practice in 
the future. Aligning with the eventual reforms or possible repeal of the RMA, there must be 
more connection and communication between the RMA and CDEMA, prior to and after 
disasters. The significant resourcing issues that characterise the sector must be addressed for 
practices such as targeted hazard and risk assessment and proactive planning to take place. 
This research has also suggested that more centralisation must be achieved in the form of an 
NPS for natural hazards, a national recovery office or both, however, it is imperative that this 
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 Natural hazards and the risks that they place on humans exist across the world. These 
hazards and risks come in countless forms, scales, frequencies and intensities and in the 
urbanising modern world that we live in, the potential for these hazards to risk lives, property 
and livelihoods is ever increasing. With the exacerbating effects of climate change, the need 
to implement effective management strategies that influence the outcomes of hazards and 
create sustainable and resilient communities is more important than ever (Hyndman and 
Hyndman, 2016). In the context of New Zealand, the past decade of catastrophic earthquakes 
has highlighted this fact clearly, the Christchurch 2010 earthquake and the extended and 
destructive aftershock sequence, including the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, and the 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake have forced thinking around the hazard and emergency management 
sector in New Zealand to change. Planning and planners play a key role in facilitating the 
outcomes of best practice in the space of hazard and emergency management and with 
consideration for the hazards and the risks that exist in New Zealand, the establishment of risk 
resilient and sustainable communities’ rests as very much a planning issue. 
The management of natural hazards presents a very real challenge for the planning 
community, considering the rapid urbanisation of global populations and the subsequent 
exposure to natural hazards that has arisen from urban sprawl and human modification of 
landscapes (Shi, Yang and Xu, 2006), planning solutions and considerations to protect against 
the effects of natural hazards and risks are vitally important. 
 
1.1 Research Scope 
 
 Hazards of all descriptions, sizes and intensities are evident across the regions of New 
Zealand, such as earthquakes, landslides, flooding, drought, volcanic activity and many others. 
Considering the timeframe and size restrictions on this research, undertaking an analysis of the 
entire range of hazards that must be addressed within the hazard and emergency management 
framework would be impractical. In order to go into enough depth and perform a sufficiently 
targeted analysis that can identify issues within the current framework and recommend 
actions to take for the development of best practice in the hazard space, this research has 
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been refined to looking into the tumultuous decade in New Zealand’s history in the form of 
the Christchurch 2010 and 2011 earthquakes and the more recent Kaikōura 2016 earthquake. 
Considering the recency and size of these recent earthquake events, this research is well 
positioned to interrogate the strengths and weaknesses of the current framework and 
highlight the changes that can and should be made in the hope of establishing best practice in 
the future. As the hazard and emergency management framework is informed through a 
variety of different forms of legislation at different levels of the planning hierarchy as well as 
non-regulatory documents, the research intends to provide a comprehensive commentary of 
the interactions between the Resource Management Act (RMA) and the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act (CDEMA) alongside the supplementary national and international 
documents that align to establish the hazard and emergency management framework. 
 The research will be framed through an analysis of the principles of pre-event recovery 
planning as a proposed method for the implementation of best practice. In particular, the 
research will investigate the viability of implementing proactive planning as the ‘new normal’ 
for thinking and planning around natural hazards and how this can facilitate better outcomes. 
Additionally, the research will investigate the current state of public participation and 
community engagement in the hazard space in New Zealand and investigate the potential role 
this could take in the hazard and emergency management context and the benefits this can 
bring to the framework as a whole. Alongside public participation with the general public, the 
research will explore the role Māori Environmental Knowledge (MEK) can and should have in 
the development of best practice for hazard and emergency management. 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
 The aim of this research is to provide an assessment of the current hazard and 
emergency management framework using the past decade of serious earthquakes as the 
grounding of the research and specifically looking into the potential role for proactive planning, 
enhanced public participation and MEK in producing best practice and developing sustainable 
and risk resilient communities in the future. Despite the major earthquakes that New Zealand 
has experienced in the last decade, contemporary literature in this country has commented on 
the need to address the state of the hazard and emergency management framework prior to 
these events. For example, Saunders and Becker (2007) advocated for proactive planning as a 
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method to address and mitigate the worsening impacts of natural events on communities, 
additionally, Saunders et al. (2007) evaluated the link between he RMA and the CDEMA and 
clearly concluded that there was a disconnect between the two Acts that is producing 
management and development outcomes that put were not optimal for reducing the risks and 
potential impacts of natural events across New Zealand. Coinciding with the RMA reform of 
2017 which formally recognised the management of natural hazards as a matter of national 
importance under Section 6(h), this research is well positioned to analyse the effect that this 
change has had on the management of hazards and provide an overview if the RMA reforms 
have been a significant catalyst for change or if more is needed to be done. Furthermore, the 
occurrence of the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes have been hugely significant events 
with regard to earthquake and hazard science. The Christchurch earthquake has forced 
increased consideration of events in areas categorised as ‘low-risk’, as prior to the Christchurch 
earthquake sequence, that was the classification of much of Canterbury (McClure et al., 2015), 
as well as the nature of earthquakes themselves, as Kaikōura earthquake is regarded as one of 
the most complex earthquakes ever recorded and was caused a shift in knowledge on the 
nature of earthquake processes and their potential effects (Dellow et al., 2017; Hamling et al., 
2017). 
 Contemporary literature has suggested for an extended period of time that the hazard 
and emergency management framework in New Zealand needs to be addressed to produce 
better outcomes and pursue the establishment of best practice. This research is situated in a 
time that can comment on the effects of recent application of the framework after the 
Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes and reflect on the effect of the 2017 RMA reforms that 
have heightened the importance of natural hazard and emergency management. The research 
intends to suggest what, if anything, should be done in the future to ensure that the framework 
is operating under best practice for the development of sustainable and resilient communities. 
 
1.3 Research Question, Aim and Objectives 
 
 This research has been grounded by the following research question, aim and 
objectives, these have been developed to ascertain the pathways to take for hazard and 




 To what extent can pre-event recovery planning principles retrofit the current hazard 




 Interrogate the effects of and planning response to the 2010 Christchurch earthquake 
sequence and 2016 Kaikōura earthquake against pre-event recovery planning principles to 
establish how this can inform best practice in the future. 
 In order to achieve the research aim and answer the research question, three research 
objectives have been developed that have been designed to define the broader scope of the 
objective and offer a structure for the presentation of the results and discussion. 
 
Research Objectives  
Table 1.1 – Research Objectives 
Objective One Explore the nature of both hazards, and hazard management in New 
Zealand to establish the effective of the current hazard and emergency 
management framework 
Objective Two Investigate the principles of pre-event recovery planning with an 
emphasis on public participation and MEK to understand how this can be 
assimilated into effective, long-term recovery 
Objective Three Analyse the options and recommendations observed through the 
research as ways to implement best practice in the hazard and 
emergency management framework 
Table 1.1 - Research Objectives 
 The first research objective seeks to establish the positive and negative aspects of the 
hazard and emergency management framework in its current form, this will be done through 
the collection of primary data and will help inform the recommendations that round out the 
research. The second research objective seeks to analyse further principles of pre-event 
recovery planning through a look at public participation and MEK, similar to research objective 
one, this will be informed through primary research. The final research objective will analyse 
the results from the primary research and convey the problematic areas of the hazard 
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management framework as described by the research’s key informants and will highlight the 
recommendations they have made in regard to attaining best practice. It is important to note 
that these recommendations from the primary data are not the recommendations of the 
research, rather the culmination of the primary data. The research recommendations and 
conclusions will be delivered in full in chapter six. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
 This research is made up of six chapters including this chapter which presents the 
rationale and grounding of the research and presents the research question, aim and 
objectives. The second chapter contains the literature review, which provides the context for 
the research as well as analysing the current body of knowledge surrounding hazard and 
emergency management in New Zealand. It will cover natural hazards, their effects and the 
range of these in a global context, a more in-depth look at earthquakes in particular will be 
taken before exploring the application of hazard management in New Zealand, before finally 
looking into public participation and MEK in the hazard and emergency management context. 
Chapter Three describes the methodology of the research; it will cover qualitative research 
methods and outline the data analysis methods used with regard to both the primary and 
secondary data. Chapter Four analyses the legislation that converges to create the hazard and 
emergency management framework in New Zealand, looking at both statutory and non-
statutory documents the chapter looks at the RMA, the CDEMA as statutory documents. 
Commentary on the role of non-statutory documents follows in the form of the National 
Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 
and other local level documents, such as Regional Plans and Policy Statements and CDEM 
Group Plans. The results and discussion of the research are presented within Chapter Five. This 
chapter analyses the findings from the research and will frame these with reference to the 
literature reviewed in Chapter Two. The threads of the different strands of the research are 
drawn together in Chapter Six which provide the recommendations and conclusions of the 
report and will address the research rationale and address the effectiveness of the research to 
contribute to the literature around hazard and emergency management in New Zealand. 
 
 6 




 Pearce (2003) indicates that historically, ‘disaster management planning’ exists outside 
the bounds and requirements of everyday, land-use planning and general resource 
management, and that issues of the scale of natural hazards fall within the scope of central 
government and a ‘para-military’ perspective. Yet, natural hazards of every description and on 
varying scales and intensities affect us all. Saunders and Becker (2015) advocate for essentially 
the opposite, where hazard planning should exist as a primary responsibility and requirement 
for a range of agencies, chief among these, local government to monitor, respond and prepare 
for natural events; ‘Pre-event recovery planning can be one way of boosting long term 
sustainability and overall resilience, instead of relying on short term resilience to see a 
community through a disaster period’ (Saunders and Becker, 2015). This chapter explores 
firstly literature defining natural disasters and the multiple complexities that they produce 
often beyond the initial event, before looking into the Kaikōura 2016 earthquake specifically 
and hazard management methods, with specific reference to public participation and Māori 
Environmental Knowledge (MEK). The current body of knowledge regarding recovery is then 
discussed before an interrogation of the current planning framework in New Zealand is 
undertaken. This chapter is of critical importance as it grounds the research and generates the 
discussion by which new ideas and theories can be generated around hazard management to 
fulfil the aim of the research. 
 
2.2 Natural Hazards 
 
 The concept of what constitutes a ‘hazard’ has been the focus of countless discussions 
and significant amounts of prominent literature for centuries, King, Goff and Skipper (2007) 
denote the importance that an understanding of natural hazards had historically, and 
continues to inform Māori culture and MEK. Natural hazards are inherently complex in 
essence, natural processes intertwine and are adversely affected by one another, one simply 
must observe the multiplicity of effects an earthquake produces to recognise this (Crozier, 
2005). Further complexities arise when considering the effect that these events have on 
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humans, through a range of spheres. From the economy to social health, from cultural well-
being to the strength of infrastructure and the lives and livelihoods of humans (Orchiston, 
2012). In the interest of simplicity, Crozier and Glade (2005) offer the following ‘non-technical’ 
definition of a hazard; ‘[P]rocesses and situations, actions and non-actions that have the 
potential to bring about damage, loss or other adverse effects to those attributes valued by 
mankind.’ Similarly, and more relevant in a legislative and contextual sense, the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM, 2002) defines a hazard as ‘something that may 
cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of an emergency’. Further, an emergency, as 
defined within the CDEMA encompasses the totality of the major natural hazards that New 
Zealand is reasonably exposed to. 
 Natural hazards operate on a scale that does not discriminate neither through time nor 
space. Natural events / disasters exist as a fundamental cycle for life on earth, just as tectonic 
movement and mountain forming processes have made habitation on earth possible, they are 
also responsible for earthquakes which expose us as humans to high levels of hazardous 
exposure (Shultz et al., 2013). Figure 2.1 displays predictive modelling composed by Shi, Yang 
and Xu (2016) regarding the global exposure that humans have to natural hazards. The map 
clearly displays the global scale of hazards have while they increase in both size and frequency, 
coinciding with the rapid urbanisation of many countries, where from 2007, there were more 
Figure 1 Global expected annual population risk for multiple hazards (2020 - 2030) 
Figure 2.1 – Global expected annual population risk for multiple natural hazards (2020 – 2030) 
Source – (Shi, Yang a d Xu, 2016: 58) 
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people living in urban centres than on rural lands, the risk of natural hazards is ever-increasing 
(Huppert and Sparks, 2006; Shi, Yang and Xu, 2006).  
 Different geographical areas are subject to different levels of hazards, both in 
frequency and intensity, while North America is heavily exposed to destructive storm events, 
conversely, Africa is frequently threatened by droughts and flooding. The threats and 
management requirements for each of these areas’ present stark differences, contending 
significant issues (Nations, 2008). However, it is important to note that the reporting of hazards 
is not uniform. Both hazard reporting as well as actual effects of hazards in countries and 
regions of lower socioeconomic status are often under-reported and the effects faced by 
populations are often much higher than is portrayed (Nations, 2008).  
 
 Knowledge regarding the spatial distribution of hazards and the process that govern 
and drive them has grown exponentially throughout time. Harmsworth and Raynor (2005) and 
King, Goff and Skipper (2007) offer an intrinsic understanding and appreciation of natural 
hazards has persisted through Māori culture and can act to complement modern scientific 
knowledge of natural hazards such as geological mapping, improved recognition and 
understanding of tectonic processes, movements and faulting and social indicators such as 
Trauma Signature Analysis (TSIG) (McInnes 2005; Shultz et al., 2013; Saunders and Becker, 
2015). However, the risk and vulnerability presented to humans remains contentious, this 
problem is presented to disaster planning and management to facilitate resilience and 
Figure 2.2 Types and frequencies of natural disasters across global regions from 1970 - 2010 
Figure 2.2 – Types and frequencies of natural disasters across global regions from 1970 – 2010 
Source – (Nations, 2010: 28) 
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sustainability for individuals, communities and nations in the face of natural hazards (Crozier, 
2005). As previously discussed, an emergency under the CDEM Act (2002) is declared only 
when an event either threatens the failure or disruption to an emergency service or lifeline 
utility, causes or may cause the loss of life or injury, or endangers the safety of the public or of 
property and that which cannot be dealt with by emergency services. As such, natural events 
and processes only culminate into a ‘disaster’ or ‘hazard’ when these events have, or have to 
the potential to adversely affect humans, as Smith (2006) states, ‘[w]hether a natural event is 
a disaster or not depends ultimately, … on its location’.  
 Under this notion, the effect of a natural event, and the classification of such an event 
as a ‘hazard’ or ‘disaster’ manifests directly into the vulnerability and risk levels imposed on a 
community (Adie, 2001; Smith, 2006). Accordingly, the ‘risk triangle’ (Figure 2.3) as developed 
by Crichton (1999) expresses the equation: 
 
R(isk) = H(azard) x (E)xposure x (V)ulnerability 
  
This concept has been widely used and accepted within modern research and literature 
governing the planning and management of natural hazards (Phibbs et al., 2015; Saunders and 
Becker, 2015). Vulnerability when assessing natural hazards has been clearly defined within 
the ‘Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’ where; ‘The conditions determined by the 
physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes, which increase the 
susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards’ (United Nations, 2015). While this has 







Figure 2.3 – The ‘Risk Triangle’ 
Source – (Crichton, 1999) 
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how vulnerability dictates the effects of disasters has been realised for some time through 
interrogations of natural events. Highlighting this identification of vulnerabilities is the parallel 
acknowledgement that in order to overcome the vulnerabilities of hazards, communities must 
foster the interaction and reconciliation of the well-beings, physical, social, economic, 
environmental and cultural, in the critical pursuit of sustainable development (Campbell, 1996; 
Saunders and Becker, 2015). Vulnerabilities vary between space and place, as well as variations 
of the risk that develop with different hazards. For example, the risks associated with droughts 
such as prolonged famine and disease (Roncoli, Ingram and Kirshen, 2001), while earthquakes 
present instantaneous effects wherein the initial effects can be devastating, while still 
potentially applying longstanding instabilities to land, slopes and infrastructure (Hancox, Perrin 
and Dellow, 1997; Crozier, 2005; McCloskey, Nalbant and Steacy, 2005). Thus, no one 
community experiences the same risks and vulnerabilities. Community vulnerabilities are 
determined by a wide range of factors including micro-level factors such as gender, age and 
health, which are governed by more broad influences such as the social, cultural, political and 
economic environments that embody different areas (Crozier, 2005; Pitilakis et al., 2006). A 
number of natural hazards, such as earthquakes impose a multiplicity of both additional 
hazards themselves, such as landsliding (Crozier, 2005), and risks to a population. These risks 
are then governed by the environments they appear in; therefore, any ‘natural’ disaster is 
confined to the impact society places on it (Birkland, 2006). 
 In this sense, the importance of building resilient and sustainable communities is 
imperative to develop positive outcomes under the intense strain that is applied when exposed 
to a natural hazard. The term ‘resilience’ is increasingly being used in a multitude of contexts, 
within the context of natural hazards, it is often coupled with ‘sustainable’ and ‘resilience 
planning’, however, as Saunders and Becker (2015) claim, a resilient community is not always 
a sustainable one, and resilience in isolation of sustainability often results in ineffective 
development outcomes despite the two terms often being used interchangeably in recent 
times. Contestation surrounding ‘sustainable development’ has been widespread where many 
definitions and criteria have been made in attempts to quantify what qualifies as ‘sustainable’. 
This topic has been popularised in many academic fields; sustainable development within the 
political sphere (Adger and Jordan, 2009), planning around natural hazards and emergency 
management, (Berke, 1995; Hancox, Perrin and Dellow, 1997; Crozier and Glade, 2005; Crozier, 
2005; Orchiston, 2012) emergent in the rapidly growing field of green urbanism and ‘urban 
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sustainability’ (Campbell, 1996; Beatley, 2011; Beatley, 2012). The widely accepted working 
definition of what constitutes sustainable management appears in the Brundtland report 
which states; ‘… meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland, 1987). More recently however, 
within the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015, which then translated into the following 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030 the following definition is offered; 
‘The sustainability of development depends on its ability to prevent new risk creation and the 
reduction of existing risks (Aitsi-Selmi, 2016). A pragmatic definition for the context of New 
Zealand can be found within Part 2, Section 5(b) of the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991. 
 In the past, resilience has been described as the ability to ‘bounce-back’ from a disaster 
(Klein, Nicholls and Thomalla, 2003). This becomes problematic as ‘bouncing-back’ from a 
disaster implies resilience is a short-term phenomenon that is limited to the immediate and 
short-term phases of recovery which are, in all actuality, extensive and in-depth processes 
(Saunders and Becker, 2015). More recently, the concept of resilience has extended from the 
previously adopted ‘bounce-back’ mechanics to implementing an adaptive capacity from the 
individual to community level (Klien, Nicholls and Thomalla, 2003; Saunders and Becker, 2015). 
Having an adaptive capacity means that individuals, communities and institutions are able to 
readily adapt to adverse circumstances, such as when afflicted with a disaster. The adaptation 
that is forced to occur during a disaster does not simply facilitate processes to ‘bounce-back’, 
but requires communities to evolve from their former state to deal with the immediate 
changing circumstances associated with short-term disaster recovery as well as evolving to 
adapt to modified circumstances that have arisen due to a disaster, for example, prolonged 
slope instability and landsliding after a significant earthquake event (Crozier, 2005; Saunders 
and Becker, 2015).  
 Land-use planning has been identified as one of the measures that can meaningfully 
contribute to the long-term resilience and sustainability of a community (Paton, 2013). Land-
use planning has an impact on the recovery of communities and societies throughout the 
entire timeline and signature of a disaster, as prior to an event actually taking place land-use 
planning has a control through zoning as to the eventual effects of an event (Paton, 2013). The 
majority of the influence that land-use planning has on disaster recovery, however, falls within 
the second timeframe, which can last from days to weeks to months to years (Schwab et al., 
1998). Land-use planning catalyses the implementation of adaptive measures that contribute 
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to the long-term resilience and sustainability of a community such as the retiring and re-zoning 
of land that are more aligned with the concept of sustainable development (Schwab et al., 
1998; Saunders and Becker, 2015). This is of critical importance for the wider success of 
disaster recovery, it is this period when long-term resilience and sustainability are tested and 
become intertwined as communities require the ability to become more adaptable to future 
adverse events (resilience) while ensuring that future generations can survive and thrive 
(sustainability) over long time frames (Saunders and Becker, 2015). Further, it is important to 
meaningfully engage the public in formulating and implementing land-use planning options 
and recovery plans in general. This serves to enhance community buy-in and administer a level 
of pride and appreciation for the governing legislation (Paton, 2013; Saunders and Becker, 
2015). Considering both the importance and contentious nature public participation in disaster 
planning and recovery, this topic will be covered more comprehensively in a future section of 
the literature review.  
 The multiplicity of events that often coincide with the occurrence of a natural hazard 
presents another challenge for hazard management, emergency management and land-use 
planning in general that test the resilience and sustainability of a community. The multiple 
effects of hazards are not limited to hazards catalysing the offset of additional threats, such as 
severe landsliding as a result of earthquakes, but these compounding effects extend across 
sectors which serves to apply additional pressures on humans (Crozier, 2005). For example, an 
earthquake event can produce severe ground shaking and cause widespread destruction of 
human infrastructure, in the form of buildings and lifeline utilities. Additionally, the subsequent 
landsliding that may occur can have profound impacts on the agricultural industry through the 
loss of land, alongside this, landsliding presents a very real risk of flooding through the creation 
of landslide dams that produces further threats (Crozier, 2005; Hamling et al., 2017). The 
pressures that accumulate as a result of the multiplicity of events and dangers that natural 
hazards present to both humans and land will be discussed at more length during the next 








 Across the world, humans experience an estimated 1 million earthquakes every year, 
however, many of these earthquakes are too small or too deep to be felt by humans and even 
fewer are considered ‘major earthquakes’ (Keller and Blodgett, 2008), despite this, the effects 
of the major earthquakes can be devastating. Earthquakes are a hazard that occur through the 
process of faulting, this process can be compared to the sliding of one rough board past 
another (Keller and Blodgett, 2008). High levels of friction occur when these plates move past 
each other, when the stresses on the plates exceeds their ability to withstand it, the rock 
ruptures along a fault and an earthquake occurs (Keller and Blodgett, 2008). New Zealand is 
located right on the plate boundary of the Pacific Plate and the Australian Plate (Figure 2.4). 
This boundary is known as the ‘Pacific Rim’, and in connection with the formation of many of 
the world’s largest and most active volcanoes, this boundary is also known as the ‘Pacific Ring 
of Fire’. This area is responsible for 81 percent of the largest earthquakes ever recorded (Jang 
et al., 2016).  
 
Faults are breaks in the earth’s crust; primary fault lines exist along the plate 
boundaries of the world’s major plates; however, fault lines are not exclusively determined by 
Figure 2.4 – Global Plate Boundaries 
Source – (GNS Science, 2020c) 
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plate boundaries. In the New Zealand context, the plate boundary between the Pacific Plate 
and the Australian Plate has created the Alpine Fault, and through this, the creation of the 
Southern Alps mountain range. New Zealand plate tectonics are characterised by the collision 
between the Pacific Plate and the Australian Plate, this is a complex plate boundary where two 
subduction zones occur at the bottom of the South Island with the Puysegur subduction system 
and the Hikurangi subduction system in the north (GNS Science, 2020d). In the south, the 
Australian Plate subducts under the Pacific Plate while the opposite occurs in the north where 
the plates grind past each other to create the Alpine Fault (GNS Science, 2020d). Leitner et al., 
(2001) identifies that the Alpine Fault has been responsible for major earthquakes in the past, 
the last being around the year 1720, and that is has the potential to rupture and cause a 
devastating earthquake that will affect much of the South Island. Despite this, the most 
devastating earthquake events in recent times in New Zealand have occurred on internal faults 
within the Pacific Plate rather than the Alpine Fault itself, the Christchurch earthquake of 2010 
occurred on a fault that was previously unknown now named the ‘Greendale Fault’ (Gledhill, 
2011). This poses considerable threats to hazard management as earthquakes are already 
notoriously hard to predict, this task is made substantially more difficult as earthquakes may 
occur on faults that we do not know exist. The location of an earthquake is also very important 
when considering the risk it can place on humans and the land. New Zealand is characterised 
by very active tectonic movement and processes, and through this, the country is exposed to 
a number of earthquakes every year, however the spatial distribution of these earthquakes 
contributes to the magnitude of the hazard placed on humans. Chen et al., (2003) identify the 
southern subduction zone (Puysegur) of the Pacific and Australian Plates as creating a high 
area of seismic activity as well as the subduction zone in the north (Hikurangi). While these 
areas are both very active in terms of amounts of movement each year, the hazard potential 
for an earthquake occurring at the Puysegur subduction zone is reduced due to its isolation 
from heavily populated areas (Chen et al., 2003). 
 Location is an important control on the impact that an earthquake can have on the 
environment, however, the size and depth of an earthquake is similarly as vital when 
considering the effects that an earthquake event can have on humans and the environment. 
Keller and Blodgett (2008) describe three major controls that determine the type of shaking 
experienced in an earthquake, and the factors governing how destructive an event will be, 
there are; earthquake magnitude, location (in relation to the epicentre), and the local soil and 
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rock conditions. The epicentre of an earthquake is the point on the earth’s surface, this is 
important for identifying spatially where the earthquake will have impact while the focus 
measures the depth of an earthquake (Keller and Blodgett, 2008). The focus (depth) of an 
earthquake contributes greatly to the force of the event and the shaking that will be felt on 
the ground. The potential for shallow earthquakes changes across New Zealand, the Puysegur 
Trench off the South-west coast of New Zealand is characterised by steep subduction of the 
Australian Plate under the Pacific Plate which typically produces deep earthquakes that 
produce less effects on the surface, while in the Hikurangi Margin, as the subduction zone is 
not as deep and steep, the potential for shallow, destructive earthquakes is increased (Furlong 
and Kamp, 2009).  
 Earthquake sizes are measured from the epicentre, while the ‘Moment Magnitude’ 
scale provides quantitative way of comparing multiple earthquakes (Keller and Blodgett, 2008). 
The Richter Scale was developed initially by Charles Richter in order to accurately measure and 
compare earthquakes in Southern California. The scale is determined from an estimate of the 
area that ruptured along a fault plane during a quake, combined with the amount of movement 
or slippage experienced along the fault itself and the rigidity of the rocks near the focus of the 
quake (Gutenburg and Richter, 1942; Keller and Blodgett, 2008). The Richter scale is a base-10 
logarithmic scale as displayed on Table 2.1 below (GNS Science, 2020b). The designation of a 
level of magnitude for an earthquake often provides misconception. The scale operates 
logarithmically where a single unit change in magnitude correlates to 10 times increase in 
Table 2.1 – The Richter Scale 
Source – (GNS Science, 2020a) 
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ground motion change and around 32 times increase in the amount of energy increased by an 
earthquake event (Keller and Blodgett, 2008).  
 Despite this, as stated earlier, the ground felt impact and overall power of an 
earthquake is largely governed by the depth of an earthquake, as such, measures of magnitude 
often fail to recognise the physical consequences and intensity that is felt on the ground, such 
as the capacity for the event to cause widespread destruction and damage to both the natural 
infrastructure, such as hillslopes, and human infrastructure such as buildings (Orchiston, 2012).  
Consequently, the ‘Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale’ (MMIS) (Table 2.2) has been developed 
to categorise the physical effects of earthquakes as they are felt on the ground, as opposed to 
how they are represented by value of magnitude and offer a more qualitative measurement 
of earthquake events. Keller and Blodgett (2008) convey the necessity of the MMIS where a 
singular earthquake event, such as the 1971 Sylmar earthquake in the San Fernando Valley in 
California had a magnitude of 6.7, however the intensity varied from MM1 to MM11 
depending on proximity to the epicentre and the local geological conditions.  
Table 2.2 – Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (simplified) 
Source – (GNS Science, 2020b) 
 17 
The substantial discrepancies when measuring and evaluating earthquakes provides 
some issues for land use planning and emergency management. Comprehensive analysis and 
an in-depth understanding must be held of local geological conditions, which includes 
acknowledgement of historical land uses and an understanding of local faulting (Gutenburg 
and Richter, 1942; Keller and Blodgett, 2008). While wide assumptions can be made which 
consider the larger and more shallow the earthquake, the more intense and destructive the 
shaking is and the more damage that is inflicted upon humans, heavy intricacies lie within the 
natural environment. In the case of Christchurch and the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, damage 
was felt widely, however, the most severe impacts were pinpointed in areas that were affected 
by specific underlying geological conditions. Liquefaction plagued much of the inner city of 
Christchurch inflicted through the historic unstable land type on the floodplains of the Avon 
River (Cubrinovski, Henderson and Bradley, 2012), rockfalls afflicted the steep slopes of the 
Port Hills which had its stability compromised with each aftershock (Saunders and Becker, 
2015). Similarly, slope instability that adversely effected the environment during the impact of 
an earthquake, and continues to pose serious threats in the future around landsliding and 
additional mass movement events triggering more failures has been attributed to Kaikōura and 
the surrounding environment as a result of the 2016 earthquake (Hamling et al., 2017). 
Significant landsliding and landslide dams typified the Kaikōura event considering the steep 
topography of the area and the size and intensity of the event at Magnitude 7.8 and MMIS 
values of 8 near the fault rupture and extended areas experiencing shaking as intense a MM 6 
-7 (GeoNet, 2016; Hamling et al., 2017). The severity of landsliding, as well as considerable 
other factors, such as the porosity and water holding capacity of landslide dams as a result of 
the earthquake were largely governed by local geological conditions (Dellow et al., 2017). The 
faults that ruptured during the earthquake occurred in two geologically and geotechnically 
distinct areas where landsliding events comprised of each different material provided differing 
results and offered differing hazards of their own (Dellow et al., 2017). The Neogene 
sedimentary rocks created landslide dams that were largely impervious to water. These dams 
held back large quantities of water in the high country around Kaikōura which threatened 
serious flooding events upon catastrophic breach, while the Torlesse Greywacke landslide 
dams were notorious permeable and did not provide the capacity for overtopped dams but 
released large amounts of sediments through high country streams in the immediate to short 
term time frame after the initial quake (Dellow et al., 2017).  
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 While earthquakes and the hazards that they produce are undoubtedly prolific and are 
dangerous natural events that pose serious threats to human lives, infrastructure and the 
natural environment, shaking is not the only cause of death and damage. Many earthquakes, 
as briefly touched on above, cause other hazards and are an excellent example of how hazards 
and inherently linked to other hazards (Keller and Blodgett, 2008). Natural events present what 
Keller and Blodgett (2008) term ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ effects. Primary effects when 
considering earthquakes are those that are directly caused and linked to tectonic movement 
and fault rupturing that cause ground shaking, mass movement and displacement etc. 
Secondary effects are those that occur only as a result to the primary effects of an earthquake, 
the potential secondary effects of an earthquake are vast, they can include; liquefaction, 
landslides, fires, tsunamis and disease (Crozier, 2005; Keller and Blodgett, 2008; Orchiston, 
2012; Saunders and Becker, 2015; Dellow et al., 2017). The linked nature of natural hazards 
and the deadly and damaging combination that they can execute onto humans has occurred 
recently and catastrophically within New Zealand. In on Monday 14th of November 2016 a 
Magnitude 7.8 earthquake that produced a maximum value of 9 on the MMIS (Hamling et al., 
2017). The epicentre of the Kaikōura earthquake struck just 15km north-east of the small rural 
township of Culverden. The event denotes the strongest earthquake that has afflicted the 
North Canterbury region in the last 150 years, and regarding readings of Magnitude, it 
produced a reading of 0.7 of a magnitude higher than the 2010 earthquake and an imposing 
1.5 magnitude higher than the devastating 2011 Christchurch quake, we already know through 
Keller and Blodgett (2008) that readings of magnitude are longitudinal and that one full order 
of magnitude higher equates to 10 fold change in ground motion and around 32 times 
increased energy release, all of which speak to acknowledging that this was in no way, an 
insignificant event. However, the strength and intensity of the earthquake were not the only 
significant impacts of this event, in fact, the Kaikōura earthquake is widely regarded as one of 
the most complex earthquakes ever recorded with modern instruments and the most 
multifaceted earthquake ever studied (Dellow et al., 2017; Hamling et al., 2017). The initial 
rupture is known to have propagated northward for more than 170kms along both mapped 
and unmapped faults before continuing offshore from the northeast tip of the South Island, 
initial estimates offered that in total the quake ruptured six faults in total (Dellow et al., 2017). 
While earthquakes that rupture multiple faults are not unheard of, the immense complexity 
regarding the Kaikōura earthquake is held when the most up-to-date knowledge confirms that 
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the quake ruptured ‘at least 21 faults’ (Wang et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2018).  However, it is not 
just the sheer numbers of faults that were ruptured during the event that has complicated 
things, Wang et al. (2018) convey that a combination of strike-slip, reverse and oblique-slip 
faults all occurred during the initial event that has challenged the previous understanding of 
the operation of earthquakes.  
 The Kaikōura earthquake produced significant levels of ground shaking, and in the 
surrounding high country, multiple substantial landslides were produced as a result (Hamling 
et al., 2017). Tens of thousands of landslides of varying sizes were generated from the initial 
earthquake over an area of 10,000km2, with the largest landslides being isolated to an area of 
3500km2 surrounding the epicentre (Villeneuve et al., 2017). It was later determined that the 
concentrations of the most severe landslides were directly correlated to major fault ruptures 
that were produced from the initial rupture in the Marlborough Fault System (Dellow et al., 
2017). Of these 10 thousand earthquake generated landslides, Dellow et al. (2017) asserts that 
there were more than 200 slips that could be considered ‘significant’. The significance of these 
landslides was determined by their capacity to block valleys with debris, many of which caused 
‘landslide dams’. Considering the topography of the area, there is very scarce human 
habitation and interaction, as such, while there were tragically two deaths as a result of the 
earthquake, considering much of the impact was isolated to high-country areas, only a couple 
of houses were damaged (Hamling et al., 2017). However, in the absence of direct and severe 
damage to humans, the impacts of the earthquake and the associated landslides presented 
further threats, in particular, the formation of landslide dams.  
Further, exclusive to all the primary and secondary effects that an earthquake can 
generate, earthquake-generated stress changes, may enhance or diminish, the tectonic load 
applied onto another fault, either moving it closer to, or further from, failure (Kilb, Gomberg 
and Bodin, 2000). The transient and oscillatory stresses that an initial quake can apply to a fault 
zone often do not result in a permanent alteration of a tectonically active area, however, it can 
catalyse the creation of aftershocks (Kilb, Gomberg and Bodin, 2000). These aftershocks can 
create substantial additional significant effects on an environment that is already heavily 
compromised. A catastrophic example of this can be found when examining the Christchurch 
earthquake sequence with the initial rupture in 2010. This 7.1 magnitude earthquake that 
ruptured the previously unknown Greendale Fault caused significant ground shaking that, in 
places, reached 10 on the MMIS (Cubrinovski, Henderson and Bradley, 2012). Alongside the 
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intense shaking, significant ‘secondary’ effects were felt, with widespread liquefaction, mass 
movement resulting in vertical displacement and landsliding, with longstanding stability issues 
(Cubrinovski, Henderson and Bradley, 2012). The initial ‘Darfield Earthquake’ in 2010 altered 
the physical and built environment in Christchurch in a very significant manner, to the extent 
that an aftershock to the main quake, a 6.3 Magnitude earthquake that produced the most 
intense ground shaking levels ever recorded in New Zealand afflicted the compromised 
environment and resulted in the loss of 185 lives and catastrophic failures of the physical and 
built environment (Cubrinovski, Henderson and Bradley, 2012). Alongside the ‘secondary’ 
effects as described by Keller and Blodgett (2008) such as liquefaction and landsliding plagued 
the city (Saunders and Becker, 2015). The land use and emergency management, response and 
recovery issues that earthquakes and the multiplicity of events that they cause, including the 
often-extensive aftershock sequences are immense. Saunders and Becker (2015) state that 
communities must build resilience to natural events such as earthquakes in order to effectively 
recover and continue to grow and develop once the immediate impacts of an event have been 
survived alongside developing sustainability to ensure that communities do not simply ‘bounce 
back’ from disasters but build upon an adaptive capacity in order to create better outcomes 
disaster management outcomes in the future.  
Considering this, recovery planning could be heavily informed with pre-event recovery 
planning and the principles that are underpinned this theory. Longer term recovery / 
preparedness measures would be prudent to implement across New Zealand where we are 
exposed to such high levels of natural hazards nationally, such as high seismic activity 
characterising large portions of the country, volcanic activity, immense levels of urban areas 
built upon floodplains etc. (Saunders and Becker, 2015). The principles and foundations upon 
which pre-disaster / pre-event recovery planning are discussed by Becker and Saunders (2007) 
specifically within the New Zealand context. Pre-planning for recovery requires a 
comprehensive understanding of hazards that may afflict a community / an area but provides 
significant benefits not only for resilience and sustainability of communities, while providing 
the means to realise substantial benefits across a range of sectors, from economic security to 
environmental protection, from cultural protection to social empowerment. Becker and 
Saunders (2007) assert a range of benefits of implementing pre-event recovery planning; 
allows for a transition from reactive planning, which can lead to poor decision-making, to 
planning proactively. This allows for sustainability principles to be implemented, community 
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involvement and equity can be introduced, recovery actions are able to be rolled out 
immediately when needed, landowners are made aware of potential hazards and risks and the 
consenting process can be fast-tracked in a range of situations among many other benefits 
(Becker and Saunders, 2007). The current approach to recovery and emergency management 
planning in general will be acknowledged at more length in the following section ‘Knowledge 
in Action’. 
 
2.4 Knowledge in Action 
 
 The process of disaster recovery in New Zealand is largely informed by the 4-step 
process known as the ‘4R’s’ (reduction, readiness, response and recovery) which is present 
within the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 which principally drives emergency 
management in New Zealand (Becker and Saunders, 2007). The 4R’s account for each of the 
different stages that must be addressed in order to achieve appropriate and full disaster and 
emergency management, these being reduction, readiness, response and recovery (CDEM, 
2002; Becker and Saunders, 2007). Naturally, pre-event recovery planning falls mostly within 
the scope of the reduction phase, where a priority exists within reducing risks that are incurred 
by communities, however, by extension, effective implementation of pre-event recovery 
planning will make significant contributions towards the other 3 phases of readiness, response 
and recovery (Becker and Saunders, 2007; Orchiston, 2012). As all regions in New Zealand are 
susceptible to some level of disaster, Becker and Saunders (2007) identify that ideally, recovery 
should attempt to not only provide for, but endorse the adoption and incorporation of 
sustainability principles in every decision that is made. Pre-event recovery planning allows for 
these decisions to be made more thoughtfully, where in the absence of the chaos and panic 
that immediately follows any natural disaster, these decisions can be obscured and harder to 
make for those that are in the position of making those decisions.  
 Pre-event recovery planning and emergency management more generally requires an 
in-depth and comprehensive understanding of natural processes and the natural events / 
disasters that occur as a result of these processes (McInnes, 2005; Becker and Saunders, 2007). 
The knowledge base that acts to inform pre-event recovery planning must not only provide 
acknowledgement and account for all the types of natural event / hazard that may be present 
in the area and have the capacity to affect the land and its inhabitants, but it must also 
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acknowledge and provide for the wide range of effects that will eventuate from these hazards. 
For example, a flooding hazard may involve inundation of urban areas, such as homes and 
businesses, but it may also result in slope failures etc. (Berke and Campanella, 2006). Becker 
and Saunders (2007) provide the methodology of pre-event land use recovery planning that 
seeks to inform the best practice for pre-event recovery planning, the methodology is 
displayed below through Figure 2.5. 
  
Figure 2.5 – Pre-event Recovery Planning for Land-use – A Methodology. 
Source – (Becker and Saunders, 2007). 
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 As we as humans expand more and more into marginal areas as demand for land grows, 
into areas that were previously avoided, an increased demand has been placed on how to best 
avoid hazards (Berke and Campanella, 2006). However, the purpose of pre-event disaster 
planning is to avoid the heavily reliance on hard mitigation and engineering measures as the 
sole solutions to hazards and risks, but foremost, to avoid hazardous areas in the first place, 
and if not, to engage in ways which foster proactive planning rather than reactive planning, 
and by doing so, creating the best possible solutions and decision-making environment for now 
and the future (Berke and Campanella, 2006; Becker and Saunders, 2007). In the New Zealand 
context, Becker and Saunders (2007) offer that the principles and the methodology behind the 
notion of pre-event recovery planning should be fully incorporated into the current framework 
for hazard and emergency management in New Zealand. This framework includes Regional and 
District Plans; Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plans; Long Term Council 
Community Plans; Asset Management Plans; structure plans; growth strategies as well as a 
wide range of other non-statutory documents, strategies and plans that contribute to the 
overall development of the field (Becker and Saunders, 2007). However, while implementing 
them into the framework is one thing, ensuring that they are adopted appropriately and 
effectively to provide the best outcomes and realise best practice is another. There should be 
meaningful and productive communication between different agencies and stakeholders that 
help administer disaster management and recovery planning as well as central and local 
government (Becker and Saunders, 2007). This helps to ensure that no hazard, no matter how 
small the risk is, gets overlooked. In addition, communication between different agencies and 
stakeholders allows for a greater accumulation of knowledge and perspectives that will further 
promote the most appropriate measures are put in place and decisions are made (Berke and 
Campanella, 2006; Norman, 2006; Becker and Saunders, 2007; Sankaran et al., 2014). Further 
details and evidence of creating enhanced and effective decision making through the public 
participation process as well as acknowledging and tapping into Māori Environmental 
Knowledge (MEK) will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
2.4.1 Public Participation 
 
 With disasters, and in turn, disaster management asserting itself as one of planning 
primary concerns on a global scale, but also with specific reference to New Zealand in the last 
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decade, the need to build resilient and sustainable communities has become more and more 
important (Saunders and Becker, 2015; Kwok et al., 2016).  Coles and Buckle (2004) state; 
‘Effective recovery can only be achieved where the affected community participates fully in the 
recovery process and where it has the capacity, skills and knowledge to make its participation 
meaningful’ (Coles and Buckle, 2004: p. 6). The very notion of public participation to facilitate 
effective and meaningful recovery efforts within and for communities is inherently linked with 
community resilience and sustainability (Coles and Buckle, 2004; Becker et al.,2011; Love and 
Vallance, 2013; Saunders and Becker, 2015; Kwok et al., 2016). Resilience exists as a multi-
dimensional attribute that in its different forms contributes in various but equally important 
ways to disaster recovery (Coles and Buckle, 2004). Resilience measures can be quantified by 
evaluating a societies capacity to adapt to challenges born from natural events and disasters 
in the period before, during and after (Kwok et al., 2016). While there is a wide range of 
classifications and assessments in which to gauge the resilience and sustainability levels of any 
given community, the factors generally fall into the following categories: social, economic, 
institutional, built, natural and cultural environments (Cutter, Burton and Emrich, 2010; 
Ostagtaghizadeh, 2016). These factors contribute largely to overall resilience and 
sustainability, in order for communities, groups and individuals to actively participate in 
increasing resiliency and sustainability, there is a strong need for continued access to 
community assets, resources and capacities (e.g. community capitals, transformative potential 
and adaptive capacities) during all phases of disaster management (Kwok et al., 2016).  
 Various theoretical frameworks exist when considering the different forms and levels 
of community participation levels and activities within the overall planning context. However, 
there is a distinct shortfall in applicable good practice information and examples when 
assessing how incentivising and implementing community participation and involvement in 
natural disaster situations, especially when looking towards longer-term recovery projects 
(Love and Vallance, 2013). Much of this lack of community involvement stems from the fact 
that traditional planning and emergency management practices have very much been reactive 
rather than proactive. Proactive planning in the disaster management sphere, as championed 
by pre-event recovery planning, seeks to enable the involvement of individuals, groups and 
communities from the beginning stages as to ensure that there are meaningful contributions 
by the wider community in the authorised and mandated disaster management plans and 
consequent actions taken after a disaster hits (Becker and Saunders, 2007). In this way, not 
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only are communities aware of the processes that will take place before, during and after a 
hazardous event, but the input that they have been able to provide into the process will 
translate into a sense of pride and accountability to situations, catalysing increased effort and 
effectiveness in the recovery process (Berke and Campanella, 2006; Becker and Saunders, 
2007).  
 The benefits of incorporating public participation within a range of spheres is well 
documented, including the planning sphere, and an understanding of how community 
involvement can positively influence emergency and disaster planning is acknowledged despite 
a lack of empirical knowledge (Coles and Buckle, 2004; Love and Vallance, 2013). Arnstein’s 
(1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 2.6) has largely driven literature surrounding 
public participation and has continued to advocate for the implementation of community 

















Figure 2.6 – Arnstein’s Ladder; ‘Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation’ 
Source – (Arnstein 1969) 
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 While Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder has conceptualised the notion of public participation 
and community involvement for a number over half a century, Love and Vallance (2013) 
acknowledge that within disaster planning and emergency situations, effective consultation, 
especially consultation the meaningfully involves the wider public becomes extremely 
challenging. Therefore, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the role and benefits 
of implementing community / public consultation within the emergency management domain, 
capitalising on the knowledge base of ‘development studies’ would be appropriate and helpful 
to situate and quantify the benefits that community involvement can have in providing 
assistance in disaster management scenarios. Davidson et al., (2007) within the work ‘Truths 
and myths about community participation in post-disaster housing projects’ highlights the 
effectiveness of recovery efforts when communities are empowered to make meaningful 
contributions and choices regarding disaster recovery. Davidson et al., (2007) conveys the 
efforts made by the Coffee Growers Association (CGO) in rural Columbia in the immediate 
aftermath of the magnitude 6.2 earthquake on January 25th, 1999. The CGO developed the 
initial master reconstruction plan prepared by the Columbian central government and 
assumed the responsibility for the reconstruction of a significant number of small towns and 
rural areas, which in total involved more than 20,000 inhabitants (Davidson et al., (2007). Upon 
the adoption of the reconstruction plan, the CGO approached the communities and as the 
‘help provider’ actively invited the ‘beneficiaries’ to convey what type of aid they needed what 
would be the most sustainable in the future. As a result, the CGO offered a wide range of 
services, which included loans, subsidies, technical aid and information and the ‘beneficiaries’ 
were able to choose what they required according to their individual needs, priorities and 
expectations (Davidson et al., 2007). These types of choices included the type of house that 
was to be rebuilt, the type of technology to be used as well as the level of contributions to be 
made in self-help and hired help. This greater choice provided to the affected populations 
generated a wide range of activities to be undertaken, some houses and shops were rebuilt 
using recycled materials, others completely rebuilt damaged property and assets. What this 
achieved was a range of solutions that actively and effectively tended to the needs of the 
communities while still treating the community as individuals and acknowledging that the aid 
needed to rebuild the community sustainably were not uniform (Davidson et al., 2007). ‘Total 
user participation in which the users had full responsibility of their own choices. It meant that 
beneficiaries were not passive ‘victims’ receiving humanitarian aid; they became the ones 
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responsible for their own projects’ (Davidson et al., 2007: p. 105), this active engagement in 
community led recovery culminated in exceedingly positive outcomes and clearly shows the 
potential for meaningful community involvement in recovery efforts that can be translated 
into countries such as New Zealand.  
Conversely, Davidson et al., (2007) undertook a case study that looked into 
participatory reconstruction in El Salvador after the occurrence of a magnitude 7.6 earthquake 
on January 13, 2001, that severely damaged the municipality of Lamaria where around 3000 
homes were completely destroyed affecting 13,440 people. While in the case of Columbia and 
the CGO’s input into the planning and reconstruction phase that empowered and enabled the 
championing of the recovery effort by the local communities, the case of the project named 
La Hermandad, in El Salvador was effectively the polar opposite. La Hermandad was run by a 
European Red Cross Agency which in total brought together 3 additional NGOs with the aim of 
creating a ‘model community’ for 300 poor and homeless families that had been affected by 
the earthquake (Davidson et al., 2007). The project was to provide housing for those families 
where the earthquake had destroyed their homes and families who owned no assets, at the 
time of aid or anytime in the past. These families were provided the materials (traditional 
bricks) to build the houses but had to construct the homes themselves with the help of a 
supervisor and an engineer, a social worker was also provided to help build a ‘closer 
community’ (Davidson et al., 2007). However, in order to build the homes, one adult per 
nuclear family would have to provide 150 hours of manual labour a month, consequently, 80% 
of the ‘beneficiaries’ of the project had to abandon their primary jobs in order to comply with 
the mandated hours needed to complete the project (Davidson et al., 2007). Alongside the 
significant loss of income for many families, divisive social problems arose such as the agencies 
pushing ‘beneficiaries’ to finish the project leading to widespread physical exhaustion and a 
local representative body that the locals wanted to form was rejected by the agency as they 
‘did not wish to see their authority undermined by an initiative’, and initiative that would have 
significantly enhanced a sense of social cohesion and enabled the feeling of ‘community’ that 
was project was initially designed to inspire (Davidson et al., 2007). This was an example in 
which community involvement and participation was completely suppressed where no input 
or influence was provided to the people in which the project was designed to help. The end 
result reveals the rift that can occur when adhering to a strictly top-down approach which led 
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to a deterioration of the effectiveness of the project when, especially when reviewing the 
constructive capacity for the ‘ideal community’ (Davidson et al., 2007). 
While examples from the ‘developing world’ such as those presented in Davidson et al. 
(2007), can assist in conceptualising public participation and meaningful community 
involvement in post-disaster environments, as well as highlighting potential shortcomings of 
not implementing this, Coles and Buckle (2004) maintain that within traditional planning 
practice, specifically in New Zealand, any focus and push for fostering community resilience 
through the public participation medium is notably absent. Historically in New Zealand, public 
participation has not been identified and pursued as a pragmatic and active solution to assist 
in disaster and emergency management at a local or central governmental level (Coles and 
Buckle, 2004; Vallance, 2015). Disaster recovery efforts that implement active and meaningful 
engagement with communities is inherently more complex than traditional recovery 
management practices. It adds an extra element to a process that is already immensely 
stressful and frantic (Love and Vallance, 2013). Disaster situations embody stress and distress 
by nature, and in many circumstances, for example, the Christchurch earthquakes, the avenues 
for local and central government agencies to engage in public participation were effectively 
closed (Brookie, 2012; Vallance, 2015). Becker and Saunders (2007) believe that an adoption 
of pre-event recovery planning would help to forge pathways to engaging with the public in 
disaster scenarios through proactive planning to create better outcomes. 
Nonetheless, in the context of the Christchurch earthquakes, despite the lack of formal 
consultation and communication with communities, public participation has a tendency to 
happen spontaneously when community pride and solidarity is shown (Coles and Buckle, 
2004). The Christchurch Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), headed by the Hon. Gerry 
Brownlee was established in 2011 to specifically facilitate the effective recovery of the 
immense effects of the earthquake in acknowledgement of the state of national emergency 
that was declared (Vallance, 2015). CERA was created to consolidate the decision-making 
responsibilities and powers under one umbrella in attempts to fast-track the process in which 
recovery could take place under the extreme circumstances that the city and the nation were 
facing (Brookie, 2012; Vallance, 2015). Under this ambition, CERA was given ‘extraordinary 
powers to expedite decision making powers [as well as being able to] suspend, amend, cancel 
or delay affected city / district and regional government plans or policies’ (Vallance, 2015: p: 
1291-1292). However as a result of this, and in spite of the legislative mandate found within 
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both CERAs Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch and the CDEM Act to facilitate and 
promote community involvement and participation with recovery efforts, many whole 
communities and the associated groups felt completely pushed out of meaningful participation 
in recovery efforts and felt like outsiders in the recovery of their own city (Love and Vallance, 
2013). The formation of CERA intentionally or not, quashed the initial attempts by the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) at fostering community engagement and delivering for 
Christchurch’s residents through the ‘share an idea’ initiative (Vallance, 2015). The initiative 
mobilised over 60,000 participants that involved over 106,000 ideas. Unfortunately, CERA and 
their Special City Development Unit were given the responsibility of creating a new blueprint 
for the city, meaning that the CCC draft recovery plan and the ‘share and idea’ campaign were 
ended before anything qualitative was realised (Olshansky and Johnson, 2012). Furthermore, 
the unit within CERA that was delegated the power to make the new blueprint for the city were 
given just 100 days to complete the task. A timeline that would not allow for meaningful public 
consultation and input even if desired (Olshansky and Johnson, 2012; Vallance, 2015). 
Agyeman and Angus (2003) state that the most useful and meaningful approaches to public 
participation that generate and utilise community buy-in and create the most equitable and 
agreeable outcomes are ‘deliberate and inclusive participatory processes. 
 Despite a lack of community involvement in Christchurch under CERA, grassroots and 
community led movements sprouted around the city in an attempt by communities, groups 
and individuals to attain some level of influence and investment into the recovery process 
(Vallance, 2015). Coles and Buckle, (2004) affirm that public participation and community 
resilience and sustainability happens spontaneously when community pride and solidarity is 
shown. The contentious and highly political nature of the recovery of Christchurch in the time 
after the earthquakes under CERA inspired the formation of a number of groups seeking to aid 
recovery. These groups included the Canterbury Communities Earthquake Recovery Network 
(CanCERN) and the Stoddart Point Regeneration Ideas Group (SPRIG) (Love and Vallance, 2013; 
Vallance, 2015). These groups were not born with the intention of challenging the power of 
local and central government through the CCC or CERA as they acknowledged from the outset 
that they neither had the skills or the mandate to do so in a way that would achieve the goals 
of a successful, inclusive recovery. Instead they recognised and accepted that they could 
provide an important role in ‘undertaking background work so that they could make a useful 
contribution to more official procedures...’ (Love and Vallance, 2013:6). The roles of these 
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groups and groups like them in both Christchurch and from international examples centred 
around acting as a conduit for communication between the wider community and expressing 
the needs and concerns of the various and numerous affected parties to the governing bodies 
(Davidson et al., 2007; Hawkins and Maurer, 2010; Love and Vallance, 2013), in the case of 
Christchurch, these were the CCC and CERA. Coles and Buckle (2004) strongly state that 
effective recovery can only be achieved when the affected community is fully engaged in the 
recovery process. While Gotham (2008), whose work focusses on the recovery efforts and 
processes in the wake of Hurricane Katrina states that the oppression of communities from the 
decision-making process is a suspension of democratic right using post-disaster reconstruction 
/ recovery to push through their own agenda. This notion has been somewhat reflected in the 
case of the Christchurch earthquakes where there has been a significant amount of reluctance 
by the public and private investors in Christchurch to participate in the rebuild of the CBD and 
are choosing to develop elsewhere (Vallance, 2015). Despite the perceived lack of 
consideration and involvement of the general public of Christchurch in regards to planning and 
implementing plans that will shape the future of the city, government institutions and agencies 
(such as CERA) are under enormous pressure to facilitate the recovery from catastrophic 
events as efficiently and effectively as possible (Gotham, 2008; Vallance, 2015).  
 
2.4.2 Public Participation in Legislation 
 
 The role and the positive impact that the wider community can have on emergency 
management and the recovery process has gained more significance and attention within New 
Zealand formal legislation of late. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) states 
within Section 12(1)(a) ‘Every regional council and every territorial authority within that region 
must unite to establish a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group for the purposes of this 
Act as a joint standing committee under the clause 30(1)(b) of Schedule 7 of the Local 
Government Act 2002’. Furthermore, each group and each member are to, under Section 
17(1)(i) ‘develop, approve, implement, and monitor a Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Group Plan and regularly review the Plan’. The first plan produced by the Canterbury Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Group that spanned from 2005 – 2010 stated within Section 
4 – ‘Readiness arrangements’ that; ‘Community involvement is an essential component of 
reducing potential impacts, minimising suffering, and supporting effective recovery’ 
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(Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan, 2005 – 2010; Section 4: p. 5). 
This small reference to the focus and positive effects of public participation accounts for the 
total references within this older version of the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan. However, as per 
Section 46 (1) of the CDEM Act 2002, ‘If a national civil defence emergency management plan 
has been operative for 5 years or more and it is more than 5 years since the plan has been 
reviewed under this section, the Minister must review the plan.’ As such, CDEM Group Plans are 
updated regularly, the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan is no exception. The most recent variation 
of the Plan was released in June 2018, with 13 years of continual development, the Group Plan 
exists in a much different capacity as it did in 2005. One of the things that has undergone a 
significant transition is the provision and endorsement of public participation as a genuine 
method for undertaking disaster management and recovery. Advocacy of public participation 
within the Group Plan is consistent throughout the document, but the perceived effectiveness 
and intentions to incorporate public participation principles by the Canterbury CDEM Group 
can be interpreted through Section 1.1 ‘Purpose’ where  the specific direction of the Group 
Plan is devised around ‘encouraging cooperative planning and action between all emergency 
management agencies and the community’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Group, 2018: p. 9).   
 The development of the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan 
has been largely driven through lessons of the Christchurch earthquakes. ‘Communities of 
action emerge in the wake of a disaster, and new bonds of social capital are created as people 
self-organise to meet immediate needs’ (Dionisio and Pawson, 2016: p. 113). The immense 
community drive in Christchurch through groups such as SPRIG and CanCERN (Love and 
Vallance, 2013; Vallance, 2015), as well as other localised public groups such as the Greening 
the Rubble Trust that fostered community involvement and engagement through the 
production of temporary gardens and small parks in the post-earthquake environment 
(Dionisio and Pawson, 2016) led to the strong development and incentivisation of public 
participation in legislation such as the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan. Despite the creation of 
CERA suppressing early initiatives to develop community consultation such as the CCC’s ‘Share 
an Idea’ campaign, the Canterbury regions resilience emerged through various community 
groups and continues to inform emergency management in the region.  
 The Waimakariri District exists as a success story for the advocation of public 
participation in the aftermath of damaging natural events. The Waimakariri District Council 
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employed a diligent model of recovery that heavily emphasised community consultation and 
drove the participation of the wider population, rather than relying on central governmental 
intervention as was seen in Christchurch under CERA. However, it is worthwhile to note that 
the scale of damage and impact for the Waimakariri District Council and the affected 
population was significantly lower than what was experienced in Christchurch (Vallance, 2015). 
The flagship enterprise developed in the Waimakariri was the ‘Hub’, an area created to act as 
a ‘one-stop shop’ for all services relating to the earthquake and the recovery processes 
(Vallance, 2015: p. 1295). While the Hub enabled concentrated area for services from central 
government, such as Work and Income and the Inland Revenue Department, the highlight is 
the accommodation provided for local NGO’s. These NGO’s provided much needed support to 
businesses, families, voluntary teams, tenancy services and provided the basis for the 
formation of the Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service (Vallance, 2015). The Waimakariri 
has been identified as an exemplar of how public participation can positively influence recovery 
processes after an immensely damaging event such as an earthquake. Olshanksy and Johnson 
(2017), assert that information is the ‘currency of recovery’ and that this way of sharing has 
produced excellent results when determining the success of the recovery processes. 
Furthermore, lessons from Christchurch have revealed that limiting public participation has 
not only limited the future growth of the city through genuine community buy-in to recovery 
(Vallance, 2015), but determined communities and groups will fight for their voices to be heard 
regardless (Kewit and Kewit, 2004; Davidson et al., 2007). 
 
2.4.3 Māori Environmental Knowledge 
 
 Knowledge of New Zealand’s susceptibility to natural hazards through a range of 
mediums, such as tectonic movement, meteorological processes and volcanic activity are well 
documented (Hancox, Perrin and Dellow, 1997; Crozier and Glade, 2005; King, Goff and 
Skipper, 2007; Saunders and Becker, 2015). However, this scientifically based understanding 
of the processes that govern the formation and occurrence of natural hazards in New Zealand 
is long out-dated by Māori Environmental Knowledge (MEK). This knowledge is founded on a 
long-term association, relationship and respect between Māori, the land and its resources 
(King, Goff and Skipper, 2007). This knowledge has been passed down through generations and 
helps to encapsulate the wider Māori worldview (Harmsworth and Raynor, 2005; King Goff and 
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Skipper, 2007). This worldview acknowledges the natural order that exists within the world, a 
system that acts in equilibrium, and when external factors interrupt this balance, the entire 
structure shifts, creating a ripple effect that disturbs all (Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013). 
Furthermore, humans do not dominate under the Māori worldview, ‘[t]he diversity of life is 
embellished in this worldview through the interrelationship of all living things as dependent on 
each other, and Māori seek to understand the total system and not just parts of it’ (Harmsworth 
and Awatere, 2013: p. 274). To fully understand the relationship that Māori have with the 
environment is to acknowledge that MEK does not exist in a strictly ‘traditional’ sense and that 
it is also informed by contemporary views and understandings, together fully representing the 
totality of experiences of generations of Māori in New Zealand (Stevenson, 1996; King Goff and 
Skipper, 2007). This knowledge has evolved into an intrinsic understanding of natural hazards 
that has formed through the observation and recording (oral and written histories) of events 
that have affected Māori throughout history (Harmsworth and Raynor, 2005; King, Goff and 
Skipper, 2007). Figure 2.7 below displays the framework for assessing the important cultural 
concept of mauri, defined as; ‘Denoting health and spirit, a sustaining life force, an essential 
essence of being, an energy or element that penetrates all living things’ (Harmsworth and 
















Figure 2.7 – An informative decision-making tool to assess the importance 
of mauri 
Source – (Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013; p. 277) 
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 Globally, environmental issues demand complex and integrated solutions in order to 
achieve the best possible outcomes for those immediately affected and involved and for those 
that may be continually affected by these processes and events into the future (Shultz et al., 
2013). Adopting the fundamental principles that act to encapsulate the Māori worldview which 
calculates the wellbeing and condition of the world through the healthy and equal interactions 
between all facets of the environment, not just simply the use and needs the environment can 
provide to humans (Winiata, 2006). MEK has long identified and acknowledged the inherent 
risk with living in New Zealand and its exposure to natural events and hazards, King Goff and 
Skipper (2007) highlight a number of oral histories that produce strong evidence of the deep 
understanding that Māori have had traditionally, and still draw from and celebrate that detail 
natural hazards and particular cultural management processes to deal with these events. Oral 
histories come in a range of forms, such as; mōteatea (laments), pepeha (quotations), 
whakataukī,whakatauāki (proverbs) and waiata (songs) (King Goff and Skipper, 2007). These 
oral histories act to provide valuable information and insight into the traditional knowledge 
and relationship that Māori have with the environment. Additionally, application of the 
knowledge from these stories can help to assert the validity of the MEK and in turn, present 
lessons and guidance for contemporary emergency management practices (Best, 1972; 
Stevenson, 1996; King, Goff and Skipper, 2007) ‘[Māori Environmental Knowledge] may even 
be regarded as a local hazard prevention tool’ (King, Goff and Skipper, 2007: p. 69).  
An oral history that exemplifies the positive impact that MEK can have on hazard 
management today is provided by King Goff and Skipper (2007) surrounding the landslides that 
occurred at Te Rapa, on the banks of Lake Taupo. Landslides on the 4th of May 1846 and then 
again in 1910 caused significant loss of life and widespread damage to the local Ngāti 
Tūwharetoa village (Ngata and Jones, 2004; King Goff and Skipper, 2007). The known history 
of Te Rapa discloses the knowledge that the area suffers from slope instability and the results 
of this can be very damaging to both human life and built infrastructure. While natural events, 
such as landsliding, occur on timescales that to a large extent, cannot be predicted with 
sufficient levels of accuracy, this history presents this issue to the area, King Goff and Skipper 
indicate that for a landslide warning sign has been created at the site (in 2006) to reflect this 
danger. Consideration of the provided oral history and the traditional MEK of the area would 
have reflected in a greater understanding of the hazard there far prior to 2006 (King, Goff and 
Skipper, 2007). 
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 While scholars, such as King, Goff and Skipper (2007) and Harmsworth and Raynor 
(2005) indicate that MEK does not represent the value it can provide in the current 
environmental and disaster management frameworks in New Zealand, Harmsworth (1997) 
recognises the legislative requirements that actively promote MEK integration into these 
frameworks. These requirements reside under the Treaty of Waitangi, the RMA, the Historic 
Places Act 1993 and the Māori Land Act 1993, which require the inclusion of Māori cultural, 
historic, spiritual and physical values in environment/land use and social planning 
(Harmsworth, 1997). The RMA explicitly enforces these inclusions through Part 2 in a number 
of different sections and contexts. Part 2, Section 6(e) and (g) relate directly to the relationship 
to and the management of Māori traditional values, beliefs and customary rights. Part 2, 
Section 7(a)(aa) informs of the regard that must be given to kaitiakitanga, defined in the RMA 
as ‘the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an area in accordance with tikanga 
Māori in relation to natural and physical resources; and includes the ethic of stewardship’, this 
ethic of stewardship is represented within S7(aa). Part 2, Section 8 unambiguously states that 
the Treaty of Waitangi must be taken into account when considering resource management 
issues. Furthermore, Iwi Management Plans (IMP) are prepared by the relevant iwi and hapū 
as ‘an expression of rangatiratanga to help iwi and hapū exercise their kaitiki roles and 
responsibilities’ (Quality Planning, 2017). IMPs help to form bridges of communication 
between Māori and open a dialogue between resource management policy makers and 
resource users as to what is important to Māori and how its resources can be managed while 
respecting the relationship that different iwi and hapū with a particular resource or area 
(Quality Planning, 2017). Moreover, Harmsworth (1997) states that; ‘[An IMP] articulates 
goals, aspirations and procedures for a group of people and their taonga’ (Harmsworth, 1997: 
p 13), essentially outlining what land use and resource management must or should consider 
with regard to Māori culture. However, often times, meaningful and effective communication 
between iwi groups and the relevant local authority does not occur, further marginalising the 
beliefs, needs and desires of all Māori (Harmsworth, 1997; Harmsworth and Raynor, 2005; King 
Goff and Skipper, 2007). This can be seen through the  manifestation of the colonial legacy on 
the Māori people, cultures and traditions, Harmsworth and Raynor (2005) assert that the 
oppression of the Māori people and culture during the time of colonisation through to the 
modern era characterised by globalisation and neo-liberalism has translated to a lesser role in 
areas such as resource and land use planning and management. Berke et al. (2002) indicate 
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that to effectively build the capacity and create meaningful shared learning between 
contemporary planning and resource management and indigenous people, a central role must 
be played in the formation and implementation of plans from the outset. However, as is normal 
in New Zealand, local governments often create plans and strategies that affected iwi attempt 
to supplement with relevant consideration for local iwi and hapū groups after the fact, 
reducing the capacity for shared learning and effectiveness and efficiency of plan making 
(Berke et al., 2002; Thompson-Fawcett, Ruru and Tipa, 2017). Māori involvement in the 
decision-making process in regard to environmental outcomes and decision making have 
historically been markedly insufficient (Webster and Cheyne, 2017). However, while 
Thompson-Fawcett, Ruru and Tipa (2017) inform of some positive changes such as the 
inclusion of local iwi in plan making in Wellington and the Auckland Māori Plan have acted to 
increase the level of involvement and representation of Māori people and the culture in 
planning context, more can, and must, be done. The limitation of Māori involvement in the 
planning process is limiting the availability and applicability of MEK into resource management 
that can act to create better outcomes into the future. Figure 2.8 displays the 
interconnectedness and wide scope that MEK holds and the numerous ways that it can 
complement planning and resource/emergency management.  
Figure 2.8 – The scope and potential of MEK in resource management frameworks  
Source – (Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013) 
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 Promoting involvement of local iwi and hapū groups into the planning process and the 
adoption of MEK and principles should not end there. The endorsement of Māori culture and 
traditions that is mandated under the RMA should extend throughout time and be represented 
in the resource management and planning processes into the future (Webster and Cheyne, 
2017). Through this increased involvement, the benefits that MEK can afford will be better 
realise and promote best planning practice. However, it is important to recognise and 
understand the context and significance of MEK, and the misuse of these in practice can result 




 This chapter has highlighted the growing body of knowledge that surrounds natural 
hazards and the hazard and emergency management sector in New Zealand. The literature has 
shown that the there is a strong understanding of the processes behind natural hazards, such 
as earthquakes, and while events such as the Kaikōura earthquake reveal new characteristics 
that need to be understood about earthquakes, the process of hazard and emergency 
management must reflect the strong understanding of hazards. While there are numerous 
discussions around the implementation of hazard management theories such as proactive 
planning and increasing the role of public participation, these have yet to be implemented in 
New Zealand with any real conviction. This research has identified the gap in knowledge that 
takes theories such as proactive planning into practice and observing the effects, either 
positive or negative. Furthermore, literature suggests that to establish best practice, public 
participation and community engagement must be enhanced, this is reflected in the legislation 
in New Zealand which actively promotes the increased and sincere public participation in 
resource management issues, including the hazard and emergency management sector. 
Chapter Four will further consider the role of public participation in New Zealand’s legislation 
through a more in-depth look at the governing statutory and non-statutory documents that 
make up the hazard and emergency management sector, this includes the role and potential 
of MEK. 
 This chapter has displayed that in a theoretical sense, there are many avenues to take 
in regard to hazard and emergency management, whether this be through proactive planning 
or enhancing the role and importance placed on public participation and community 
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engagement, however, we are yet to see that translate into practice. This research will 
continue by observing the statutory and non-statutory framing in regard to the hazard and 
emergency management framework before an in-depth analysis of the opportunities and 
barriers for the implementation of the theories observed in this chapter, when addressing the 









 This chapter introduces and outlines the methods employed to address and fulfil the 
research question as defined in chapter one. Also contained within this chapter is the 
justification for the chosen methodology and the impact that it will have on the outcome of 
the research as a whole. The conducted research will be centred around a qualitative approach 
that is supported by both primary and secondary data. The primary data has been produced 
through a range of face-to-face interviews with key stakeholders that are both able and willing 
to contribute to the working body of knowledge surrounding hazard management. The data 
produced through these interviews has been supplemented by the secondary data that is 
mainly comprised of a targeted evaluation of the literature and an analysis of the relevant 
legislation and policy regarding disaster management in New Zealand. While the literature 
review focusses on the evolution of hazard management and potential pathways to retrofit 
the current framework based on contemporary knowledge, such as pre-event recovery 
planning, public participation and the inclusion of Māori Environmental Knowledge (MEK). The 
policy review interrogates the relevant legislative framework mandated in New Zealand and 
the appropriateness of this, as well as a look into the role and capacity of Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Groups for the future of disaster management in New Zealand.  
 Further within this chapter is an overview of the ethical considerations that have been 
incorporated into the study in order to conduct safe and appropriate research. Following this 
an assessment of the limitations to the chosen research design that this research has faced will 
be discussed. Emphasis will be placed on the state of the research under the effects of the 
global Covid-19 pandemic and what effect this had on the research. 
 
3.2 Research Approach 
 
 Designing an effective research approach to guide and direct work is imperative to 
producing work that both respects the time committed to it by all those involved and that 
contributes to the wider body of knowledge that it seeks to achieve the objectives of the 
research as well as contribute the knowledge of managing natural hazards. Moreover, without 
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the implementation of an appropriately formed process, the entire research project may be 
jeopardised through a misrepresented or inaccurate set of results and recommendations, and 
in essence, failing the objectives and aims of the entire work. As such, the research is based 
around qualitative approach in order to fully answer the research question and satisfy the aims 
and objectives of the research as to meaningfully contribute to the working body of disaster 
and hazard management knowledge in New Zealand. Ochieng (2009) states that in general, 
quantitative research outputs are confirmatory and inductive, however, there are many 
different qualitative research strands that take a more exploratory path and intend to deduce 
results to develop a specific hypothesis. Qualitative data provides the opportunity to undertake 
research that is highly complex and place it within a specific context that can be simplified and 
managed to ensure that readability and understanding is high (Ochieng, 2009). This research 
aims to generate a contemporary understanding of the effectiveness and the outcomes that 
are generated under this framework, taking a qualitative approach helps to realise this, and 
creates new ways of seeing existing data (Ochieng, 2009; Choy, 2014). Typically, qualitative 
research allows for the exploration of homogenous views while utilising social capital to attain 
results that are highly representative of a wide scope of communities, alongside this, effective 
cultural assessments and analysis allowed for by qualitative research can help uncover and 
highlight important values histories and beliefs (Choy, 2014). This is of particular importance 
for much of the research undertaken in New Zealand and for this research in particular that 
seeks to meaningfully discuss and incorporate Māori views and knowledge within the scope of 
hazard management. Furthermore, qualitative research does not set in stone hard boundaries 
that prevent the pathways of discussion and data to form naturally, new information that may 
derive from interviews or surveys can help shape the future of the research and unearth 
additional factors to research to compliment the initial capacity of the study (Ochieng, 2009; 
Anderson, 2010; Choy, 2014).  
 This research is informed through three main mediums which include a literature 
review, a policy / legislation review and the results gathered from key informant interviews 
with identified key stakeholders. The review of contemporary literature is vitally important to 
the research in general as it informs the research process in general and helps in the creation 
of specific research objectives, while the policy review helps frame the research in the context 
of New Zealand. The use of these approaches is known as triangulation which as described by 
Patton (1999), comes from land surveying and ‘is based on the premise that no single method 
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ever adequately solves the problem of rival explanations’ (Patton, 1999: p. 1192). As Patton 
further asserts, ‘triangulation is ideal’ (Patton, 1999: p. 1992), however there are a range of 
different examples and criteria of correctly implementing the principles of triangulation. The 
different strands of triangulation are method triangulation, investigator investigation, theory 
triangulation and data source triangulation (Patton, 1999; Carter et al., 2014). This research 
intends to incorporate the principles produced through method triangulation and data source 
triangulation. Method triangulation is centred around scrutinising data through a range of 
different collection methods, in the case of this research, these methods are the literature 
review, policy review and interviews with key stakeholders. While data source triangulation is 
characterised by adopting and utilising data from a range of different sources, for example 
these could be individuals, groups, communities and local and central government (Carter et 
al., 2014).  
While it is largely agreed that implementing the principles that guide triangulation 
when engaging in research based on qualitative data provides the most credible and accurate 
results (Patton, 1999; Ochieng, 2009; Carter et al., 2014), there are still a range of limitations 
that must be considered by researchers in order to produce work that will hold up to scrutiny 
and be able to meaningfully contribute the relevant field. A common theme that is used to 
criticise the qualitative method is the time-consuming nature of data collection. A further 
critique is that all researchers interpretations are limited and there is an inherent amount of 
bias that infiltrates results through a researchers personal experience and knowledge that can 
be related to the observations and data collected through the research process (Anderson, 
2010; Choy, 2014). Furthermore, concerns are often conveyed in the empirical nature of data 
collection which Anderson (2010) claims can affect the subject’s responses, and therefore 
affect the validity of the data and can have more than minor repercussions for the conclusions 
and recommendations that are produced through a research study. As such, when conducting 
this research, a significant amount of care has been given to ensuring that the key informant 
interviews, that comprise a large portion of the data collection process, occur as organically as 
possible and that all participants are able to opt out of lines of questioning as they see fit 
without any disadvantage to themselves or the research. Figure 3.1 below outlines the various 
strengths and benefits of undertaking qualitative research and helps to underpin the 
justification for this research embarking under this method to produce important and 




Qualitative research is often positioned within the researchers’ interest, and or, area 
of expertise (Ochieng, 2009; Choy, 2014), the topic of hazard management will always be a 
contemporary issue within New Zealand due to the geographic location and geological 
conditions that characterise New Zealand. Moreover, current events have presented the 
opportunity for a very focussed study on the current methods, effectiveness and efficiency of 
the hazard management framework. Firstly, following the aftermath of the Christchurch 
earthquakes and the questions that were raised during these events around the appointment 
of Christchurch Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and the implications of this in regard to 
hazard management and public participation. Additionally, the occurrence of the Kaikōura 
earthquake in 2016 has opened another pathway for this research to evaluate lessons learned 
from Christchurch and interrogate a more contemporary hazard management issue in New 
Zealand, one in which the effects will continue to be felt for years to come and where the 
process of hazard management in many ways are still being undertaken. Planning and hazard 
management have the capacity to create better and safer environments in the future, this 
research presents a very real opportunity to meaningfully contribute to the extensive working 
body of knowledge around planning and best practice hazard management to help achieve 
more sustainable and resilience environments. As previously stated,  this research will make 
use of three main research avenuesl a literature review, a policy analysis and interviews with 
key informants, these will be based around the use of a major case study into the 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake and supplemented by the lessons learnt from the 2010/2011 
Figure 3.1 – Strengths and weaknesses of qualitative research methodology 
Source – (Choy, 2014). 
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Christchurch earthquakes. Case studies are a widely used medium when engaging in qualitative 
research as they allow researchers to better understand the problem being investigated 
through the allowance of ‘penetrating questions … to capture the richness of organisational 
behaviour’ (Choy, 2014: p. 102-103). According to Zainal (2007), case studies exist as a 
particularly robust method of research when holistic, in-depth investigation is required and 
allows for a more comprehensive understanding of issues that often times are extremely 
complex. While there are a range of criticisms that follow the use of case studies, such as 
lacking scientific generalisation and lacking rigour (Yin, 1984), Zainal (2007) and Choy (2014) 
however, assert that case studies are extremely useful for researching processes at the micro 
level and relating findings back to wider, real world examples. In this instance, the research has 
taken advantage of recent significant cases of hazard management in action in New Zealand 
through the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes and attempts to contribute to the 
continued development of the disaster management framework to produce resilient and 
sustainable communities in the future. 
 
3.3 Ethical Considerations 
 
 Making pertinent ethical considerations are important for any type of research, this is 
to both ensure that the participants and contributors to any study, in this case key informants 
are protected, as well as in New Zealand ensuring that the values and beliefs of Māori culture 
are not compromised both within the data collection process and with the end result of the 
research. Ochieng (2009) states that considering and satisfying ethical requirements to 
produce work is of critical importance. Orb, Eisenhauer and Wynaden (2001) convey the 
importance of conducting ethical qualitative research in upholding human rights and 
protecting those involved from any potential harm. Ethical considerations must be made 
during all major phases of research, whether that be the generating the research approach, 
data collection or the interpretation and communication of the findings that are provided from 
human subjects (Orb, Eisenhauer and Wynaden, 2001). The expression of the information 
provided through interviews or further information provided by key informants in any research 
must be handled with great care as to protect those that offered the information. Researchers 
must be aware that information divulged from key informants used or taken out of context 
may contain sensitive information, as such anonymity and discretion must be applied when 
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using these resources as to retain a high ethical standard for research (Orb, Eisenhauer and 
Wynaden, 2001).  
To ensure that the most effective and appropriate considerations were made prior to 
the commencement of the face-to-face interview section of data collection ethical approval 
was sought from the University of Otago Ethical Committee. The completion of the ethics 
application outlined the procedure for conversational interviews with key informants to take 
place, and among other things, clearly stated that if a participant at any time felt 
uncomfortable with the interview process or any specific question, they could withdraw 
without any disadvantage to themselves. Prior to conducting the interviews, key informants 
were given an ‘Information Sheet’ (Appendix A) to provide clarity about the scope of the 
research and the role each participant would play in the data collection process. Alongside the 
information sheet, a ‘Consent Form’ (Appendix B) was required to be signed by each key 
informant prior to the interview as to satisfy ethical requirements at the University of Otago. 
Furthermore, participants in the research were given until October 1st to withdraw any 
information provided, again, without any disadvantage to themselves.  
Ensuring anonymity of key informants and other research participants is critically 
important when conducting qualitative study (Sanjari et al., 2014). However, Welland and 
Pugsley (2018) assert that complete anonymity almost impossible to guarantee to participants 
in the current internet age where electronically stored materials and evidence of participation 
are often times never able to be fully deleted (Welland and Pugsley, 2018). Despite this, 
researchers can still guarantee confidentiality for key informants and ensure that any 
information presented within the study is devoid of any material that will relate back to the 
individual that offered it, unless consent is given to accredit any information to an individual 
(Saniari et al., 2014; Welland and Pugsley, 2018). Upon undertaking this research, assurances 
were given that any personal information of all participants would not be released unless prior 
consent was granted.  
The interviews themselves were taken through an open-ended approach in which the 
conversations that were to unfold could happen as organically as possible, as ‘interviews are 
inherently social interactions’ (Rapley, 2001: p. 303). The use of semi-structured or open-ended 
interviews are an important tool for gathering data in qualitative research, as they enable the 
flow of information to naturally and can often result in the discover and use of completely 
different and complimentary paths for future or current research to follow (Rapley, 2001; 
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Adams, 2010). Employing these methods helped ensure that the data collected through the 
face-to-face interviews with key informants were as accurate and as reliable as possible as to 
make the most appropriate conclusions and recommendations to end the study. 
The above information is provided to indicate that across all fronts, sincere attempts 
were made to ensure that the research was conducted in an ethical manner. 
 
3.4 Research Methods 
 
 The following section will outline the various methods of research that were employed 
throughout this research. The range of methods used were selected under the theory of 
method and data source triangulation which is used to create the most accurate and reliable 
base of knowledge to pose against the set research questions (Carter et al., 2014). The 
definitions and characteristics of both method and data source triangulation have been 
discussed above.  
 
3.4.1 Primary Data 
 
  Primary data is that which is collected through a specific design for a specific research 
question or study that best suit the needs, consequently, the collection and presentation of 
the results deriving from primary data are then added to the existing store of knowledge 
according to the subject matter (Hox and Boeije, 2005). A popular method to attain primary 
data is through interviews, a method that this study has employed. Primary data through the 
form of interviews were collected in this study between the 3rd of August to the 11th of 
September where ten were conducted. These interviews were conducted with hazard 
planners, members of Civil Defense Emergency Management Group members and members 
of central government (See Table 3.1 for a list of key informants). The study location of 
Kaikōura was chosen as it provided an excellent contemporary example of not only a natural 
hazard in New Zealand but an insight into the hazard management framework from theory / 
legislation into practice. Alongside this, the study afforded a very applicable comparative study 
to that of the Christchurch recovery and hazard management efforts and allowed for an 
interrogation of the lessons learnt from Christchurch into a following disaster event in New 
Zealand. Moreover, the nature of the research itself allows for the potential application across 
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a nation-wide scale as it deals with a multitude of issues that the wider New Zealand faces, 
such as tectonic activity, mass movement risk and a wide array of other natural hazards. Hox 
and Boeije (2005) state that conducting interviews as a means to provide primary data for a 
study are ineffective not just in the way they offer applicable primary data for a study but also 
the contributions they can make to shaping and focussing the study as a whole, by providing 
additional lines of thinking and adjusting the scope of the research as to produce the most 
meaningful and appropriate end result. The following sections outline the progression and 
reasoning behind the chosen methods of primary data collection through the form of field 
research interviews and the field study.  
 
Key Informant Interviews 
 The interviews conducted through this research adopted a semi-structured, open-
ended process, by which conversations and answers could flow organically, presenting non-
coerced information alongside providing the opportunity for additional research paths to be 
followed to strengthen the study (Rapley, 2001; Adams, 2010). The flexibility in constructing 
and holding semi-structured, open-ended interviews further allows for the active comparison 
and analysis between information provided by interviewees and allows for discussion points 
to feature in the research that may not have been identified or realised prior (Rapley, 2001). 
Table 3.1 on the next page shows the codes and occupations of the key informants used in this 
research. Due to the nature of the world this year with reference to the Covid-19 pandemic, 














Table 3.1 – Key Informant codes and occupation 
Key Informant Code Key Informant Occupation 
K1 Marlborough Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group 
Manager 
K2 Senior Social Scientist at GNS Science  
K3 Civil Defence and Emergency Management Controller 
K4 Strategy Policy and District Plan Manager 
K5 Former Resource Consent Planner 
K6 Director GHD Consulting 
K7 Resilience and Strategy Research Team Member - EQC 
K8 Chair of Earthquake Science University of Otago 
K9 Community Resilience to Natural Hazards and Climate Change 
Programme – Department of Internal Affairs 
K10 Centre for Sustainability, Lead Scientist AF8 – University of Otago 
 
 Selecting and attaining key informants to contribute to the research is a very important 
consideration when undertaking a research study (McKenna and Main, 2013). In the case of 
this research, a range of methods were employed as to attain the most representative, 
knowledgeable and appropriate participants to generate applicable and meaningful work. 
Purposive or criterion-based sampling used to engage with key informants that were actively 
involved in administering or facilitating the implementation of the hazard management 
framework in New Zealand. This method of sampling revolves around deliberately reaching out 
to active members within the study area (McKenna and Main, 2013). The information provided 
through key informants based of purposive or criterion-based sampling would help generate a 
full understanding of the current effectiveness and appropriateness of the framework to be 
assessed against pre-event recovery planning principles. Additionally, utilising purposive or 
criterion-based sampling allows for snowball sampling (Bernard and Bernard, 2013; McKenna 
and Main, 2013). Snowball sampling is another useful tool seeks to ‘actively engage community 
members in the identification and recruitment of other potential research participants 
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(McKenna and Main, 2013: p. 121-122). This method allows for, and encourages information 
sharing and again, opens up dialogue pathways that act to expand and enrich the initial 
research design to provide the most useful end product.  
 McKenna and Main (2013) also identify the importance and value of incorporating 
community members into the interview process, rather than simply experts or those involved 
in the topic in a professional capacity. Balancing the voices of the participants helps to provide 
a more well-rounded understanding and appreciation for the issue / topic area, this can be 
done effectively by actively seeking those voices that are often marginalised or under-
represented (Morin et al., 2003; McKenna and Main, 2013). The notion of integrating not only 
experts and professionals into the data collection process, but community members as well 
aligns strongly with the ethos of this study that intends to analyse the current involvement of 
communities and groups within hazard management and determine the effectiveness they can 
have on the system if meaningfully involved. The combination of sampling methods aids in the 
integration of different perspectives and knowledge and acts to increase the capacity for the 
applicability of the research in general (O’Fallon and Dearry, 2002; McKenna and Main, 2013). 
 
3.4.2 Secondary Data 
 Secondary data is the compilation of all academic work already completed and 
published, using this data as a means to provide context and assess findings is an important 
part of any research project. ‘Technological advances have led to vast amounts of data that 
has been collected, compiled, and archived, and that is now easily accessible for research’ 
(Johnston, 2017: 619). In the context of this research, an analysis of secondary data was 
employed to strengthen and set the context for the wider research and the primary data 
collection that was to take place. A history of hazard and disaster management was examined 
through secondary sources, such as the recovery efforts made in the Christchurch 2010 and 
2011 earthquakes and the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. Additionally, legislative documents were 
reviewed through this research that relate directly to disaster and hazard management, this 
was done through the form of the Resource Management Act 1991, Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act 2002 and various Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plans among 
other legislative and non-legislative documents. The following section overviews the use of 
secondary data used within this research and the benefits that they provided to the study.  
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3.4.3 Literature Review and Document Analysis 
 
 According to Rocco and Plakhotnik (2009), literature reviews have five primary 
functions in which they contribute to the validity and strength of any research, they are as 
follows; ‘(a) to build a foundation, (b) to demonstrate how a study advances knowledge, (c) to 
conceptualise a study, (d) to assess research design and instrumentation, and (e) to provide a 
reference point for interpretation of findings’ (Rocco and Plakhotnik, 2009: p. 122). However, 
while not all these five factors of a literature review are fulfilled within every research study, 
they act to provide a basis for the justification and benefits of providing a literature review in 
general. A literature review is centred around the interrogation of relevant academic materials 
in relation to the specific case study, and helps by describing hypotheses and propositions of 
previously made studies, defining relevant terms and clarifying previously made assumptions 
in order to build upon and contribute to the existing body of knowledge (Merriam and 
Simpson, 1995; Rocco and Plakhotnik, 2009).  
 Research based around an already known and studied topic, such as this one, undergo 
a literature review that helps to lead to new understandings and reconceptualization’s of the 
topic at hand, and that the following primary research seeks to further explain (Merriam and 
Simspon, 1995). Rocco and Plakhotnik (2009) explain the review of literature ‘as honouring the 
past to inform the present [which] gives us the opportunity for it to affect the future’ (Rocco 
and Plakhotnik, 2009: p. 128). This research was founded on an extensive literature review that 
was conducted prior to the primary data collection methods were employed. This enabled the 
grounding of the research based on the relevant literature and enabled the development of 
areas of interest and the way that primary data collection could take place, both in who was 
contacted as well as the conversations that were to take place between the researcher and 
the interviewees. The literature review was dissected into two major parts, the first being a 
substantial review of the current academic literature of hazards, and hazard management. This 
was centred around earthquakes, specifically the Kaikōura 2016 earthquake as well as the 2010 
and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes, pre-event recovery planning, public participation within 
hazard management and the role of MEK. Additionally, a comprehensive review of the current 
legislative framework that governs the implementation of hazard management processes and 
applications in the field. This document analysis included looking to statutory documents such 
as the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991 and the Civil Defence Emergency Management 
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(CDEM) Act 2002 to analyse the relationship between the emergency management 
frameworks and application of these processes on the ground. Alongside this, non-statutory 
documents were analysed within the study such as Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Group Plans which were useful in examining the scope in which pre-event recovery planning 
can be used to help further inform these documents and the processes they endorse to create 
more resilient and sustainable communities in the future.  
 
3.5 Case Studies 
 
 While there are many concerns around the validity and appropriateness of case studies 
within qualitative data, such as the influence of the researcher on the overall research design, 
the selection of interviewees and other data sources and the sufficiency and reliability of 
sources of information (Diefenbach, 2009), case studies ‘are generally strongly precise where 
quantitative studies are weaker’ (Starman, 2013: p. 36). This research has identified the 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake as the main case study in which the literature review and document 
analysis will be assessed against, while also calling on the evidence and learnings that have 
been well documented and applied since the 2010 and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes. 
Starman (2013) indicates that case studies are particularly effective when asking questions of 
‘how’ and ‘why’ things occur and help to uncover the underlying contextual elements that have 
influenced these decisions. In the case of this research, the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ are extremely 
important to analyse as the functions and results of hazard and emergency management are 
being critically analysed as to uncover how these functions and processes may be informed 
through the principles of pre-event recovery planning. While case studies in of themselves are 
subject to a range of criticisms surrounding the legitimacy of the data they produce, in this 
case, and coupled with the extensive literature review and document analysis, the 
contemporary case study of the Kaikōura earthquake has been identified as a key research 







3.6 Positionality  
 
It is always important to considering researcher positionality when addressing the 
methodology behind the research, Bourke (2014) indicates that the research is heavily 
influenced by both the researcher and it’s participants and the one must be aware of biases 
and perceptions when dealing with human-to-human interactions in the data collection 
process. Positionality refers to a range of factors including race, nationality and gender, while 
Moser (2008) suggests that other factors such as personality and other personal life 
experiences play a role in the positionality of a researcher. Thus, it is important to be aware 
that the way a researcher presents themselves will play a part in how they are perceived by 
participants during human-to-human contact, considering this research is largely based around 
the collection of primary data through interviews, positionality is an important aspect to 
consider. As such, every effort was made by the researcher to remain neutral an unbiased 
during the process of key informant interviews, these interviews were held more closely to a 
conversation so as to implore the respondents to offer their authentic and sincere responses. 
Furthermore, this research is positioned as a review of the current hazard and emergency 
management framework while trying to ascertain how best practice can be implemented and 
what needs to change for this to occur. Therefore, the researcher made a concerted effort to 
remain neutral in the framing of questions, as to not unintentionally lead key informants into 
answers based around a critique of the framework, and to the fullest extent possible, allowed 




 Alongside considering the positionality of the researcher, it is also very important to 
reflect on and acknowledge the limitations of the research process. Firstly, this research has 
unfortunately had to be undertaken through the Covid-19 pandemic, in New Zealand, this 
involved a lockdown period of over two months and had a significant impact on the ability to 
contact key informants and hold interviews. A number of potential key informants are 
employed in the CDEM sphere and therefore, were tasked with helping with the Covid-19 
response and as such, could not be interviewed, it also eliminated the possibility of face-to-
face interviews during this period, alongside this, the global pandemic made it very difficult to 
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recruit participants, as a result the research was unable to contact iwi and hapū groups around 
the Kaikōura area or community groups. The lockdown also hindered the researcher’s ability 
to fully utilise the resources available to them from the University due to having to work from 
home. Alongside the time constraints placed on this research, this contributed to the fact there 
were only 10 key informant interviews held, ideally this number would have been closer to the 
20 mark and the range of key informants interviewed would have been wider, the research is 
regrettably missing interviews that were conducted with community group representatives 
and those who were involved with the response of the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes 
in a volunteering capacity as well as the involvement of iwi and hapū groups. 
 Furthermore, the research scope was limited to looking at the RMA and CDEMA as core 
statutory legislation, if afforded more time for the research to be undertaken, the scope would 
have been widened to look into other statutory legislation such as the Building Act 2004 and 
the Local Government Act 2002 as they play a major role in the formation of the hazard and 
emergency management framework. Ideally, the scope would have been widened further by 
making an analysis of a broader range of hazards that afflict New Zealand, such as landslides, 
drought, flooding and volcanic activity rather than just earthquakes. This would have also 
provided the opportunity to look at more regions in New Zealand, rather than just the 




 This chapter has provided the justification and explanation for the research approach 
that was taken. A mixed-method research approach was taken that triangulated the three 
sources of primary and secondary data, from a review of the current body of literature 
regarding the management of natural hazards, an in-depth policy and document analysis and 
primary data in the form of ten key informant interviews. While there is some debate 
concerning the viability of a purely qualitative approach, this chapter has also shown that the 
triangulation of three different research methods and consideration of the limitations of 
qualitative research will enable reliable results and findings. This chapter has also outlined the 
ethical considerations made for the research, the positionality of the research and the 
limitations.   
  
 53 




 This section seeks to explore the relevant statutory and non-statutory policy and 
documents that influence the development of the disaster and hazard management 
framework in New Zealand and which frame recovery efforts and management of hazards. The 
review of the relevant materials provided in this section are designed to provide context for 
the various claims, ideas and theories presented earlier in this report through the literature 
review and also provide a basis for the primary data collected through this research to be 
referred to and assessed against. Within this section, a review of the legislation and 
frameworks that are relevant to hazard and emergency management will be discussed, with a 
specific emphasis on earthquakes and the additional hazards that they present. In order to 
achieve this, a range of different documents will be evaluated, such as the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) 1991, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEMA) 2002 
and the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan. In New Zealand, 
planning documents exist on a hierarchy that is informed by the RMA which is the overarching 
framework and legal foundation for all planning functions to be executed. The hierarchy is 
shown in Figure 4.1 on the next page displays that the RMA has responsibilities to inform the 
higher tier of planning statements and standards at the central government level, which are 
then used to inform the lower tier planning documents and frameworks at the lower 
governmental levels. As Figure 4.1 shows, the RMA and its contents effectively control the 
formation and content of all other plans through the establishment of the Act’s purpose and 
foundational values that are largely set out within Part 2 (Quality Planning, 2017b). Following 
this, the principles and functions of the RMA exist to generate a number of National Policy 
Statements and sets National Planning Standards that act to guide the content and context of 
lower level planning documents for example, Regional and District Plans (Quality Planning, 
2017b). However, as this process is generally focussed around land-use planning, the concept 
of planning for and around natural hazards operates slightly differently. Figure 4.2 displays the 
interlinked and complex natural of planning documents and frameworks that operate within 
the same sphere to produce and maintain effective and manageable control and planning of, 
and for natural hazards.  
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Figure 4.1 – ‘Linkages between key RMA documents’ 
Source – (Quality Planning, 2017a). 
Figure 4.2 – ‘Relationships between key legislation for the land use management of natural 
hazards 
Source – (Quality Planning, 2013). 
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In New Zealand, no one agency is responsible for hazard management, rather it is influenced 
by the input of a range of different statutory and non-statutory bodies as shown in Figure 4.2. 
However, the role of local authorities and Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups are 
vital for the effective management of this (Quality Planning, 2013), and a hierarchy between 
planning documents still exists when considering natural hazard planning as it does with land-
use planning in general.  
 In order to provide a holistic view of the processes that underpin natural hazard 
planning in New Zealand, and specifically in the case of Canterbury after both the 2010 and 
2011 Christchurch earthquakes and the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake, this section will explore the 
range of different planning documents at differing levels of the hierarchy. This will provide a 
much more detailed understanding of not only the functions of natural hazard planning, but 
also how and why the processes that are being implemented on the ground are being deployed 
and will assist in reviewing the current framework and discerning how principles of pre-event 
recovery planning can retrofit the current regime.  
 
4.2 Resource Management Act 1991 
 
 As previously mentioned, the RMA is responsible for guiding the contents and 
development of all lower level planning documents in New Zealand, and by extension, the 
management of the physical and natural resources in the country. The Act is underpinned by 
the Part 2 Section 5 Purpose which states that; ‘The purpose of this Act is to promote the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources’ (RMA, 1991: s5). The concept of 
sustainable management is further defined in the act as ‘… [sustainable management] enables 
people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for 
their health and safety …’ (RMA, 1991: s5). While this does not specifically reference the need 
for protection against and management of natural hazards, (Glade, 2003; Crozier and Glade, 
2005) state that natural hazards such as landslides, can be influenced by anthropogenic 
activities, such as farming and logging, that increase both the intensity and frequency of 
events, thus negatives impacted the natural and physical resources of an area through loss of 
land, flooding, sedimentation etc. and disallowing the sustainable management of the land.  
 Natural hazards are defined in the RMA as ‘… any atmospheric or earth or water related 
occurrence (including earthquake, tsunami, erosion, volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, 
 56 
subsidence, sedimentation, wind, drought, fire, or flooding) the action of which adversely 
affects or may adversely affect human life, property, or other aspects of the environment.’ This 
definition helps to display the totality of the scope in which hazards are defined under the chief 
legislative document guiding the management of all natural and physical resources. Further, 
under Part 2, Section 6(h), the management of significant risks from natural hazards are 
considered a matter of national importance which ‘all persons exercising functions and powers 
[under the RMA] … shall recognise and provide for…’ (RMA, 1991: s6). Clearly the management 
and monitoring of natural hazards is not simply a task that must be undertaken in order to 
protect and safeguard New Zealanders, their livelihoods, and the health of the environment, 
but it is mandated under the primary resource management legislation document in the RMA. 
This mandated requirement is further revealed in sections 30 and 31 which state the functions, 
powers and duties of local authorities, section 30 considers the functions of regional councils 
while section 31 conveys the functions of territorial authorities.  
 Within section 30 (Functions of regional councils under this Act), natural hazards are 
mentioned three times; (1)(c)(iv), (1)(d)(v) and (1)(g)(iv). These three subsections have been 
designed to consider the use of land, the coastal marine area and any bed of a water body, and 
the above stated subsections all state that the ‘avoidance and mitigation of natural hazards’ 
must be ‘controlled’. Similarly, in section 31, the ‘avoidance and mitigation’ of natural hazards 
is promoted through (1)(b)(i) which governs the control of any or actual potential effects of 
the use, development, or protection of land. This research will suggest that the goal to ‘control’ 
natural hazards is not only not an appropriate approach to take to such against such core and 
unrelenting natural physical processes to promote sustainable and resilient communities but 
does not promote effective and sustainable management that underpins the RMA. Within the 
RMA, sustainable management means ‘managing the use, development, and protection of 
natural and physical resources in a way, or at rate, which enables people and communities to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their health and safety …’ 
(RMA, 1991: s5). A legislative process that mandates the ‘avoidance’ of unabating natural 
processes sets a dangerous scope of dealing with natural events and promotes a focus on 
reactive rather than proactive planning. It is also important to consider the depth of knowledge 
that we have in regard to natural hazards, the Kaikōura earthquake for instance, occurred on 
fault lines that were previously unknown, as such, a framework that emphasises and 
incentivises the ‘avoidance’ of hazards can not always be appropriate, and proactive and 
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carefully considered approaches to hazard management must be considered, such as pre-
event recovery planning. Glavovic, Saunders and Becker (2010) identify that under the current 
hazard management framework, primary used within the CDEMA, that is largely centred 
around the 4R’s of reduction, readiness, response and recovery, and go on to suggest that 
reduction does not get enough attention or emphasis. Further, the full role in which land-use 
planning under the RMA can contribute to risk reduction and the overall better management 
of hazards and extreme natural events is left unrealised through both the lack of emphasis 
being placed on the reduction phase as well as contestation in the implementation of 
legislation and principles within the RMA and the CDEM Act 2002 (Saunders et al., 2007; 
Glavovic, Saunders and Becker, 2010). A regrettable view of hazards and planning for hazards 
has developed despite the increased knowledge base surrounding how hazards operate and 
the areas that they afflict, wherein there is the underlying sense that hazards ‘won’t affect me, 
they will occur somewhere else.’ Glavovic, Saunders and Becker (2010) portray this view as the 
simple hope that ‘it won’t happen to them (communities)’ (Glavovic, Saunders and Becker, 
2010: p. 682), and further convey the message that hazards are an intrinsic part of nature, and 
ignorance of the potential risks will cause immense issues in the future if not appropriately 
considered prior to irreversible development.  
 Section 62 of the RMA outlines the ‘contents of regional policy statements’ and 
pursuant to ss(1)(i)(i) a regional policy statement must state the objectives, policies and 
methods for the control of the use of land in the context of natural hazards, where again, the 
focus is to ‘avoid or mitigate natural hazards or any group of hazards’ (RMA, 1991: s62). 
Furthermore, section 65 of the RMA governs the preparation and change[s] of other regional 
plans, where ss3(c) states that regional plans should be prepared where any risks from natural 
hazards arise or are likely to arise. In the context of New Zealand, this subsection accounts for 
every single region. Filtering through the higher tier planning documents and the hierarchy 
that exists under the RMA, the contents of regional plans are largely directed through Regional 
Policy Statements (RPS), which act to inform what Saunders et al. (2007) consider ‘one of the 
most important aspects of the RMA (Saunders et al., 2007: p. 37). However, the content of 
RPS’s and therefore, Regional Plans, often mimic the issues presented above in which reactive 
planning and a general lack of urgency and consideration is given to natural hazards. 
Additionally, there is a significant amount of variability that exists within RPS’s and Regional 
Plans as they are designed and formulated as effectively independent agencies interpreting 
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higher order planning documents in different ways (Glavovic, Saunders and Becker, 2010). This 
mirrors the observed inconsistencies between the RMA and CDEM Act in how hazard 
management should be approached and how they are represented in each legislative context, 
(Saunders et al., 2007), this factor, however, will be discussed further when this report 
addresses the CDEMA more comprehensively in the following section. A lack of cohesiveness 
and integration between different regions, through uncommon definitions and focusses of 
hazard management has led to a range of different and challenging mandated controls of 
hazards and has made the general management of risk across the country difficult under the 
current RMA framework. Glavovic, Saunders and Becker (2010) express that the variance that 
exists within the different regions regarding the application of hazard management makes it 
difficult to realise the potential of natural hazards planning and obscures the production of 
best practice.  
 Glavovic, Saunders and Becker (2010) consider that while the RMA, operating as the 
chief institutional and legal regime for resource management, and specifically, natural hazards 
in New Zealand has ‘solid policy, legal and institutional foundation’ (Glavovic, Saunders and 
Becker, 2010: p. 687), there are still a number of issues that persist within the current 
framework (Figure 4.3), those which need to be addressed quickly and with purpose to ensure 
Figure 4.3– Cooperative hazards governance: Barriers, burning issues and priority actions 
Source – (Glavovic, Saunders and Becker, 2010). 
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 that New Zealand communities are sustainable and resilient into the future with regard to 
hazard and emergency management. Figure 4.3 displays the areas identified by Glavovic, 
Saunders and Becker (2010) as the barriers and ‘burning issues’ for hazard management in 
New Zealand under the current framework. While not all of these barriers and burning issues 
are derived from solely the influence on the RMA, this legislation is a large driving force behind 
a number of these issues. 
 The current hazard and emergency management framework in New Zealand assumes 
that reduction measures will take place under the RMA, as a function of conditions and due 
diligence under land use planning principles and consent conditions (Glavovic, Saunders and 
Becker, 2010). However, there is a tendency to underplay the actual risk of hazards, and the 
most appropriate reduction methods (which in many cases would be to avoid the development 
of hazard prone sites) are not realised as economic conditions and potential growth are 
prioritised higher (Glavovic, Saunders and Becker, 2010: Saunders and Kilvington, 2016). 
Further factors inhibiting best practice hazard and emergrency management includes the lack 
of a full understanding of the processes behind, effects of humans on, and the recurrence rates 
of hazards (Glavovic, Saunders and Becker, 2010: Saunders and Kilvington, 2016). Despite 
many other statutory and non-statutory documents contributing to the realisation of the entire 
hazard management framework in New Zealand, the shortcomings and issues that are 
presented within the RMA and how this affects the process cannot be understated. More 
effective measures and implementation must be administered under the RMA’s outlined role 
in hazard management of ‘avoidance and mitigation’ to ensure that the undue risk is not put 
on communities that effects the capacity for the growth of resilience and sustainability in 
favour of economic factors, or the failure or unwillingness to fully understand and account for 
hazards and the effects that they have. The RMA and those who administer its functions and 
powers must ensure that more equitable and appropriate measures are taken as to fulfil the 
primary objective of the RMA, which is sustainable management, and to provide social, 
economic and cultural well-beings, communities health and safety and the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable needs of future generations (RMA, 1991: s5). This is further represented as 
Saunders and Kilvington (2016) state, ‘the [mitigation measures] of the RMA do not necessarily 
result in a reduction of risk; only a reduction of the hazard’ (Saunders and Kilvington, 2016: 246-
247).  Furthermore, while underpinned by an ethos of consultation and cooperation under the 
RMA, the lack of an effective framework, resources and initiative for many divisions of local 
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government regarding disaster and hazard management is diminishing the potential for active, 
best practice management to occur (Saunders and Kilvington, 2016).  
 While above mentions the limitations and contestations regarding the RMA and its 
influence on the current disaster and hazard management framework, these challenging 
factors can be readily amended through a variety of legislative processes and avenues. This is 
an important factor to consider as making amendments and changes to National Policy 
Statements, Regional Policy Statements and amendments and alterations to the RMA itself can 
have a significant trickle-down effect that can shape the entire direction of not only hazard 
planning and management, but general land-use planning as well (Saunders et al., 2015).  
 
4.3 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 
 
 Specifically designed to address emergency management issues and govern the often-
chaotic times following a disaster situation, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 
(CDEMA) 2002 encompasses a range of functions and processes that this research seeks to 
address. The CDEMA defines a hazard as ‘something that may cause, or contribute substantially 
to the cause of, an emergency’, while an emergency is further defined as ‘situation that – (a) is 
the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, without limitation, any 
explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, 
serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, 
infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an emergency service or lifeline utility, 
or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and (b) causes or may cause loss of life or injury or 
distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part 
of New Zealand; and (c) cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a 
significant and co-ordinated response under this Act.’ For the purposes of this research, hazards 
and emergency are following the definition of ‘natural hazard’ provided in the RMA and stated 
earlier within the report.  
 The CDEMA is underpinned by the function of the ‘4R’s’:  reduction, readiness, 
response and recovery, where the compilation of all these factors is designed to produce a 
fully encompassing hazard and disaster management framework (Saunders et al., 2007). Given 
the theme of this research, the focus will be primarily on the first two ‘R’s’ of reduction and 
readiness, however, the following section seeks to outline the current use and efficiency of all 
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four ‘R’s’ as to give account of the framework as it stands today. Saunders et al. (2007) contend 
the following objectives of the CDEMA and the approach to hazard management that it 
endorses through legislation: promotes sustainable management of hazards, encourages and 
enables communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk, provides for planning and 
preparation for emergencies (readiness and reduction) and for response and recovery, 
requires local authorities to coordinate planning and activities, provides a basis for the 
integration of national and local civil defence emergency management and, encourages 
coordination across a wide range of agencies, recognising that emergencies are multi-agency 
events (Saunders et al., 2007: p. 38).  
The enactment of the CDEMA in 2002 allowed for the collaboration between a number of 
government agencies, emergency services, local government (councils) and non-governmental 
organisations to produce a nation-wide vision for Civil Defence Emergency Management 
(Norman, 2006). Thus, the National CDEM Strategy was born and has been through 3 different 
stages of development from its introduction in 2003, with a second iteration in 2007 and 
finally, the most recent overhaul and update to the strategy being in 2019 (Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management, 2019). The earliest constructions of a nation-wide 
strategy to address hazard and emergency management were prior to the largest natural 
disasters for New Zealand in recent memory, being the 2010 and 2011 Christchurch 
earthquakes that caused significant loss of life, catastrophic damage to the natural and built 
environment and had ripple effects to every aspect of life, from the economy, to social and 
cultural well-beings. This was also prior to the most recent significant natural event / disaster, 
the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake that caused widespread damage and served as a stark reminder 
of the susceptibility of New Zealand to damaging natural events and the need for effective and 
efficient civil defence and emergency management services as major road and rail networks 
were blocked for months, and which the area still presents immense risk through slope 
instability etc. Considering this, the National CDEM strategies in the past have placed a 
significant emphasis on recovery, highlighted by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Managements’ ‘Focus on Recovery’ that was published in 2005 (Norman, 2006). The ‘Focus on 
Recovery’ produced by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) 
indicates the high priority that was placed on reactive planning and measures within the 
planning framework at this time. This research seeks to explore how this framework would 
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produce better outcomes and achieve the goals of ‘holistic emergency management’ more 
successfully.  
As previously stated, the CDEMA and the framework is centred around the ‘holistic 
approach to the issues of recovery planning, (Rotimi, Le Masurier and Wilkinson, 2006: p. 2) 
which has been defined through the 4R’s. To help administer the rolling out of the 4R’s before, 
during and after a natural event, such as an earthquake, the CDEMA mandates the 
establishment of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups. Section 12 of the CDEMA 
requires the establishment of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups that must 
encompass every regional council and territory authority within New Zealand (CDEMA, 2002: 
s 12(1)(a), s 13(1)). As per s 13(2) no group can have more than one regional council as a 
member unless approval has been received under s 22, this is designed to ensure that there 
are no conflicts of interest within emergency management within regions and that the 
necessary steps can be taken with full support. The functions of Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Groups are laid out within section 17 of the CDEMA, these functions effectively 
contain the entire framework of emergency management as identified through the CDEMA 
and through the 4R’s. Subsection 17(1)(a)(i-iii) requires Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Groups to engage in the implementation of first of the 4R’s of reduction and readiness through 
the identification or risks, consultation of these risks with the relevant parties and the 
identification and implementation of ‘cost-effective risk reduction (CDEMA, 2002: s 17). 
Further in section 17, response and recovery are recognised, firstly through ss (1)(d) which 
states ‘a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, and each of member, are to respond to 
and manage the adverse effects of emergencies in its area’ (CDEMA, 2002: s 17) which 
encapsulates the requirement of ‘response’ under the framework provided by the CDEMA. 
Recovery is then addressed with ss 17(1)(e) which requires ‘a Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Group, and each member of, are to plan and carry out recovery activities’ 
(CDEMA, 2002: s 17).  
 The above stated creation and functions of Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Groups that execute the 4R’s as produced through the CDEMA are only the initial duties that 
are required by these groups. In addition, Section 48 of the CDEMA requires Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Groups to produce management plans that outline the procedures 
and framework for emergency management along all phases as outlined through the CDEMA. 
The Group Plans are designed to create a more inclusive and representative emergency 
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management framework for each region that allows for more focussed and effective analysis 
and delegation of localised emergency management issues. The Group Plans are made at the 
discretion of each Group and are designed to encapsulate the various local hazard 
management issues that persist in each region. While these Group Plans are independently 
designed and implemented by each different Group, they must be approved by the Minister 
(as defined in section 4 of the CDEMA) to make appropriate amendments and ensure that the 
operational plans are effective for their purpose. Furthermore, under section 56 of the CDEMA, 
the plans produced by Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups are subject to a 
comprehensive review after either 5 years of being operative or if the plan has not been 
reviewed in the last 5 years, whichever occurs first. Additionally, minor plan changes can occur 
outside the times of review under section 57 so long as the effects will not be more than minor 
to any persons as a result (CDEMA, 2002: s 57). The enactment and execution of the functions 
and duties outlined in these plans must also be consistent with the National Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Strategy and must reflect the purposes and objectives that are 
outlined within the CDEMA in full.  
 Overseeing and contributing to the development and realisation of all civil defence and 
emergency management functions is the National Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Strategy that is required under section 31 of the CDEMA. The Strategy may include the relevant 
statements from the Crown regarding the goals of civil defence emergency management in 
New Zealand, the objectives designed to meet the goals and the specific targets that are 
designed to make the objectives and goals under the strategy achievable (CDEMA, 2002: s 
31(2)(a-c)). The Strategy must be publicly notified under section 32, while being open to public 
submission, and at all times a Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy must be 
operative and a review must be undertaken every 10 years to ensure that the national direction 
for civil defence and emergency management remains appropriate and effective (CDEMA, 
2002). Further, to provide guidance at a national level is the requirement to produce a National 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan under section 39 of the CDEMA. While the relevant 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups design and implement plans that are specifically 
designed to engage with and address the relevant civil defence and emergency management 
matters specific to a region, the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan must 
state and provide for the hazards and risks to be managed at the national level (CDEMA, 2002: 
s 39). Through providing guidance to the relevant Civil Defence Emergency Management 
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Groups and their plans, similarly, the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 
must undertake a comprehensive review every 5 years to ensure that the direction and 
guidance that is provides is up to date and appropriate, however, at any time the Minister may 
review the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan under section 46(2) if a review 
is deemed necessary (CDEMA, 2002).  
The accumulation of the national and regional level strategies and plans allow for the 
specialised direction and effective management of hazards and risk in New Zealand, coupled 
with the regular intervals in which reviews take place under the CDEMA allows for the 
management of hazards to managed effectively. However, Saunders et al., (2007) suggest that 
RMA and the CDEMA, which operate as the chief legislative documents in regard to civil 
defence and emergency management do not necessary operate in unison, and that they ‘work 
somewhat in isolation of each other, or in silos’ (Saunders et al., 2007: p. 39). This isolation of 
each other produces inconsistencies in how hazard and emergency management, the 
assessment of risks and the functionality of the processes outlined in each Act are physically 
implemented and can often lead to poor management and planning outcomes (Saunders et 
al., 2007). One main area for contention is that the RMA is mainly focussed on the land-use 
measures that are centred around reduction (the first of the 4R’s), while the CDEMA does not 
really address these issues in much depth. This has resulted in a range of discrepancies within 
the various different planning documents and legislation that govern the outcome of civil 
defence emergency management planning and produce difficulties in effectively assessing and 
implementing best practice when there such deviations are required from one set of legislation 
to another (Saunders et al., 2007).  
Considering the conflict that surrounds the different applications and appropriateness of 
the legislative framework in New Zealand in regard to hazard management and planning, and 
more broadly, civil defence emergency management, Saunders et al. (2007) offer a framework 
so that the RMA and the CDEMA can act more cohesively in the future. The framework 
provided is represented below in Figure 4.4 which displays the effective communication and 
interconnectedness that both the RMA and the CDEMA could have to establish a more holistic 
and effective civil defence emergency management and hazard planning process. Figure 4.4 
also displays the various levels of government that are associated with each different element 




Figure 4.4 – Hazard reduction linkages betw
een the RM
A and the CDEM
A  
Source – Adapted from
 Saunders et al., 2007. 
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aid for understanding how each of these different documents can and should work together 
to achieve this goal of a more comprehensive disaster management framework. It is hoped 
that implementing a more holistic and cohesive operational framework to tackle civil defence 
emergency management matters in the future will result in more effective overall outcomes 
as hazard management continues to evolve and develop. 
 
4.4 Non-Statutory Planning Instruments 
 
 Non-statutory planning instruments and tools also have a profound effect on the 
operation and realisation of civil defence emergency management and hazard management 
principles and can drastically shape the frameworks at the national level and can have critical 
impacts on the undertaking of hazard management at the various regional and local scales. 
The establishment of continued development of non-statutory planning instruments such as 
the newly revised National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS) that was released in 2019 are 
of the utmost importance, as non-statutory documents such as this facilitate the national 
direction for hazard and emergency management. Alongside National Environmental 
Standards, National Policy Statements etc. guidelines are created in which the hazard 
management and the civil defence and emergency management framework can be built upon, 
as these national level planning documents and statements must be given regard to when 
formulating and enforcing Plans in New Zealand (Quality Planning, 2017b).  
Regional Policy Statements are developed as a responsibility of each regional council in 
the country, these statements must give effect to higher level planning documents and 
formulate the basis for regional directions across all aspects of resource management, which 
includes hazard and emergency management. Regional policy statements as defined by 
Saunders et al., (2015) ‘are regional-level documents that contain regional-level policy, but no 
rules’ (Saunders et al., 2015: p. 63). While these documents are non-statutory by nature and 
do not directly inform or contribute to the overall hazard management framework directly, 
they are influential in shaping the regional control of hazard management. The establishment 
of effective RPS’s are especially vital when considering the effect that they have Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Groups and the Plans that they are mandated to create under section 
48 of the CDEMA.  
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The following sections will outline a range of the guiding non-statutory planning 
instruments that have helped to shape the current hazard management framework in New 
Zealand at both the national and regional levels, and with specific reference to the NDRS, will 
show the trajectory for hazard management for New Zealand for the foreseeable future as the 
guiding framework for all matters related to natural disasters. 
 
4.4.1 National Disaster Resilience Strategy – 2019 
 
 The NDRS was developed under a requirement of the CDEMA when it was passed in 
2002. Section 31(1) states; ‘The Minister must, on behalf of the Crown, complete a national civil 
defence emergency management strategy’ (CDEMA, 2002), the strategy created must outline 
clearly the goals of the Crown in regard to civil defence emergency management as well as 
outlines the specific objectives and targets that will make the strategy achievable. Since the 
enactment of the CDEMA, and subsequently, the formulation of the first NDRS in 2003, a 
successive strategy was made in 2007 and the latest edition was released in 2019 after a 3 year 
development which included a wide range of workshops and collaboration with 
representatives of over 300 organisations, embracing local and central government, social, 
community and voluntary sector groups, as well as the private sector (National Disaster 
Resilience Strategy, 2019).  
 The current NDRS was developed during a time of extreme pressure and tragedy in 
New Zealand in terms of natural disasters and civil defence emergency management. This 
review occurred when the country was still very much undertaking recovery efforts after the 
devastating 2010 and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes as well as the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake 
being very fresh in the memory of all involved, and the repercussions of this event still plaguing 
Kaikōura and the wider regions. Despite this, the tumultuous environment in which the NDRS 
was developed in provided the opportunity to create a strategy that was informed by the 
lessons learnt from the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes. ‘These lessons have specifically 
created a direction that emphasises encouraging wide participation, provides for planning and 
preparations for emergencies, and encourages co-ordination across a wide range of agencies’ 
(NDRS, 2019: p. 9). While the methods in which ‘planning and preparations for emergencies’ 
are outlined within the Strategy at various points and capacities, these aspirations could be 
realised through the methods and principles outlined within the concept of pre-event recovery 
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planning, supported through this research and conveyed in Figure 2.5 and by Becker and 
Saunders (2007). Furthermore, the development of the Strategy that was largely informed 
through the lessons learnt from disaster management of the last decade has developed a very 
focussed set of priorities, objectives and recommendations to continually develop and outline 
the path for more effective and holistic civil defence emergency management for the next 10 
years as the life of the new Strategy. Figure 4.5 displays the priorities and objectives that have 
been formulated in the NRDS.  
Figure 4.5 – National Disaster Resilience Strategy Priorities and Objectives for CDEM in New 
Zealand for the next 10 years. 
Source – (NRDS, 2019: p. 3) 
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 The priorities and objectives that are displayed through Figure 4.5 are designed to 
create a more holistic and effective approach to civil defence emergency management, which 
by definition, includes disaster and hazard management. Considering the themes of this 
research, the objectives from the NRDS that hold the most relevance are 1,2,3,5,8,9,14,17 and 
18. These objectives have been highlighted in particular as they reflect and embody what this 
research considers to be vital steps forward for disaster and hazard management for New 
Zealand in the future. Objectives such as 1 and 3 are centred around the procurement of 
knowledge of natural processes and how they present and impose risk on communities, and 
how an understanding of these risks can improve hazard management. This relates directly to 
the foundational principles of pre-event recovery planning that Becker and Saunders (2007) 
highlight and are displayed of Figure 2.5 which endorse the widespread establishment of 
proactive hazard planning as national standard practice in order to significantly increase 
preparedness and knowledge of risk, therefore increasing the ability to respond to and recover 
from destructive natural events (Becker and Saunders, 2007). Additionally, throughout the 
NDRS, foremost within Section 3.4, it is stated that the cost of recovery and response from 
disasters is immense, and further, that most, if not all projections of costs from a disaster do 
not fully comprehend the total cost (NRDS, 2019: p. 2, 13). As such, emphasis is placed on the 
reduction and readiness phases to be more comprehensive, as incentivising and funding work 
done prior to a destructive natural event can have an immense impact on the total cost of a 
disaster (Burby, 2005). This study by Burby (2005) analysed the effectiveness of states in 
America where local government implemented ‘comprehensive plans’ regarding weather-
related natural disasters ability to reduce the cost of natural disasters and those that did not. 
The findings from Burby’s (2005) report showed that if all states that were affected by weather-
related natural disasters had incorporated comprehensive plans that addressed disaster and 
hazard planning, insurance claims on just residential properties would be reduced by $213(US) 
million. Furthermore, Benson and Clay (2004) assert that in the case of developing countries, 
natural disasters afflict both severe short-term economic impacts as well as long-term 
consequences for economic growth, development and poverty reduction. Despite this, the 
authors claim that not all negative impacts are inevitable, and that the integration of long-term 
and meaningful investment into the establishment and continual development of hazard risk 
management can produce significant reductions in the costs of disasters (Benson and Clay, 
2004). However, this is not to say that all aspects of disaster and hazard management are 
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better, or should be planned for in advance, Pradhananga et al., (2016) identify the emergency 
supply allocation after a natural disaster is most effectively, and most cost efficiently done in a 
post-disaster situation, where deprivation costs and total costs can be managed more 
effectively. 
 Objective 14 of the NDRS translates directly to the section of this research that is 
focussed on including and incentivising public participation within the current disaster and 
hazard management framework. Objective 14 states; ‘Cultivate an environment for social 
connectedness which promotes a culture of mutual help; embed a collective impact approach 
to building community resilience’ (NRDS, 2019: p. 3). The increased acknowledgement of, and 
emphasis being placed on the role of the community in disaster and hazard management 
within the primary non-statutory planning instrument for civil defence emergency 
management in New Zealand will allow for a trickle-down effect to penetrate, and become 
increasingly prevalent within statutory and non-statutory planning documents, such as 
regional and civil defence emergency management group plans into the future. Furthermore, 
the third priority (shown in Figure 4.5) established through the NRDS clearly indicates the 
intent of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management to promote and facilitate 
increased levels of public participation for hazard management moving forward as lessons 
from the past decade, Christchurch in particular have helped shaped this new vision. This 
enhanced focus on facilitating public participation within the disaster and hazard management 
sphere has come from the recognised current and previous weaknesses that have been 
identified through the reviewing of the 2012 NDRS through to the development of the 2019 
NDRS. Appendix 2 of the NDRS is titled ‘Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this 
Strategy’ and within page 45 highlights some of the current barriers to resilience. Two factors 
are directly related to public participation where the NDRS states that individual household 
awareness and preparedness is ‘not as high as it should be, given our risks’ (NDRS, 2019: p. 45), 
and building community resilience is still seen as an extremely resource intensive operation, 
even when simply playing a facilitative role (NDRS, 2019: p. 45). This assessment has been 
developed through the lessons that have been learnt through the past decade of dealing with 
natural disasters and the noticeable shortfalls that must be addressed in order for disaster and 
hazard management to be successful and holistic in New Zealand moving forward.   
 The newly developed NDRS also takes significant steps to promote the use of MEK and 
the endeavours for the widespread adoption and acknowledgement of cultural knowledge to 
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be input into the disaster and hazard management framework. Within Section 5 of the 
Strategy, the NDRS states; ‘At the community level, an understanding of hazard events, whether 
from living memory or oral and written histories, can inform and influence decisions on 
preparedness, including life-saving evacuation procedures and the location of important 
facilities’ (NDRS, 2019: p. 27). This notion is supported through the primary objectives of the 
NRDS, primarily through objective 8 (as seen on Figure 4.5) where a concerted effort is to be 
taken in regard to the inclusion of ‘greater recognition, understanding, and integration’ 
(NDRDS, 2019: p. 3) of not only the values and beliefs of Māori, but how the traditions and 
experiences of Māori can help facilitate better practice disaster and hazard management 
outcomes. Furthermore, the wider importance of culture is identified as a tool to help improve 
civil defence emergency management in general through objective 18 which states; ‘Recognise 
the importance of culture to resilience, including to support the continuity of cultural places, 
institutions and activities, and to enable the participation of different cultures in resilience’ 
(NRDS, 2019: p. 3).  
In addition to the above mentioned statements and objectives regarding both the 
increased facilitation of public participation and MEK, that exist as a clear statement of intent 
from the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management as to meaningfully incorporate 
and provide for Māori environmental and cultural knowledge. Appendix 3 of the Strategy 
highlights the future of disaster and hazard management in New Zealand is focussed towards 
higher levels of collaboration in the future. As per Appendix 3, the NRDS as a whole was 
developed following the framework of ‘Collective Impact’ (Figure 4.6), first introduced through 
the Stanford Social Innovation Review 2011. This framework is ‘premised on the belief that no 
Figure 4.6 – The effect of ‘Collective Impact’ on creating a cohesive vision and uniting common 
goals 
Source – (NRDS, 2019: p. 48). 
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single policy, government department, organisation or program can tackle or solve the 
increasingly complex social problems we face as society’ (NRDS, 2019: p. 48). These methods 
were employed to create the Strategy, these same foundational principles can and should be 
used to continually develop the hazard and disaster management framework in future. An 
obligation to facilitate collaboration and promote inclusivity will not only help encourage a 
culture of management that focusses on proactivity but will support the overall objectives and 
goals of the NRDS to support and advocate for public participation and the endorsement of 
MEK.  
 The Strategy sets out the priorities, objectives and recommendations, some of which 
have been outlined above, and also presents and advises the way in which these should be 
achieved under the framework provided. A major component of completing the vision of the 
Strategy is that it must be realised through the formation of ‘other key related documents, 
such as the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group Plans (NDRS, 2019: p. 9). The NDRS itself 
outlines that some work is done by the Strategy itself, in the form on the guiding principles and 
setting out a nationwide direction and set of priorities, while the rest of the work is driven 
through other legislation and policy that aims to realise the ambitions of the NDRS, such as 
Regional and District Plans. In this way the outcomes of the Strategy can be realised through 
implemented on the ground as the priorities objectives and policies will be instituted through 
land-use planning and planners.  
 Outside of the structured priorities and objectives that the NDRS provides, the Strategy 
also outlines the scope and role of the document within the hazard management framework 
in New Zealand. Section 1.5 of the Strategy outlines the ‘Intended Audience of the Strategy’. 
Detached from the original guiding purpose of the Strategy in creating a structure for lower 
order planning documents to be informed through when engaging in general land-use 
planning, it also provides itself the role of the primary learning document for hapu and 
community organisation and individual, families and whanau, where all readers are 
encouraged to consider what this Strategy means for them, in any capacity (NRDS, 2019: p. 
10).  
 The Strategy’s footing in the current hazard management framework is also important 
to consider as this research was previously mentioned that the current climate for emergency 
management can be convoluted with a range of high level guiding documents, namely the RMA 
and the CDEMA can create an environment and visions that do not interact with much 
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harmony (Saunders et al., 2007). However, section 2.2 of the Strategy indicates that New 
Zealand and the CDEM framework is well supported through the current regulatory regime, in 
the form of the RMA, CDEMA, Building Act, Local Government Act etc., this is further supported 
on page 24 that states that New Zealand has created a ‘coherent, joined-up approach to 
resilience that connects with several government departments and organisational mandates’ 
(NRDS, 2019: p. 24). As Saunders et al. (2007) describe, there seems to be a disconnect 
between theory and practice where planners operating under the framework and guidance of 
the RMA are often detached from the processes that those operating under other Acts such 
as the CDEMA. This feeling of disengagement between the various pieces of legislation 
governing the disaster and hazard management framework is not provided for or even 
recognised however in the NRDS that has been specifically developed around the lessons learnt 
from the past decade of disasters and using the framework of ‘Collective Impact’. Section 6 of 
the NRDS states that ‘New Zealand has a seamless end-to-end emergency management system 
that supports effective response to and recovery from emergencies …’ (NRDS, 2019: p. 29).  
 A range of different factors have been implemented when considering the formulation 
and rationale for the creation of the NRDS. As previously discussed, the Strategy has been 
informed through the lessons learnt in New Zealand over the past decade living through some 
of the most destructive and deadly natural disasters in the history of the country. The 
framework of ‘Collective Impact’ has also had a significant influence on the development of 
the Strategy as have the two previous versions of the NRDS. However, national lessons of 
disaster management have not been the sole driving force for the content of the Strategy, 
Section 3.7 outlines the commitment made by New Zealand to the ‘Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015 – 2030 (NRDS, 2019: p. 15). During development, three 
key ideas were identified that united the visions of the NRDS and the SFDRR; Firstly, a greater 
effort to understand risk, where investment can be prioritised as to make better, more 
informed decisions and build resilience into everyday processes in for now and for the future. 
Secondly, a shift in the focus, from managing disasters to managing risk, and thirdly, taking a 
broader ‘whole-of-society’ approach, acknowledging that everyone has a role to play when 
engaging in risk management and reduction (NRDS, 2019: p. 15). Considering the common 
themes and the emphasis placed on acquiring knowledge to be able to better comprehend and 
analyse risk, the shift in thinking from trying to manage physical processes themselves and 
start to manage what is manageable in terms of the risk we place upon ourselves through land-
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use planning and development and expanding the scope of disaster and hazard management 
to all aspects of society are all factors that can be discussed and approached through the 
framework of pre-event recovery planning. Considering the mandate of the NDRS through 
collaboration with not only the SFDRR, but with ‘Collective Impact’, the disaster and hazard 
framework in New Zealand requires new thinking to achieve the ambitions of the Strategy, this 
research will continue to argue that, at least in some capacity, the framework and principles 
that underpin pre-event recovery planning can provide these new ways forward. The principles 
of pre-event recovery planning are somewhat supported through the NRDS already, the 
Strategy states a clear ‘Vision for New Zealand’ on page 25 while stating that ‘New Zealand 
takes a proactive, anticipatory, smart approach to limit impacts before they happen, 
understanding that action up-front limits costs later’ (NRDS, 2019: p. 25).This clearly shows the 
intent from the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management to engage in planning 
proactively in the future and outlines a clear endorsement for this approach to planning in the 
future, which could be supported and informed through pre-event recovery planning.  
 
4.4.2 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030 
 
 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is the successor of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005 – 2015 which started a global movement targeting strategic and 
systematic approach for reducing vulnerabilities and risks to hazards while it ‘underscored the 
need for, and identified ways of, building resilience of nations and communities to disasters’ 
(United Nations, 2005: p 1). The framework was produced on the back of extensive 
consultation that dated from March 2012 as well as inter-governmental negotiations from July 
2014 to ensure that global input and acceptance was attained to help ensure the success of 
the framework (United Nation, 2015: p. 5). Building upon previous iterations of similar 
frameworks to address the global susceptibility to hazards and the risks that they endanger 
people with. The framework addressed both natural and manmade hazards that range from 
environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks and aims to provide a 
comprehensive guide to multi-hazard management of disaster risk within and across all sectors 
(United Nations, 2015). Thus, and as previously shown during the analysis of the NDRS, New 
Zealand has used the Sendai Framework and the guiding principles as a foundational document 
in order to produce effective management strategies for addressing all hazard related 
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consequences. The following interrogation of the Sendai Framework will identify a selection of 
the most influential information and guiding principles that have acted to inform the wider 
New Zealand framework. This review however, in keeping in line with the scope and purpose 
of the research will situate its review within the sphere of natural hazards.  
 There is a clear correlation between a number of the guiding principles within the 
Sendai Framework and the strategy put forward by the Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management in New Zealand through the NDRS, where risk identification and 
subsequent reduction are heavily focussed on as well as adopting a ‘whole-of-society’ 
approach where risk effects everyone, therefore the approach to risk management must 
engage all. However, there are a number of pathways and ideologies within the Sendai 
Framework that go beyond the scope of the New Zealand framework and the directive 
produced through the NDRS and are more closely related and interlinked with the guiding 
principles and ideals of pre-event recovery planning that has been used as a foundational 
theory within this research. The Sendai Framework offers four priorities for action when 
seeking to achieve meaningful levels of disaster risk reduction within the 15 year time frame 
of the framework, these four priorities are as follows; Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk; 
Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; Priority 3: Investing 
in disaster risk reduction for resilience; Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for 
effective response, and to ‘Build Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
(United Nations, 2015: p. 14). These four priorities are somewhat intertwined either within the 
current hazard management framework in New Zealand already or are becoming more and 
more relevant within hazard planning theories and development, one of which is pre-event 
recovery planning that is seemingly fully aligned with the principles and priorities outlined 
within the Sendai Framework.  
Both the Sendai Framework and pre-event recovery planning strongly promote the 
need to and immense advantages of proactive planning and thinking with regard to hazards. 
This is conveyed through the strong advocation of the need to better understand not simply 
disaster themselves, but moreover, the risk and dangers that these events and processes effect 
humans, livelihoods and properties. Proactive planning with regard to natural hazards and 
emergency management is a multi-faceted process that enlists a range of different processes 
and approaches that are outside the conventional perception of proactive hazard planning in 
risk identification and hazard knowledge. Proactive planning is also achieved and developed 
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through collaboration and co-operation between and within government agencies, lifeline 
utilities and very importantly, through building relationships and engaging in meaningful 
participation with communities. The Sendai Framework acknowledges that while risk 
identification, knowledge and reduction is imperative to effective overall hazard management, 
there are a number of different avenues that must be taken to ensure that this process is 
utilised to its fullest potential. Priority 2 within the Sendai Framework endorses the need to 
strengthen governance with regard to hazard management, one of the identified options to 
undertake this is to achieve higher levels of co-ordination at a national and regional level while 
at the same time ‘incentivising the public and private sectors to take action and address 
disaster risk’ (United Nations, 2015: p. 10). Furthermore, the guiding principles of the Sendai 
Framework call for the empowerment of local authorities in supporting and mobilising the 
community through the allocation of resources as well as highlighting the benefits and 
necessity of creating meaningful and sincere engagement of all groups as disasters, hazards 
and risks do not discriminate between groups.  
New Zealand has clearly taken into account the Sendai Framework with regard to the 
hazard management framework that has been developed in this country, and the continual 
development and guidance from the United Nations persists through the most recent updates 
to our framework, namely in the NDRS. However, there are elements that are not represented 
through the national framework that would be beneficial to the hazard management sphere 
in New Zealand in general, that has the potential to be supplemented through theories such 
as pre-event recovery planning. 
 
4.4.3 Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan 
 
 As previously stated, the requirement under section 48 of the CDEMA for Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Groups to create Group Plans are an essential piece within the 
current hazard and emergency management framework in New Zealand. CDEM Group Plans 
are designed to be ‘living documents’ and exist to inform not only the Group itself of the 
relevant disaster and hazard management planning processes and considerations, but also the 
Groups member agencies and the general public (Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management, 2018: p. 4). CDEM Group Plans exist as an important link in the wider hazard 
management framework in New Zealand as they ‘state and provide for the hazards and risks 
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to be managed by the Group, and the CDEM arrangements necessary to give effect to the Plan’ 
(Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, 2018: p. 4) and should be considered at 
the same level as Regional Policy Statements when assessing the overall hierarchy of planning 
documents. The Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group have, in accordance 
with section 48 of the CDEMA, created a Group Plan that was last amended in June of 2018 to 
address and consider any and all matters in the region in regard to hazard and emergency 
management. As per section 12(1)(a) of the CDEMA, ‘every regional council and every 
territorial authority within that region must unite to establish a Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Group…’, as such, the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group 
covers a very large proportion of the South Island. Figure 4.7 displays the area of the 
Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group and the members of the Group.  
 While essentially the entirety of New Zealand is underlaid by significant hazards and 
risks of all types and sizes, no other region has seen such a tumultuous decade in terms of 
significant hazards as Canterbury with the occurrence of the 2010 and 2011 Christchurch 
earthquakes and most recently the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. As such, the Canterbury Civil 
 
Figure 4.7 – Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Area. 
Source – (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018). 
 78 
Defence Emergency Management Group and the Plan that has been constructed for the region 
is focussed very intensely on assessing, mapping and making the required provisions against 
risk, and the potential for future hazardous events. Understanding this, the Group Plan was 
designed under the foundational principles of the hazard management framework in general, 
in the context of the 4R’s, which overall was formulated to provide strategic direction on how 
‘risk-based emergency management will be implemented in the Canterbury region’ 
(Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 7). While guided by the 
national framework as conveyed through the CDEMA and the 4R’s structure, the Canterbury 
CDEM Group Plan is further informed through a range of statutory and non-statutory 
mechanisms, this includes legislation, policy and plans and all connect through the medium of 
the Group Plan to provide for the integrated management of natural hazards and their effects 
in the Canterbury region (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018). 
Amongst the different guiding statutory and non-statutory documents and mechanisms, the 
Canterbury Regional Policy Statement (CRPS) prepared by Environment Canterbury was a 
crucial document for the initial and continued development of the Group Plan. The CRPS 
strongly conveys the intent to prioritise the avoidance of development and land-use activities 
on and within areas that have high susceptibility to risk from natural hazards, ranging from 
seismic activity to inundation. There are a number of different objectives and policies 
contained within the CRPS that communicate this intent, one such objective within the 
statement is 11.2.1 which states ‘Avoid new subdivision, use and development of land that 
increases risks associated with natural hazards’ (Environment Canterbury, 2016). Furthermore, 
the preference of completely avoiding the exposure of people and developments to potential 
adverse risk in regard to natural hazards as well as aiming to avoid hard or soft engineering 
solutions to help minimise risk is reflected in objective 11.2.2 which states ‘Adverse effects 
from hazard mitigation avoided or mitigated’ (Environment Canterbury, 2016). These priorities 
have been made effective through amendments to the CRPS in the aftermath of the 
Christchurch earthquakes and have made their place in their document for good reason, the 
post-earthquake and rebuild scenario that Christchurch is still very much going through has 
raised questions around the appropriateness of the legislation and guidelines governing land-
use in the region, things were deemed to have needed to change in order to create a more 
safe, resilient and sustainable environment in Canterbury (Environment Canterbury, 2016).  
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 Considering the content within and the strong influence that the CRPS has had in the 
development of the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan has, 
particularly in the most recent version of the Plan, being updated in June of 2018, one of the 
foundational principles identified within the Plan is ‘To manage risk effectively it is essential to 
understand the risk management context within Canterbury’ (Canterbury Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 7). These guiding philosophies were developed with 
the recognition that the Group has made that there is two distinct but innately interconnected 
aspects of reduction and readiness planning (the first two of the 4R’s in hazard planning in New 
Zealand). These highly interdependent aspects are community and organisational readiness. 
Given this focus, the Group have identified through the Plan the scope in which these aspects 
will be addressed moving forward with hazard management and throughout the life of the 
Plan. With regard to community readiness, there is a specific focus on two things; Engaging 
communities to increase their understanding of hazards and the consequences of this, in both 
the short and long-term, and in developing community response planning (Canterbury Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 8). ‘Enhancing community readiness is 
primarily about public education, effective public warning systems and supporting community-
level response planning’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 
38). The Group has made a clear indication of the necessity and benefits of fostering a wider 
environment of knowledge and awareness with regard to natural hazards and the threats that 
they cause not just within the Group itself but with ‘individuals, families, businesses and 
communities’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 38), this 
aspiration has a direct link to the principles of pre-event recovery planning where the links 
between communities and risk awareness and knowledge are designed to be strengthened 
through meaningful public participation and consultation. While the individuals, families, 
businesses and communities rely on the Canterbury CDEM Group, equally, the Group relies on 
the local communities for hazard awareness and warnings, local knowledge, relationships with 
community members and provision of response resources. Understanding and acknowledging 
this, the crucial role of engaging in public participation should not be understated, and the 
relationship between the public and effective hazard planning is clear. 
 The second identified aspect of attaining more representative reduction and readiness 
through the Group Plan is organisation readiness. Organisational readiness refers to ensuring 
that all trained personnel have clear identified roles and have the skills to fulfil these roles in a 
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fashion that achieves the identified targets of effective hazard management (Canterbury Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018). Achieving organisational readiness requires 
collaboration and effective communication across an immense number of different 
stakeholders, it includes the CDEM sector which includes emergency response agencies, 
government and non-government organisations and has spin-off effects to a range of other 
areas (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, 2018: p. 38). ‘Enhancing the 
ability of organisations to prepare for and manage civil defence emergencies is the priority for 
the CDEM Group’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 8). The 
primary method identified by the Group to assist in achieving the levels of organisation 
readiness required for effective hazard management is through targeted risk identification, 
and through identification, reduction. As previously stated, the CRPS has had a significant 
influence on the content of the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan, as such, where the CRPS ‘prefers 
to reduce risk through avoidance of risk rather than strategies to mitigate the hazard’ 
(Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 34), the Canterbury CDEM 
Group Plan reflects this intent. However, in order to be able to confidently identify where risks 
are most adverse, and to assess the appropriateness of development in regard to these risks, 
comprehensive risk identification must occur, in order for risk reduction to be effective. Risk 
reduction involves identifying and analysing long-term risk to human life and property from 
hazards, taking steps to eliminate (avoid) if practicable, and if not, reduce (mitigate) the 
magnitude of their impact and the likelihood that they will occur. The Canterbury CDEM Group 
Plan states that risk reduction is achieved in part through using statutory and non-statutory 
mechanisms, including legislation, policy and plans for the integrated management of natural 
hazards (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 34).  
 Despite this clear intention to pursue risk identification, and through this, risk reduction 
the Canterbury CDEM Group has identified a number of issues within the wider CDEM 
framework in New Zealand that is hindering the continual positive development of the sector 
moving forward. Section 4.4 of the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan outlines the issues and 
objectives of Plan. These issues pertain to the wider CDEM sector where three main matters 
are conveyed, they are as follows; ‘Risk reduction should be given more emphasis by the CDEM 
Sector; Risk management planning should be integrated and coordinated across the CDEM 
sector; Risk needs to be better understood and more effectively communicated by the CDEM 
sector’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 34). The shortfalls 
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of the CDEM sector as communicated through the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan can 
potentially be addressed when looking at the principles and guiding theories that form pre-
event recovery planning. Risk reduction as defined in the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan 
involves analysing long-term risks to humans and property, this aspiration can be directly 
related to the emphasis on proactive planning that is championed by pre-event recovery 
planning. An adoption of this processes would be a first step in seeking to address the issue 
that the Canterbury CDEM Group have identified of a lack of importance on risk reduction 
throughout the entire sector and would result in a more holistic framework. Additionally, the 
aspiration of the Canterbury CDEM Group to highlight risk management planning is highly 
dependent on a comprehensive working body of knowledge surrounding risks, therefore, for 
risk management planning to become more integrated and coordinated, and risks to be better 
understood and communicated within the wider CDEM sector in general, proactive and 
targeted planning must occur to develop a knowledge base to support this. Pre-event recovery 
planning offers a guiding philosophy for this to occur on a national level scale. This is supported 
through an objective stated under section 4.4.2 of the Group Plan which acknowledges the 
benefits of forward thinking within the CDEM framework where it states the Canterbury CDEM 
Group will ‘proactively identify, understand and manage the risks that Canterbury’s 
communities face’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 34). 
Furthermore, the Group Plan states that ‘risk identification enables realistic planning’ 
(Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 36), where the most 
effective way to deal with hazards, which by their very nature are hard to predict, a sound base 
knowledge provides the opportunity for not only realistic, but effective planning.  
 Saunders et al. (2007) suggests that there is a disconnect within persons exercising 
functions, powers and duties under the various forms of legislation that exist to make up the 
hazard management framework that operates in New Zealand, namely, the CDEMA and the 
RMA. This disconnect occurs in particular in regard to effectively communicating the concept 
of risk for land-use planning and best practice under the RMA. The Canterbury CDEM Group 
Plan also recognises this, displayed within Table 4.3 on page 37 an identified proposed action 
is to ‘Assist with ensuring that hazards and risks are taken into account in land-use planning 
practices’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 37). A specific 
purpose of the Canterbury CDEM Group, as conveyed through their Group Plan is in 
‘encouraging cooperative planning and action between all emergency management agencies 
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and the community’ (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2018: p. 9). It 
is in the hope that these efforts to coordinate efforts and processes such as proactive planning, 
meaningful public participation, education and risk identification and management will bring 
about the immediate, medium and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a 
community following an emergency.  
 
4.5 Local Level Planning Documents 
Iwi Management Plans 
 An Iwi Management Plan (IMP) is a document that has been developed and approved 
by either an iwi, iwi authority, rūnanga or hapū to address any and all matters of resource 
management activity that is deemed to be of significance or importance within the respective 
rohe (region) of that iwi (Saunders, 2017). While IMPs are designed around the Māori 
worldview that is centred around resource management issues and the relationship between 
Māori and the environment, where it is a living, working system rather than a commodity, 
stating there is a natural balance within the universe, and the exploitation and 
commodification of the natural environment unsettles this balance (Harmsworth and Awatere, 
2013). Considering this, IMPs are often more of a holistic document and do not simply start 
and end with the relevant resource management issues that iwi determine are important to 
them, as such, they are also used to express ‘economic’ social, political and cultural issues in 
addition to any environmental and resource management issues of an iwi or hapū (Saunders, 
2017: p. 3). Alongside this, IMPs can, and usually contain information that directly relates to 
the context of the iwi and hapū groups that are in the area. This is commonly in the form of 
specific cultural values, historical accounts, descriptions of areas of interest as well as hapū / 
iwi boundaries. Another aspect of high significance within IMPs is the consultation and 
engagement protocols that must be taken into account when facilitating resource consents 
and plan changes (Saunders, 2017). The inclusion of these guidelines and protocols cannot be 
overstated as consultation with iwi has often been underdelivered, and in order to obtain an 
environment of genuine collaboration and cooperation, consultation is key (Solutions, 2004). 
However, it is equally important to note that considering the comprehensive nature of IMPs, 
they should not be taken as a substitute for genuine, meaningful consultation (Solutions, 
2004).  
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 While the cultural and spiritual values of each iwi and hapū will be directly reflected in 
their detailed approaches and philosophies regarding sustainable management within the IMP, 
the Plans also provide the opportunity to assist not only all Māori, but also the general wider 
public (Saunders, 2017). Iwi management plans can assist Māori in a number of different ways 
as conveyed by Saunders (2017), these include; facilitating knowledge transfer by capturing 
mātauranga Māori, providing a framework to articulate values, aspirations and issues and 
ensuring iwi / hapū interests are recognised in the resource consent application process 
(Saunders, 2017: p. 5). Alongside this, the author has noted the swathe of positive impacts that 
the creation of IMPs can have in educating and informing the wider public about matters of 
importance to Māori, these include; enhancing understanding and appreciation, building 
community awareness and helping resource consent applicants identify relevant matters for 
assessments of environmental effects (Saunders, 2017: p. 5). Furthermore, within the 
legislative environment, Solutions (2004) noted that the more widespread inclusion and 
acknowledgements of IMPs as legitimate statutory documents had increased the relationship 
between iwi and hapū groups and local government in the form of councils. This increase in 
local government recognition and an increase in the partnership between local iwi and councils 
has been brought about largely through amendments in the RMA in 2003. These amendments 
targeted the reference and wording when addressing IMPs within the RMA, this was changed 
and strengthened to ‘take into account any relevant planning document recognised by an iwi 
authority, and lodged with council, to the extent that its content has a bearing on resource 
management issues in the region’, what is of note is the language change from ‘have regard 
to’ to ‘take into account’ has significantly elevated the importance of IMPs under the RMA, 
thus promoting them up the hierarchy of planning documents and requiring by law local 
authorities take account of these documents if they have been lodged with council (RMA, 
1991; Saunders, 2017).  
 Figure 4.8 on the following page outlines the influence and scope that iwi management 
plans are afforded within the planning hierarchy that is presented through the RMA in New 
Zealand. Saunders (2017) note that under the RMA the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi are 
overarching pursuant to section 6(e) which states that the relationship between Māori and 
their culture and traditions in regard to ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu and other 
taonga are matters of national importance. As such, IMPs have considerable influence over a 
large portion of the wider planning framework and whose content operates as a primary 
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planning tool for the creation of lower level planning documents. Figure 4.8 shows that the 
influence of Iwi management plans, while IMPs themselves do not directly have influence over 
the higher-level planning documents under the RMA, such as Coastal Policy Statements and 
National Policy Statements, they help to inform RPS’s and therefore the lower-level planning 
documents such as Regional and District Plans (Saunders, 2017). In this position, RPS’s, regional 
plans, district plans and other non-statutory planning tools must recognise and provide for the 
contents of IMPs. 
 
Considering the wide-reaching nature of IMPs and their content, these tools have the 
potential to significantly contribute to the hazard management framework in New Zealand. 
With regard to the wide scope and large field of influence that IMPs command, they have the 
Figure 4.8 – The influence of Iwi Management Plans under the RMA based planning hierarchy 
Source – (Saunders, 2017). 
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potential to contribute to a wide range of resource management issues and problems that are 
of relevance to Māori, this includes natural hazards. Information on natural hazards can include 
various management options, action points for reducing risks and importantly guidance with 
regard to the engagement processes to assist with the transfer of natural hazard science and 
mitigation measures (Saunders, 2017). Kenney et al. (2015) acknowledge that as the 
indigenous people of New Zealand, Māori have a long, storied history of managing and 
integrating life surrounded by natural events and systems that can at times, be hazardous to 
people, such hazards include tsunamis, flooding and earthquakes, thus over time, Māori have 
produced, through necessity ‘adaptive strategies to minimise disaster-related risks’ (King, Goff 
and Skipper, 2007; Kenney et al., 2015: p. 10).  A range of these traditional risk management 
strategies are articulated through the work of Kenney et al. (2015) as a response to the 
Christchurch earthquakes which are centred around the traditional Māori risk management 
ideals. Figure 4.9 displays the relationship between MEK and the hazard and risk management 
strategies that were developed by indigenous Māori and their intrinsic relationship with the 
land.  
 Figure 4.9 illustrates the breadth of knowledge and living experience that can be 
realised through not only the acknowledgement, but acceptance and application of MEK in its  
various forms into the hazard management sphere. Kenney et al. (2015) suggested the wide-
reaching benefits of the application of MEK within the context of Christchurch in the post-
earthquake period that extended from mainstream emergency management actors, 
Figure 4.9 – Conceptualisation of Traditional Māori approach to Disaster Risk Reduction 
Source – (Kenney and Phibbs, 2015; Kenney et al., 2015) 
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government agencies to broad-based support for communities in times of adversity, as well as 
communicating the aspirations of Māori and their cultural identification within the recovery of 
the city and the subsequent rebuild. Understanding this, and the immense positive effect that 
MEK can, and has had for individuals, families, communities and whole cities. Saunders (2017) 
identifies the opportunity and potential for natural hazard planning to transcend self-
mobilisation and community activism as was seen heavily in the case of Christchurch and the 
earthquakes and be placed with IMPs that have, after the RMA amendments and conditional 
on them being lodged with council have legitimate statutory power.  
 However, Harmsworth and Awatere (2013) identify that mātauranga Māori is often 
underutilised within a planning context, and therefore is used more as an appendage rather 
than a functional and meaningful collaboration between standard, westernised modes of 
thinking and the value that MEK can bring. Both Harmsworth and Awatere (2013) and Saunders 
(2017) promote a planning system that not only recognises the immense benefits of a 
connection between western thinking and MEK, but endorse the equally shared load of 
resource management, and by extension, natural hazard management through western and 
indigenous practices. Regardless of which framework or capacity that MEK and IMPs currently 
function within in the New Zealand setting, MEK and IMPs have been recognised as a method 
in which a far greater and more collaborative understanding of the Māori worldview, beliefs 
and values toward both resource management and hazard planning can be applied. ‘Iwi 
management plans have become a key tool for facilitating involvement of Māori in resource 
management as they are able to present particular attitudes, values and beliefs, as well as 
introducing mātauranga Māori into resource management and planning’ (Harmsworth, 2005; 
Saunders, 2017: p. 12-13). Using a co-planning approach, resource management planners, as 
well as those involved in the hazard management and planning sphere, can draw upon a range 
of planning frameworks, models and tools based on the dual paradigms to help inform planning 
and policy more specifically (Saunders, 2017).  
 Despite relatively recent amendments to the RMA and the wider resource 
management framework elevating the status of IMPs and more generally the legitimacy of 
MEK within the New Zealand planning sphere, beyond the remnant issues surrounding 
acknowledgement and acceptance of MEK, there still remains a range of external factors that 
are inhibiting the full potential of MEK to be realised within the system. The report generated 
by Solutions (2004) highlights one of the main constraints to both the initial creation of, and 
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the continued development of IMPs to be a lack of resources for iwi. A large proportion of the 
work done on IMPs where either done through volunteers who at the best of times find it 
challenging to juggle multiple responsibilities and also work effectively on an IMP to best reflect 
the wishes and aspirations of the local iwi, or the work is done by outside consultants and the 
benefit of the connections and relationships being built during the creation of the plan can be 
missed. Nevertheless, the creation of IMPs and the continual development of them is most 
certainly a positive for local iwi and developing a much more involved and real sense of 
collaboration and co-operation within the resource management sphere. However, this is 
predicated on the development of sincere and meaningful relationships and co-operation 
within local government, local iwi and indeed the wider communities, IMPs as a statutory and 
mandated acknowledgement of MEK. In doing so, IMPs will have the capacity to act as the 
catalyst for further growth within the sphere and open pathways for MEK across all sectors of 
resource management, as well as within the hazard management sphere (Solutions, 2004; 








 This chapter endeavours to analyse and synthesise the findings that have been 
generated through the primary data collection process. The information provided in the 
following chapter will connect and discuss the content from the previous chapters, particularly 
the literature review and the policy analysis while directly relating the findings back to the 
research question, aims and objectives. This chapter intends to present an overview of the 
hazard and emergency management framework in New Zealand and will provide an informed 
evaluation of the current framework and ultimately offer a number of pathways and 
recommendations for long-term sustainability and resilience in the hazard and emergency 
management sphere moving forward. The employment of triangulation for the study with 
regard to the literature review, policy analysis and primary data collection has enabled a 
research process that has provided appropriate results that have been used to satisfy the aims 
of the research.  
 This chapter is divided into three sections that are centred around the three research 
objectives that were formulated to defined to set the scope and grounding of the research. 
The first is concentrated on the hazard and emergency management framework as it exists 
now in New Zealand, where the current positives and negatives of the system are explored 
through as first reviewed through literature and the policy review while being directly 
compared to the empirical evidence acquired through the primary data collection. Following 
this, the discussion will develop into how the principles and foundations of pre-event recovery 
planning, with an emphasis on public participation and MEK can be assimilated into effective 
long-term recovery before finally reviewing the evidence provided by the key informants of 
the research as to what developments and improvements can be made to the hazard and 





5.2 Research Objective One - Explore the nature of both hazards, and hazard 
management in New Zealand to establish the effectiveness of the current 
framework 
 The first section of the this chapter aims to address the first research objective of this 
research through the lens of both the initial literature and policy review, with the additional 
analysis and information provided through the primary data collection and key informant 
interviews while being supplemented through a further interrogation of the current literature 
in the hazard management sector. The themes that have been compiled within this section to 
address the research objective include the ambiguity around the definitions of hazards and 
hazard management, the role, hierarchy and distribution of work and effort of the 4R’s, the 
interaction of the range of legislation feeds in the hazard management framework, resourcing, 
national and regional differences, the role of insurance among others.  
 
5.2.1 Defining ‘Hazard’ and ‘Hazard Management’ 
 
 As alluded to within the policy analysis, the current hazard management framework is 
built upon a wide range of legislation that are very significant and powerful in the broader New 
Zealand context, two such legislative documents are the RMA and the CDEMA. While this 
chapter will explore more fully the ramifications of having these two powerful statutory 
documents having such an immense impact on the roles and functions of the hazard 
management framework further within this chapter, it is important to firstly acknowledge the 
definitions for the wider hazard management framework becomes rather ambiguous due to 
these guiding documents. Saunders et al. (2007) express the disconnect between both the 
RMA and the CDEMA in general, however, the case of comparing the definitions within both 
of these Acts aptly conceptualises this detachment at the very core of the national hazard and 
emergency management system. Pursuant to Part 1, Section 2 of the RMA, a natural hazard 
means ‘any atmospheric or earth or water related occurrence (including earthquake, tsunami, 
erosion, volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, sedimentation, wind, drought, 
fire or flooding) the action of which adversely affects or may adversely affect human life, 
property, or other aspects of the environment’. This is in contrast to the multifaceted definition 
that is provided within the CDEMA, as per Part 1 Section 4 of the CDEMA, a hazard is firstly 
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considered ‘something that may cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of, an 
emergency’, further, a definition is provided of an emergency which is as follows; ‘emergency 
means a situation that – (a) is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, 
including without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, 
flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or 
substance, technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an 
emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and (b) causes 
or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the 
public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; and (c) cannot be dealt with by 
emergency services, or otherwise requires a significant and co-ordinated response under this 
Act’. While at face value it seems the major difference between the two is located in the 
discrepancy between the RMA defining any hazardous event as having to be natural while the 
CDEMA includes ‘any happening, natural or otherwise’. However, the CDEMA also requires a 
hazard to cause of, or contribute to the declaration of an emergency in order to generate a 
civil defence response. K2 noted ‘the thing about that definition is that you can have many 
small events that don’t result in a declaration but can still have quite a big impact on people’. 
This highlights the strong disparity within the two definitions provided at the very core of the 
hazard management framework, yet, this research has shown that the inconsistencies within 
how to define hazards, and as a result, hazard management extend further than what is located 
within the guiding legislation. Table one, below, displays the range of different definitions and 













Table 5.1 – The varying definitions of ‘hazard’ as per the key informants 
KEY INFORMANT DEFINITION OF A ‘HAZARD’ 
K1 ‘The only hazards I am interested in are the ones that are going to 
effect a person – I’m really into hazards that become emergencies, 
and emergencies by their very nature involve people’. 
K2 ‘The RMA is the broadest one (definition), for CDEM is has to be an 
emergency and then the Building Act, that’s just restricted in 
certain events … the RMA pretty much covers off a good definition 
in that it is pretty much any atmospheric, or geological event’. 
K4 ‘… hazards that occur as a result of interaction with people and the 
environment … mostly concerned with the risk, I suppose as 
opposed to the hazard. Concerned with what’s people’s interaction 
with natural hazards and how that results in risk and how we can 
minimise that risk in our community’. 
K5 ‘… you actually want to take a look at the risk associated with the 
hazard to try to make decisions about land use and prevention or 
you know, what you need to be ready to do, and face the 
challenges that can present’. 
K6 ‘I tend to take a fairly pragmatic sort of approach and just address 
the issue in front of us, whatever that might be, and try to find out 
a practical sort of solution …’ 
K8 ‘Now to me, a hazard is a natural feature, it’s an earthquake 
shaking event, it’s bulk displacement … so that’s a hazard … when 
it comes into contact with humans and infrastructure and property, 
then it becomes a risk.’  
  
Table 5.1 highlights the ambiguity surrounding how hazards are defined and how they 
can be approached within the context of hazard management. This appears to be a reflection 
of the disconnected nature between the RMA and the CDEMA where some respondents, such 
as K1 take an approach more reflective of the definition provided in the CDEMA, while K2 
offered thoughts suggesting the RMA provides the most workable definition through its broad 
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nature and non-reliance on a state of emergency. Many other respondents expressed the 
feeling, in the reality of working within the hazard and emergency management sphere, events 
only become hazardous, or fall within the scope of hazard management when they affect, or 
have the potential to affect humans, and by extension, property and livelihoods. Considering 
the ambiguity surrounding the definition of hazards, both within the guiding legislation of the 
wider hazard and emergency management framework and within those who are actively 
working within this sphere, a significant level of uncertainness and ambiguity is realised when 
engaging in defining and quantifying what hazard management both should, and does look like 
currently in New Zealand.  
 The ambiguity surrounding the term hazard was shown and discussed above through 
the Table One, the following section will look into how this translates into a range of different 
perspectives and challenges within the legislation when attempting to define and engage in 
hazard management as a result of the disconnected nature of guiding legislation in the hazard 
management sphere. While K2, expressed the views of hazard management as ‘toolbox’ 
wherein the entirety of hazard and emergency management should be looked at holistically in 








 The above quote highlights the importance and necessity of an integrated and holistic 
system in order to effectively and efficiently manage the adverse effects of natural hazards and 
create and maintain resilient and sustainable communities. This judgement is supported by K6, 
working as a consultant in resource management who expressed their relationship with the 
current framework; ‘I tend to take a fairly pragmatic sort of approach and just address the 
issues in front of us … important areas of projects that I’ve been involved in … we looked at all 
the tools available’.  Despite this, K2 goes on to say, ‘with the current structure, it’s very much 
across a whole lot of different legislation which can be confusing’ before continuing to mention 
‘… councils have tried their best, but the legislation still isn’t perfect.’. This sentiment is reflected 
‘I see hazard management as a toolbox, it includes a whole lot of 
different actions that can take place. So, it is of course land-use 
planning … also emergency management planning … having 
hazards mapped … having community response plans … insurability 
… engineering … the building code … hazard management doesn’t 
fit under one particular action; it has to be a combination of action 
for it be managed effectively.’ 








when considering further engagement with key informants in the context of hazard 
management and how the current system has created a considerable amount of variability 
with how hazard management is regarded and interpreted, as will be shown throughout this 
chapter. K5, a former Resource Consent Planner in Kaikōura stated that when working in the 
hazard and emergency management sector, the concept of hazard management was actually 
superseded by a different concept, ‘risk management’. This concept was shared among a range 
of the different stakeholders interviewed as part of this research, K4, a current working hazard 
planner supported the notion that on the ground, a more achievable and accurate definition 
of hazard management was risk management while K8 maintains natural hazards are 
inherently natural, and management of these processes in reality only occurs when they pose 
a risk to human life, property or livelihoods, therefore a more apt description would be risk 
management.  
 Another common response from a number of key informants were related to the 
framework itself and the perceived shortfalls in providing the means for effective hazard, or 
risk management to be undertaken. K3, a prominent figure in the emergency management 
sector within the Marlborough District Council highlighted the difficulty within the current 
framework in engaging in hazard identification, and further difficulties with being able to take 
steps to address these hazards; ‘I’ve been through a number of hazard identification exercises 
… it’s what you don’t know that is the biggest hazard … it’s a matter of understanding … natural 
and man-made hazards … knowing how to mitigate them is the really hard bit’. While K1 
described the framework as ‘very hit and miss’ and expressed concerns over the lack of 
targeted and in-depth analysis and understanding of the hazards that are present within New 








 Furthermore, K7 who has worked in the sector through various central government 
agencies such as MBIE and CERA conveyed their view that ‘there is no consistent approach’ 
‘The (hazard management) framework really needs some serious 
work because at the moment, we’re only just starting to get a 
handle on some significant hazards in the way they really need to 
be managed … I don’t think we manage hazards particularly well 
and certainly even regionally, when it comes to population around 









with regard to the current hazard management framework, K7 largely attributed this to 
legislative issues and inadequacies concerning the guiding legislation for the hazard and 
emergency management framework. A more holistic analysis of the intricacies and potential 
positive and negative effects of the web of legislation that governs the hazard and emergency 
management framework and the interactions will be provided in a future section. As found 
within the interview / data collection process within this research, the availability, reliability 
and ability to perform adequate risk assessment and analysis based on the data, resources and 
personnel available is critical for creating a culture and a framework that is comprehensive and 
wide-ranging. While this section will address the issues mentioned above in terms of legislative 
backing, resourcing and legacy issues, it is important to note in this context substantial forward 
steps are being made to ensure that the foundations are laid for the future of hazard and 
emergency management in the future, despite the fact that in the past, there have been 
limitations to the creation and availability of effective and comprehensive data to allow for and 
facilitate effective risk assessment. This has limited the application of a productive and 
applicable framework, whether it be through a lack of resources, legacy issues or simply a 
consequence of the extremely tumultuous and demanding decade for the country in dealing 
with the aftermath of three major earthquakes (Christchurch 2010 and 2011 and Kaikōura 
2016) as well as countless other hazards of varying intensities and severity. K8 is the chair of 
earthquake science at the University of Otago as well as being heavily involved at a national 
scale in regard to earthquake science through roles at GNS Science, leading the National 
Seismic Hazard Model and working significantly on the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquake 
sequences. Furthermore, with EQC and MBIE K8 has been working with the Alpine Fault 
magnitude 8 (AF8) group as well as targeted work in low seismicity areas to help better 
understand the hazards and exposure to risk in some of New Zealand’s less studied and 
understood areas, such as Southland. When asked the question of whether or not sufficient 
work is being done to help understand natural processes and the risk they can and do present 
New Zealanders K8 replied; ‘I would have a year ago, I would have said definitely yes’, however 
in recent times a substantial amount of funding and work is being done to help achieve a 
greater understanding to help with a sense of security and knowledge in the hazard 
management sphere that comes with increased risk assessment and availability of knowledge. 
A colleague of K8 who was interviewed for this research was K10. K10 leads the science-based 
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team in AF8 and responded similarly when asked for their views on the current state of funding 
and understanding in regard to natural processes, hazards and the risks they present; 
 






 Considering the role and advancements being made in the hazard management sector, 
specifically in regard to the identification and assessment of risks, K8 and K10 both 
acknowledge that progress is being made in these areas. However, there is the recognition 
that building and assimilating this knowledge for not only to those gathering it, but those in 
local government and indeed the wider populations of New Zealand takes time. Furthermore, 
while the work currently being done is overdue and desperately needed, the sentiment 
remains that more work in this space can, and should be done; ‘It’s still a relatively small 
number of people doing the work (hazard and risk identification and assessment), so it could be 
resourced better’ (K8). More detail regarding resourcing for both the general science and for 
hazard and emergency management will be covered in future sections.   
 The NRDS highlights the amalgamation of numerous pieces of key national level 
legislation such as the RMA and the CDEMA, the NRDS states; ‘New Zealand is relatively well 
placed in this regard (risk and resilience, and our future wellbeing) with a comprehensive 
legislative framework in place for risk management’ (National Disaster Resilience Strategy, 
2019: p. 12). This point is further emphasised within the NRDS on page 44 where the Strategy 
states that the current legislative framework is an identified strength of the current system. 
However, this statement has not been reflected within this research as per the key informants 
that participated in this research, all of whom are in some way directly involved in the 
exercising of powers, functions and duties of the very legislation that guides and frames the 
hazard and emergency management sector in New Zealand, or work in and have expertise in 
earthquake and hazard science. This research has shown that, while at the theoretical level, 
the extensive range of legislation that makes up the hazard and emergency management 
framework is a strength, this does not correlate to efficiency or best practice on the ground. 
‘… there are other parts of New Zealand that have relatively lower 
seismic hazard which we still need to work with to bring them up to 
speed … in terms of reducing and mitigating risks. But it is only 
natural that we start … with the big known risks we have, and that’s 









K1 described the current framework as very ‘hit and miss’ and K2 conveyed the confusing 
nature of the web of legislation that makes up the framework and explained that, while 
Councils have tried their best to work within the confines of the current system, it is not perfect 
and there is work to be done. This is supported through the work done by Saunders et al. in 
2007 which states that the web of legislation creates uncertainty and communication between 
the two major Acts (the RMA and the CDEMA), and the effectiveness of this system is limited 
as often those working under different Acts are siloed and best practice is not achieved. 
Furthermore, Fenwick, Seville and Brunsdon (2009) claim that within the scope of hazard and 
emergency management, ‘inter-organisational silos, whatever the cause, can significantly 
interfere with community resilience’ (Fenwick, Seville and Brunsdon, 2009: p. 21). Where the 
isolation of different key players within the hazard management framework, such as the RMA 
and CDEMA lead to poor development decisions and outcomes that have significant knock on 
effects to a range of economic, social and environmental factors, such as resilience and 
sustainability. 
 
 5.2.2 The current structure under the 4R’s and the interaction of Legislation 
 
 Separate from the hazard management framework, the current environment under the 
4R’s were a major point of discussion when engaging in the key informant interviews for this 
research. A common theme that emerged within the discussion with key informants around 
the 4R’s was centred around just one of the R’s, response. There was an undeniable leaning 
towards favouring and emphasising the role and outcomes when engaging in response for two 
main reasons. One of these reasons was around the role of CDEM Groups and the national and 
regional ‘call-to-arms’ that often occurs when an emergency hits and the strength around 
these linkages that result in great response outcomes right across New Zealand, this fact will, 
however, be discussed in a future section where the a more comprehensive analysis of the 
CDEM Group system will be discussed. The common assertion made surrounding response was 
in the form of its dominance against the other three R’s where a range of views were offered. 








 The sentiment of the above quote were common to several key informants surrounding 
the 4R’s, where there was a strong acknowledgement of the emphasis and work put into the 
response phase within the hazard and emergency management. This has largely been 
attributed to the past decade of exposure to extremely disastrous and damaging earthquakes 
in Christchurch and Kaikōura as well as innumerable other hazards, such as flooding and 
drought that have afflicted all parts of New Zealand. K2 identifies previous amendments to the 
RMA that saw the management of significant natural hazards as a matter of national 
importance after the Christchurch earthquake sequence, there has been a more positive 
reception to the management of natural hazards under the RMA where the 4R’s are considered 
more fully. However, despite this strength, the respondents interviewed as part of this 
research have also shown that the focus and prioritisation into the response phase of hazard 
management has come at the expense of the other 3 R’s. As alluded to above, a strong 
influence in the structuring of the hierarchy of the 4R’s is the attention and consequences in 
response to events through a range of lenses, whether they be political, economic or 
environmental, the findings from this research through the key informants have shown that 
this can have a significant spill-over effect from response into recovery particularly in the more 
serious events that leave a wide range of issues that are often required to be addressed over 
a period of years rather than a period of months and weeks. This feeling is reflected in the 
quote below provided by K2 which helps to convey the importance that is placed on response, 
at times to the detriment to other areas of hazard management, such as recovery; ‘if you’re 
not careful, those (response) blinkers can stay on way into recovery’ (K1). Furthermore, this 
research has found that not only does the application of response efforts hinder the role and 
effectiveness of recovery efforts during and after a natural event / hazard, it also obstructs the 
ability for proactive planning in the sector in two main ways, one will be discussed more fully 
in future sections and is surrounded by resourcing, capacity and capability and the other is 
related to the interactions between the main legislation that governs the national hazard and 
‘Of course, when things go horribly wrong, and there’s a disaster … 
it’s the response that gets the most scrutiny, so if you completely 
bungle the response then it doesn’t look good. So, I guess there is 









emergency management sector. As discussed above, there is a considerable amount of conflict 
and miscommunication between the RMA and the CDEMA when exercising functions and 
powers in the hazard and emergency management sector. Previously, chapter four has 
outlined the CDEMA framework and discussed the creation and role of CDEM Groups and their 
role in the framework. K2 and K9 explain that as response transitions into the medium-term to 
long-term recovery, the actual governance and leadership also transitions from emergency 
response and management under the CDEMA to land-use planning and general resource 














This disconnect and inefficiency can be directly related to the functional detachment 
between the RMA, the CDEMA and the people tasked with exercising functions, roles and 
powers under both of these Acts. This challenge to the current framework has also been 
documented by Saunders et al. (2007) as well as within this research as it displays a 
considerable problem that needs to be addressed if best practice is to be achieved within the 
scope of hazard management in the future. In addition, Rotimi (2010) identifies similar issues 
in the context of the CDEMA and the RMA where a realignment is necessary to ensure that 
both the Acts, as well as the Building Act are more concise and effective when dealing with 
natural hazards, particularly those that will cause widespread damage and/or loss of life. It is 
important to note that this research was conducted in 2010, prior to the 2010 Christchurch 
earthquake that set off the highly active and damaging earthquake sequence Christchurch and 
‘… it goes beyond the … CDEM Groups during the recovery, you 
need to be thinking broader … its also that land use and recovery 
and response … the planning side of things often gets forgotten … it 










’… moving from response to recovery … these go beyond CDEM 
things and are a more a function of the planning system … I think 
we know that across the natural hazards management system, 
there is not a good connection between the planning system and 











New Zealand experienced thereafter. Within the research, Rotimi (2010) identified the need 
to review the state of the current framework in order to ‘prevail in the aftermath of a severe 
disaster’ (Rotimi, 2010: p xi). Despite this, a large proportion of the problems and points of 
work and improvement called for by the author are continuing to be discussed today, showing 
that the work that has needed to achieve best practice is still yet to be achieved. Crawford et 
al. (2018) acknowledge the ‘complicated policy environment’ that characterises the current 
hazard and emergency management sector, with specific reference to the CDEMA (Crawford 
et al., 2018: p. 611). Additionally, the authors have discussed the disconnect in the 
development from ‘science to policy’ where a further constraint to the system is bridging the 
gap between the science surrounding natural hazards and those who are tasked with creating 
and enforcing effective policy for living with natural processes and events (Crawford et al., 
2018: p. 610). Alongside Crawford et al. (2018), Saunders et al. (2007) have identified 
constricting and complicated legislation and in turn, governance surrounding natural hazards. 
One identified method conceived to help alleviate some of the issues that are being faced is 
risk modelling, as per Crawford et al. (2018: p. 611) ‘risk modelling is important as 
understanding the impacts and consequences of a natural hazard event is an essential building 
block for resilience’. Furthermore, risk modelling done accurately and efficiently provides the 
potential for enhanced communication and understanding concerning the entire risk 
management framework in New Zealand. As such, this has been identified as a necessary step 
in facilitating more effective and comprehensive communication between science and policy 
with regard to hazard and emergency management and will act to mitigate legislative 
disconnections under the current system (Saunders et al., 2007: Crawford et al., 2018). The 
role of science in informing policy as well as sectoral ambiguity surrounding the use and access 
to information regarding natural processes and the risks they pose will be further discussed in 
a future section. 
 Alongside the observed disconnect with the RMA and CDEMA, K7 identified that the 
‘siloed’ nature of the two Acts has trickled down into the structures and processes at the local 
government level within Councils, with regard to land use planning in general and with hazard 
management, K7 is quoted as saying ‘… regional councils and district councils don’t necessarily 
talk to each other that well … it’s a pretty fragmented system really’. This shows clearly that 
there are problems with the alignment of the operational functions of the hazard and 
emergency management framework from the national level right through the system into the 
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regional and local levels. This has produced the miscommunication between governmental 
bodies is resulting in poor decisions being made and obstructing the development and 
implementation of best practice. A further quote by (K7) that was made in reference to 
addressing the issues stated above is as follows; ‘Central government could partner a lot more 
with local government on developing legislation … that reflects back to natural hazards where 
instead of butting heads it could be much more collaborative and cohesive … I think central 




 One of the most prominent themes that were produced through this research were 
the issues surrounding funding and negative implications of resourcing, or a lack thereof in the 
hazard management sector. A general lack of resourcing was commonly conveyed by the key 
informants that ranged not only from sectors of local government, such as small district 
councils and territorial authorities, but right through to the central government level and 
within national agencies and in relation to iwi management plans and therefore, the role and 
capacity of MEK. The issue of a lack of resourcing within the hazard management sector 
extends widely, it ranges from constraints regarding the capacity for people working in the 
space as well as the upskilling and continual development of these workers. Moreover, the 
difficulties communicated relating to the resourcing issues in hiring, maintaining and upskilling 
personnel in the hazard management space trickle down into further issues relating to the 
allocation of what time can be spent working on what at any given time. This problem has been 
pinpointed to afflict both local and central government in very detrimental ways. All of the key 
informants discussed both of these struggles within the context of local government and 
expressed the importance of assessing the implications of a lack of resourcing for a range of 






As shown within Figure 5.1, the resourcing issues that afflict the hazard and emergency 
management sector are extremely wide reaching with adverse effects from local government 
to central government and beyond. There was a unanimous response amongst the key 
informants involved in this research that were currently, or were employed in the past by 
district councils and territorial authorities that one of the largest restrictions, if not the largest 
surrounding implementing successful, efficient hazard and emergency management were the 
immense financial constraints that characterise the sector at the local government level. K4 
provides a quote that is telling of the issues that afflict the hazard and emergency management 














- Shifting priorities to general hazard management from national 
level guidance and legislation (K1).
- National level guidance is not targetted or applicable for all 
levels in New Zealand, primarily focussed on large urban areas / 
cities (K1, K3).
Within Local Government
- Trouble building skilled surge capacity and retaining skilled 
personnel (K1, K3, K4, K5, K6, K9).
- Contesting priorities within Councils for what work needs to be 
done and what work can be done (K1, K2, K5).
General Resourcing Issues
- Budget cuts in local government specifically appears to 
disproportionately affect hazard management (K1, K3, K5).
- The hazard management sector responsibilites are extremely 
broad, difficulty arises when attempting to prioritise and address 
all issues with already thinly spread resoruces (K1, K3, K4, K5).
Figure 5.1 – The wide-reaching implications of the resourcing issues in the hazard 
management sector. 







The quote above highlights an important contestation with the current state of the 
framework and the ability and potential for growth and development in the future. The 
sentiment from the statement above is largely upheld by the other key informants within this 
research who worked in the sector where the optimism surrounding the progress being made 
in the hazard management space is unfortunately shrouded by financial constraints that hinder 
further development and best practice to assimilate into current practice. K1 indicates that 
these issues are occurring at a national level where many territorial authorities across the 
country are suffering from substantial budget cuts; ‘… in the current climate mate it’s even 
worse, … we’re really fortunate our operating budget hasn’t gone down much, but a lot of the 
other groups out there had huge, huge cuts, and that impacts on a lot of stuff.’ K5 goes on to 
state that despite the hazard and emergency management branches of most councils being 
underfunded to begin with, these issues are exacerbated by further budget cuts occurring; ‘I 
think where it falls down is at the local level. You have a lot of councils that when they’re trying 
to save money, one of the things that they cut is emergency management, on the bet that it is 
very rare to have an event (natural disaster).’ This becomes increasingly problematic when 
considering that with the previous decade in this country being characterised by significant 
and immensely damaging natural events, chiefly the 2010 and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes 
and the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake, they occurred on fault lines that were not previously known 
to exist (Beavan et al., 2011: Stirling et al., 2017). ‘I think the one thing that Canterbury (and 
the earthquakes) taught us was anywhere in New Zealand can have an earthquake, it was 
considered a low risk zone.’ The consequence of money being pumped out of various local 
government hazard management departments across the country is reflected in a wide range 
of aspects that have additional further negative impacts on the framework as a whole. K9 
identifies that the lack of money directly translates into a serious issue in regard to the capacity 
and the capability of the personnel that local government has access to in order to pursue and 
produce best practice; ‘… they (councils) don’t always have the capacity and the capability to 
do that, they don’t have the technical people in house, some regional councils have really good 
‘I think New Zealand is moving forward with hazard management 
and practice and nationally, there is more awareness. But it always 
comes down to that same old chestnut, which is resources, and of 
the limited resources we have, where do we apply them? 
 









hazard data people, but they don’t always have the money to go and do the research (K9).’ This 






These issues however are not isolated simply to local government and the various 
councils and territorial authorities across New Zealand, similar budgeting problems and 
additional negative financial situations also affect central government, and worryingly, these 
often have considerable spill-over effects into local government and the application of hazard 
and emergency management on the ground. K7 suggests that in order for the hazard and 
emergency management sector to produce better outcomes in the future, collaboration within 
and between agencies, and between central and local government must be significantly 
increased; ‘More and more technical advisors are needed in government or at least employed 
by government to inform policy choices. I don’t think that’s happening anywhere near as much 
as it should do.’ Furthermore, K7 states that ‘… there is a bit of a tendency for civil servants to 
sit in Wellington and say we’ve written the Act, we’ve done our bit you know. And local 
government says all you have done is thrown a burden at us, and we can’t fund what you’ve … 
required us to do.’ This clearly shows the deeply ingrained contestation that exists not just 
within the hazard and emergency management sector, but within the entire resource 
management framework in New Zealand and highlights that at the centre of all the conflict 
and disengagement, are resourcing and funding issues.  
Aside from the significant issues outlined above, at the national / central government 
level there are additional challenges relating to funding and resourcing that are inhibiting the 
best practice of hazard and emergency management in New Zealand. Figure 5.1 above outlines 
a range of resourcing implications that have an impact on the framework, however, what it 
doesn’t display is the important issues surrounding the acquisition and availability of reliable 
risk assessment. With reference to the key informants used in this research that were 
currently, or have been employed in local government (e.g. district councils, territorial 
authorities etc.), a recurring theme was the both the difficulty in sourcing, but also the need 
to have access to up-to-date and reliable land hazard data in order for appropriate risk 
‘I mean, there are definitely those limitations at the local level 
because a lot of councils just don’t have the money and they may 
have other priorities.’ 
 









assessment to take place. A guiding principle that created the grounding for this research was 
pre-event recovery planning, which, as highlighted in previous chapters is centred around 
access to reliable and comprehensive hazard and risk data in order to engage in proactive 
planning. This can be implemented to address some of the issues that are born through the 
skewed nature of the 4R’s where reduction and readiness receive considerably less attention 
as has been discussed previously. As such, in order to engage in meaningful and effective pre-
event recovery planning, there is an inherent link to the resourcing, capacity and capability 
issues that have been presented in this research.   
  
Table 5.2 – A range of responses from key informants advocating for proactive planning and 
the need for increased access to reliable hazard data sets. 




‘… really it’s just a matter of understanding I guess natural hazards and man-
made hazards and then how do we manage those … how to mitigate and 
manage them is the really hard bit.’ 
K4 
 
‘I would say that you’re far better off to font load the process and have 




‘… the smaller councils in particular have problems funding the 
collection of data to develop hazard maps … and they don’t get much 
support from central government in that regard or any support.’ 
K7 
 
‘… when it comes to land use hazards by far the biggest bang for buck 
is avoid, avoid the hazard altogether. The second biggest bang for the 
buck is you try and control the impacts of the hazard … some and just 




‘… there has been an ongoing criticism of NEMA is that they officially 
look after the 4R’s … but they have almost all their attention on 
response and not the others.’ 
K9 
 
‘I think there are a lot of very complex problems. One of them is risk 
assessment is expensive. It takes a lot of complex science with a lot of 
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theoretical underpinning models, and sometimes it takes time to get 
agreement of whose models should be followed.’ 
 
‘… its very hard to get agreement to get investment in data … certain 
agencies are responsible for certain data sets … lets prioritise what are 
the top data sets … so that they can be shared at the local level, you 
know, so that we’re all working to the same consistent data … I guess 




‘I agree that there are parts of New Zealand that have a relatively lower 
seismic hazard, which we still need to … work with and bring them up 
to speed I guess in terms of trying to reduce some risks and mitigate 
some risks.’ 
  
 Table 5.2 displays both the call from the key informants for more emphasis to be placed 
on proactive planning with the support for the principles and essence of pre-event recovery 
planning as well as the undeniable need for increased access to data sets that reliably and 
comprehensively communicate the nature of hazards, their spatial distribution and the 
associated risk that they produce. A more comprehensive account of the desire for proactive 
planning under the banner of pre-event recovery planning will be provided when addressing 
research objective three later in the chapter.  
  This section has shown clearly that at the heart of a range of the difficulties and 
constraints to the hazard and emergency management system is councils and organisations 
are significantly underfunded. The effects of this harsh reality extend across the entirety of the 
sector and has a detrimental impact on a wide range of the obligations and responsibilities that 
persons exercising functions and powers under the legislation that governs the sector, such as 
the ability to engage with the 4R’s equally and equitably and to perform their responsibility to 
the wider New Zealand public in providing positive actions against the effects of hazards. The 
following quote from K8 eloquently sums up the role of hazard and emergency management 
in New Zealand, but also highlights that the current significant constraints placed on the sector 
due to resourcing is inhibiting the function of the framework and is impeding the 











   
 The above quote focusses on that the role of local and central government in regard to 
hazard and emergency management is essentially a ‘duty of care’ for New Zealand and New 
Zealanders, however, this duty is being hindered by the myriad of resourcing issues and the 
consequences of this. Boston and Lawrence (2018) identify that, within the scope of planning 
for the impending effects of climate change there are a numerous crossovers with the hazard 
and emergency management framework in general. Two such areas of overlap that have 
already been addressed within this research is the fragmented nature of the guiding legislation 
for hazard and emergency management, ‘the relevant statutes (e.g. the RMA, CDEMA etc.) are 
poorly aligned’ (Boston and Lawrence, 2018: p. 42). Further, the authors state that the current 
environment for hazard and emergency management in New Zealand places too much 
emphasis on post-event responses and does not engage in sufficient proactive planning 
(Boston and Lawrence, 2018: p .42). Overall, including both the considerations for the required 
work required for climate change adaptation in the future and the general issues associated 
with the hazard and emergency management framework in New Zealand, Boston and 
Lawrence (2018) have drawn similar conclusions to that of this research in that despite the 
range of issues that characterise the current framework, such as the disconnected nature of 
legislation, resourcing and funding issues are at the heart of many of these issues. Boston and 
Lawrence (2018) describe the current hazard and emergency framework, with specific 
reference to the ability to adapt the reality of life with climate change as having ‘a gross 
mismatch between the resources and capabilities available to local authorities’ (Boston and 
Lawrence, 2018: p. 48). While this paper was written with direct reference to climate change, 
almost all of the issues that are plaguing the development of policy and practice in that space 
‘I’m one for people who are in positions of authority and knowledge to be 
exercising a duty of care to the public. And I think if you’re in council, or 
you’re in a territorial authority, or you’re in government, you should be at 
the very least providing guidelines if not, you know legislation law, to 
stop people knowingly building in areas where they’re going to be at 
threat. I think that’s one of the roles that a lot of councils you know … I 
won’t say they’re negligent with it because it’s their policy they’re 
working with the way things have been decided but I think it’s a real lost 
opportunity. Yeah, and more than that I think they owe the New Zealand 
public … they owe them that knowledge if they have that knowledge.’ 
 









have relevance to hazard and emergency management in general and shows that the 
resourcing issues and beyond have significant negative implications at an immense scale.   
 
5.2.4 National and Regional Differences 
 
 The national and regional differences that have manifested themselves in the current 
hazard and emergency management framework will be discussed in this section. There is a 
range of aspects to discuss through the lens of variability throughout the country, included is 
the CDEMA mandated CDEM Groups and the advantages and disadvantages of this scheme, 
differences in Regional Policy Statements (RPS’s), the potential for a National Policy Statement 
(NPS) to be developed for natural hazards and legacy issues with infrastructure development 
constraining the development of best practice and the process of knowledge building.  
 As previously discussed, the role of short to medium-term recovery is held by persons 
exercising functions and powers under the CDEMA before it is then shifted to the responsibility 
of the RMA. While this means that the longer-term recovery is facilitated outside the scope of 
the CDEMA, those persons still play a vitally important role in response and recovery during 
arguably the most turbulent and crucial time in the direct aftermath of an event. Therefore, 
the role and functions of these were communicated through the key informants with specific 
reference to the roles that CDEM Groups have and the capacity and capability of these in 
fostering appropriate development and recovery outcomes during the times that they are 
responsible for the recovery process. The analysis of the roles and effectiveness of CDEM 
Groups will be split into two main categories as was the nature of the responses that were 
gathered through the key informants on this topic. The first will highlight the strengths and 
benefits of the current system focussing on the initial timeline of a disaster and the role of 
CDEM Groups in the short-term recovery. The second part of the discussion will be centred 
around what does not function quite as well with regard to ongoing recovery and the transition 
from being dictated by the CDEMA to the RMA. Figure 5.2 displays the varying responses from 






















Figure 5.2 highlights the conflicted nature of participants feelings towards the current 
framework and the role, capacity and capabilities of the CDEM Groups. Considering the varying 
responses that highlight both the positive and negatives of the CDEM Groups within the 
current hazard and emergency management framework, the following quote succinctly 







Figure 5.2 – The varying responses made in reference to CDEM Groups displaying both the 
positives and negatives of the current system 
Source – Author 
I think local government across 
New Zealand is very willing to help 
eachother - K3
I think because we are a small 
unitary area ... we tend to involve 
everyone in our planning anyway 
... in a small community it's quite 
easy because they're all the same 
people - K3
Yeah we had an amazing response 
from other communities (including 
CDEM Groups) that came and 
supported us - K4
Smaller communities are actually a 
lot more resilient than you might 
think. Their networks are much 
stronger ... often orders of 
magnitude stronger than an urban 
community - K6
So (CDEM) Groups and recovery? 
Nah mate, we don't really help 
eachother out in that respect very 
much at all - K1
(When asked if the respondant 
experienced or has heard of any 
fragmentation within the CDEM 
Group system) - Oh very much, 
very much so - K3
Possibly the issue is that we're just 
so fragmented across the country 
with different groups, different 
structures ... needs more work to 
be done - K3
‘Yeah, it’s hard case, we’re really good at helping each other out 
when it all turns to crap, Group Managers send staff all around the 
country to help each other when the event kicks off. But when 
recovery comes along, we all go home and get back to where we 
came from.’ 
 









 K1 demonstrates with the above quote that the current system that involves the 
creation and running of CDEM Groups as per Section 12 of the CDEMA shows that there are a 
range of both positive and negative aspects of these Groups under the current framework. 
While as is often the case with a such systems, there is often overlap and a significant amount 
of blurred lines when attempting to make the distinction between when something stops being 
positive and starts being negative and vice versa. However, this research has found that this is 
not the case when considering the roles and impacts of CDEM Groups. The key informants 
made a very clear distinction with regard to when the CDEM Group system works well 
compared to where it falls down somewhat with regard to isolation of group members during 
recovery. With reference to Figure 5.2, when engaging in initial response and short-term 
recovery of events there is a very good response to the CDEM Group system that coincides 
with almost a national level response where assistance is found across the country in the form 
of staff and resources, but when recovery starts to lengthen and the legislative power is shifted 
from the CDEMA to the RMA, seemingly that support stops. K2 identifies that that is more a 
symptom of the framework and miscommunication between the CDEMA and RMA; ‘So for 
instance, I know that Kaikōura really struggled with how they were going to respond from a 
land-use planning point of view, that doesn’t really involve the CDEM Group, it’s a planning 
issue, but there was not much support for them.’ The key informants conveyed that while the 
initial stages of response and recovery were well supported, the good work could not continue 
due to the isolation that existed within the framework for longer-term recovery. One potential 
method to remedy this shortcoming that was communicated by a number of the key 
informants was to create a permanent national recovery office or something similar that was 
responsible for assisting regions, especially the smaller, underfunded regions when it comes 
to transitioning from recovery with CDEM Groups under the CDEMA to engaging with the RMA 
and general land-use resource management. This idea was conveyed by a number of different 
respondents and will be spoken about more fully when addressing research objective 3 and 
the recommendations from this research.  
 In addition to the identified strengths and weaknesses of the CDEM Groups within the 
current framework, supplementary questions during the key informant interviews focussed on 
the role of RPS’s and their formative capacity in the creation of both regional plans as well as 
CDEM Group plans were discussed in relation to substantial variation around the country and 
what consequences this can have when looking at intra and inter regional events. It is 
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important to communicate that while RPS’s themselves do not create rules that are directly 
binding on individual citizens, they may provide a course of action, of which the direction and 
breadth is at the discretion of the regional council creating the RPS (Environment Guide, 2018), 
and therefore, provide strong direction for the formation of regional plans which are tasked 
with controlling the land use and resource management effects of natural processes, events 
and hazards. As such, the example used during the key informant interviews regarding the 
differences in RPS’s stance on natural events, hazards and risks to frame the question around 
national and regional differences to hazard and emergency management were the Otago and 
Canterbury RPS’s. While the research was not heavily informed or framed around an analysis 
of different RPS’s, it was useful in this setting to refer directly to these two examples as they 
share a regional boundary and are essentially at two different ends of the spectrum in terms 
of their stance to hazards and the risks they pose. Unsurprisingly, due to the aftermath and the 
legacy issues that threaten the Christchurch and wider Canterbury region after the 2010 
earthquake, including the lengthy and damaging aftershock sequence that included the 
infamous 2011 earthquake, the Canterbury RPS is much more directive than its Otago 
counterpart. A number of different respondents referred to the Canterbury RPS and ‘directive 
and restrictive’ while the Otago RPS was commonly referred to as ‘permissive in comparison’. 
The questioned posed using the framing stated above was whether a more ‘directive and 
permissive’ approach to handling hazard and emergency management was more appropriate 
for the future rather than a ‘permissive’ policy environment with an emphasis on acceptable 
personal risk was debated, from this there was a very one sided response amongst the 
participants, the following are a range of the responses gathered from the key informants 









 Figure 5.3 displays the common responses from the key informants based on the 
question surrounding the appropriateness of permissive RPS’s against restrictive RPS’s. While 
K6 stated that a restrictive approach could be more appropriate ‘if you try to legislate for every 
possible eventuality or you know, take that restrictive approach, you’ll see its quite possible that 
you’ll fail , you can’t think of every possible situation’ and that perhaps a more pragmatic 
approach would work best, the rest of the key informants who were asked this question were 
very much supportive of seeing a harder bottom-line drawn when considering the risks that 
natural events and hazards pose on humans, property and livelihoods. However, while it is 
• 'I guess there is a danger with being less restricitve ... there is 
certainly a danger with development ... if you don't have a high 
level document that's ensuring some level of protection is 
provided ... you end up with leaky building syndrome ... that 
requries more detial and responsibility.'
K4
• 'I think we should be more hard nosed, the challenge is you need 
data ... also we've got a huge database of claim information 
(from Christchurch) that would help if it was made public.'
K7
• 'Until we get stricter rules in plans, people, they don't care about 
risk ... we talked to Auckland Council last year in a workshop ... 
they said it doesn't matter what flood risk information you give 
people in high risk areas, property prices aren't changing ... 
people will only stop building in high risk areas if there is 
something to stop them (such as property price).'
K9
• '... you know, we're happy to see people take on risk, as long as 
they understand what they're taking on ... and know that they 
are going to be liable for their own risk ... but if Councils are 
going to be liable (as a result of permissive planning rules) that's 
different, that's a problem.'
K9
Figure 5.3 – Selection of responses characterising the responses of key informants regarding 
opinions of permissive vs. restrictive RPS’s for natural hazards. 
Source – Author. 
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understood amongst the majority of the key informants that RPS’s, and consequently, regional 
plans such as Canterbury and the Bay of Plenty; ‘the most advanced RPS that I’ve seen is the 
Bay of Plenty RPS which has a lot of method around how to determine what is a good risk or 
not, and … what is considered okay and not okay’ (K2), these are not being produced around 
the country, in part due to the time consuming and costly nature of changing legislation and 
the lack of knowledge and data available to create effective strategies, policies and rules that 
will be achievable, appropriate and effectively controlled. Therefore, a number of the key 
informants offered an additional avenue that may be taken in order to help achieve this, or at 
the least, improve the hazard and emergency management framework in general. This method 
involved creating an NPS for natural hazards. While the comments and thoughts behind a NPS 
for natural hazards were mostly positive, there was a range of concerns from a number of key 
informants around how such a high level document could be applicable nationally; K6 
identified similar problems to a potential for an NPS when considering the appropriateness of 
permissive versus restrictive RPS’s and subsequently regional plans etc. as the legislative 
requirements in implementing and enforcing an NPS for natural hazards would be immense. 
Furthermore, the innate unpredictability and spatial variations that come hand-in-hand with 
processes governing natural hazards also raised concerns for a number of key informants; 
 





 Despite the above quote being somewhat typical of the initial responses from the key 
informants asked about the potential for an NPS on natural hazards, there was another 
common theme that arose through talking about the idea of the NPS. This additional theme 
was centred around the notion that it would produce more standardised and equitable 
outcomes in regard to hazard identification and risk assessment that can be rolled out across 
the country. It is hoped that in doing so, some kind of consistency in how we perceive and plan 
around the numerous and potentially destructive risks that we live around would be achieved; 
 
‘… the thing with natural disasters is that they’re very context 
specific. So, it’s really hard to say ‘right, let’s develop a national 
policy statement’ … because each context is slightly different and 
will require different involvement from different agencies to see it 
through. 
 
















 The above quote from K9 reflects the commonly held views of many of the key 
informants in the scope of both the nature of permissive and restrictive and a natural hazards 
NPS. Moreover, K9 identified that the absence of an NPS for natural hazards represented a 
very harmful gap in the broad land-use and resource management framework in New Zealand. 
‘We have a lot of national policy statements at the moment … we’ve got the new NPS for urban 
development that has just come out, but we don’t have a balancing one … where is the one 
that’s telling us about managing risks from hazards? So, it’s basically a missing one in the set 
at the moment’ (K9). Lawrence (2016) asserts that as a result of recent RMA reforms, largely 
as a result of the devastating Christchurch earthquake sequence, natural hazards should be 
considered ‘matters of national importance’ within Part 2, Section 6 of the RMA. As of the 19th 
of April 2017, pursuant to S6(h), the management of significant risks from natural hazards now 
is a matter of national importance, however, Lawrence (2016) further states that alongside 
this, a high order planning document such as an NPS on natural hazards should be developed 
as; ‘such a link [natural hazards NPS] would make integrated planning for disaster and climate 
change risk easier for councils to address’ (Lawrence, 2016: p. 34). While this was written under 
the scope of climate change risk, the author has communicated the immense benefit national 
guidance would have on the hazard and emergency management sector broadly. Moreover, 
the potential for an NPS on natural hazards to benefit the management of natural hazards has 
been discussed for many years in New Zealand in times prior to the devastating decade that 
this country has had in regard to natural hazards and earthquakes. Nathan and Van Dissen 
(2001) suggest the development of an NPS for natural hazards could be developed in order to 
support national consistency in managing natural hazards that needs to be ‘urgent addressed’ 
(Nathan and Van Dissen, 2001: p. 5). Additionally, Becker and Johnston (2002) convey the need 
for an NPS, or ‘best practice guidelines’ (p. 7) would allow for both greater ability for each 
‘I would like to see more national direction … like a national policy 
statement on natural hazards which provides stronger policy 
guidance that sits above the regional policy statement and the 
district plans to give councils guidance on where they should and 
shouldn’t be allowing development. 
 









region to plan for hazards while also being equipped to ‘devise local solutions for local 
problems’ (Becker and Johnston, 2002: p. 7).  
The findings from this research are entirely consistent with common discourse for hazard 
and emergency management planning in New Zealand for around two decades where, in order 
for natural hazards to be better managed, there must be more national level direction that 
helps guide best practice. The urgency to implement these methods has become increasingly 
apparent after the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes as well as innumerable other 
hazards that have afflicted New Zealand in recent times. Further, the past tumultuous decade 
has, through trial by fire, shown that devastating hazards can afflict areas of New Zealand that 
were previously considered low risk, such as Canterbury / Christchurch prior to the 2010 
earthquake sequence.  
A further constraint identified in the development and implementation of best practice for 
hazard and emergency management exists within the intra and inter regional differences that 
have emerged as cause for concern for many of the key informants where the legacy issues of 
development in unsuitable environments presents a very pressing and complicated issue for 
the current hazard and emergency framework. The key informants participating in this 
research have clearly identified the legacy issues associated with development in areas of 
adverse risk in New Zealand poses immense problems for hazard management broadly, in the 
fact that these issues pertain to existing infrastructure. Additionally, these problems are 
amplified through continued development of urban areas that are already under risk. Figure 
5.4 displays a range of quotes from the key informants regarding their outlook on the vast 
legacy issues that present substantial challenges now, and in the future. 
  
• '... if you look at New Zealand and how New Zealand has developed 
over time, most of the areas where our towns and cities have been 
developed because of access to the coastal environment or ... river 
access ... or ease of building on river plains ... so they're subject to 
coastal inundation, flooding ... or another huge range of concerns.'
K4
• '... there is value in people being able to live by the coast and 
people value that or do things in certain places to live on 
floodplains and all of that ... but its about balancing the actual 










 Figure 5.4 articulates a range of the views of the key informants regarding the effect 
that legacy decision making will have on the development of best practice and the hazard and 
emergency management sector in general. While it is impractical to consider the movement 
away from existing urban areas in New Zealand in favour of rebuilding in areas that are subject 
to less frequent and destructive hazards for a mass of reasons, progress must be made to 
ensure that both existing legacy issues are mitigated and these outcomes are not repeated 
moving forward as knowledge increases and development continues. The matter of legacy 
development issues can be related to the previously discussed option of increased hazard 
identification and risk assessment, an increased emphasis on these areas will ensure that, 
provided that knowledge is available and is being used appropriately and effectively, the 
amount of development that will occur on and in areas that are exposed to adverse hazard risk 
can be minimised. However, while there exists prudent options for the continued development 
of infrastructure in the future, there still remains the immense issue of working with the 
immense amount of infrastructure that has already been built in risk prone areas.  
• '... doing a lot of work in the Clutha Distrcit with council and a 
number of communities, coastal communities that are going to 
have problems, or already do have problems associated with 
natural hazards that are only going to get worse ... these will 
require a planning response probably sooner rather than later.'
K6
• '... building on new land is only adding a very small percentage 
considering a lot of the building stock has already been built. so 
even if we make really good decisions about future land use, we've 
still got a legacy of 100 or 150 years of really poor land use 
decisions ... building stock that's already been built in dumb places.' 
K7
• '...  land use planning in the hazards context is just fraught with 
challenges because of ... legacy decision making.'K10
Figure 5.4 – Key informants’ views regarding the impact of land-use legacy decision making 
and the impact on hazard and emergency management. 
Source – Author. 
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K8 identifies that typically with areas that suffer from developmental and infrastructural 
legacy decision making issues, there are a substantial amount of buildings that while being 
built, are often very far off what acceptable levels of building strength etc. for new builds. Using 
Dunedin as an example, ‘… right now, in Dunedin the code values (for earthquake strength) are 
very low because they’re based on 500-year return period margins, and in this part of the world 
those are very low numbers. So, it doesn’t take much to reach … code. This poses a serious 
problem … but now with modern building practices we can address this … retrofitting beyond 
… code would be ideal.’  K9 further offered that the role of scientific advancements and modern 
building practices can help avoid in making the same mistakes twice and adding to the already 
immense amount of legacy building issues in urban areas in New Zealand; ‘I spent two years 
working at MBIE on the repair and rebuild guidance for Christchurch for foundations for the 
land that was liquefied … we developed foundation solutions for building on technical category 
one, two and three land for rebuilding … that was all new technology developed from experts 
in America … however that technology hasn’t necessarily been picked up and utilised.’ This 
quote shows that while there is the development and drive to implement new, smart solutions 
to existing issues, there remains uptake problems to implementing these new technologies 
and may be reflective of the resourcing issues that characterise the hazard and emergency 
management sector in New Zealand. Lawrence et al. (2015) explain that an immense 
proportion of the current infrastructure and urban areas in New Zealand exist in areas that are 
already subject to natural hazards and risk, in which this risk will only become more severe 
with the development of climate change. 65% of New Zealand’s population, and hence, much 
of the critical infrastructure is located within 5 kilometres of the coast and over 100 towns and 
cities are located on flood plains (Lawrence et al., 2015). These numbers are immense in 
themselves, however, development of these areas is not slowing down, it is increasing. The 
authors compare the reality of risk-based development in New Zealand to that of Norway, 
wherein both countries have seemingly accepted the fate of risky development and now rely 
heavily on technological advancements and solutions to manage these risks (Lawrence et al., 
2015). However, continually building in areas that are overlain with significant risk can often 
lead to the exacerbation of existing risks especially when engineering outcomes and 
techniques are not implemented effectively, but can also have negative impacts even when 
current best practice is utilised (Jenkins and Davies, 2009; Stevens, Berke and Song, 2010; 
Lawrence et al., 2015). Development legacy issues in New Zealand are immense, and while 
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addressing these issues with much meaningful analysis has fallen outside the scope of this 
research, it is a problem that must start being addressed in order to create sustainable and 




 Despite insurance playing a vital role in the hazard and emergency management 
framework, it was originally outside the scope of the research. However, the effectiveness and 
the role that insurance plays in the sector was addressed in a range of the key informant 
interviews and as such, the relevant findings are documented as follows: the importance of 
insurance and the role that this sector plays when considering the entire hazard and 
emergency management framework was not disputed by the key informants, all believed 
insurance to be one of the critical fail-safes in ensuring that the framework worked effectively 
and equitably. Rather, what was considered was how this sector works alongside hazards and 
risks and the obvious failings of insurance to date. Figure 5.5 depicts the nature of comments 




• 'I think there is a question about the role that insurance 
companies play ... (after the Kaikoura earthquake) we had a 
number section 72 notices under the Building Act ... insurance 
companies would say no damages occurred to the property, just 
around it, so we're not actually paying anything ... that's 
probably a gap that needs filled ... how do you address the 
shortcomings between insurance and hazards?'
K4
• 'It's a mix of the three, it's the legislaton, it's the community 
building and then it's insurance ... we had people whose houses 
were fine, but that land around them was unstable, so they 
couldn't live in their houses. Well that left them in a pretty bad 
position and government had to step in a pay those people 
because insurance companies wouldn't.'
K5
• '... New Zealand is the only country in the world to my 
knowledge that insures land through EQC, but they don't have a 
say in land use decisions ... I think the phrase used to describe 
that was 'very troubling' ... theres also an issue that I think 
homeowners mauybe don't appreciate fully how hazardous parts 
of New Zealand are.'
K7
Figure 5.5 – Key informants’ thoughts on the role and effectiveness of insurance in hazard and 
emergency management 
Source – Author 
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 Figure 5.5 indicates the key informants view the current role of insurance is a weak link 
within the hazard and emergency management sector and the contestation within and around 
insurance companies on how natural hazards affect properties and in what capacity insurance 
companies can play is problematic. The key informants who spoke on the role of insurance in 
the hazard and emergency management sphere highlighted the shortfalls that currently inhibit 
the system, where insurance companies’ policies are at odds with the harmful effects that 
hazards have on the ground. The commonly identified problem through the respondents was 
that negative impacts to land, without having negative effects to property and actual 
infrastructure was  preventing individuals from claiming with insurance, and instead, were 
reliant on government support. Glavovic, Saunders and Becker (2010a) note that within the 
context of New Zealand, and specifically regarding private insurance, rather than the 
governmental insurance scheme (namely EQC), that the full potential and benefits of insurance 
have ‘yet to be realised’ (Glavovic, Saunders and Becker, 2010a: p 691). Furthermore, 
contemporary commentary on the role of insurance for dealing with natural hazards in New 
Zealand has been criticised heavily, with criticisms ranging from disjunction within and 
between the various agencies that converge to create the hazard and emergency management 
framework in New Zealand, devolution of responsibilities to local authorities creating 
inconsistencies in management and inequality in gathering reliable hazard and risk data, and 
therefore under-delivering reliable data for insurance companies, and the adverse 
distributional consequences of public natural hazard insurance, where in essence, more 
expensive homes receive more comprehensive and generous coverage than those with lesser 
market value (Basher, 2016; Owen and Noy, 2019). 
 Despite the role of insurance with regard to natural hazards having recieved a 
significant amount of criticism of late, and while Glavovic, Saunders and Becker (2010a) note 
that best practice regarding hazard and emergency management is moving away from control-
based measures to deal with natural hazards, such as insurance, it still plays a vital role in the 
framework in New Zealand to date. K7 notes that there is an untapped resource regarding 










 The quote from K7 highlights that while there are very serious issues that need to be 
addressed within how insurance regarding natural hazards operates within New Zealand, there 
is the additional opportunity for insurance claim information to be used to help inform better 
land-use management. While unfortunately, a comprehensive analysis of the role and 
potential avenues that insurance can go down to help produce best practice has fallen outside 
the scope of this research, the information provided by the key informants and cotemporary 
literature have shown that there are significant issues that need to be addressed in order for 
insurance to play a more positive role in the future for hazard and emergency management in 
New Zealand. 
 
5.2.6 Lessons from Christchurch and Kaikōura 
 
 One of the secondary points of focus for this research was to consider that after the 
devastating decade New Zealand has had in regard to large, damaging earthquakes, have the 
lessons that were required to be learnt in dealing with the fallout from these events actually 
learnt, and passed on to the management of future events to inform best practice. As such, 
one of the concluding questions asked to a number of the key informants involved in this 
research was centred around the lessons learnt form Christchurch and Kaikōura regarding 
what was done well after experiencing previous events, and what, if anything did not translate 
so well with regard to following events. 
 The response gathered from this question was mostly positive, however, some areas 
for increased focus and work did reveal themselves if best practice is to be reached at some 
point in the future. While many of the key informants stated, there will always be unknowns 
when dealing with natural hazards as not one is ever the same as another, and K3 went further 
as to state that; ‘… as long as we all learn … and we all share experiences, you know, pick up 
what works well, understand what didn’t work well, because that’s still a learning opportunity, 
‘Another problem is we’ve got a huge database of claim information, 
which hasn’t been made readily public at the moment. I’d quite like to 
make it public … it is in Christchurch recently because of problems with 
people buying and selling houses where earthquake insurance pay-outs 
weren’t spent on repairs.’ 
 









and understand that you’re going to make mistakes. Things do go wrong. Just try your hardest 
not to repeat them.’ While this was the comment of one individual from one isolated key 
informant interview, the message from this statement was reflected much of the views of the 
other key informants where there is an understanding that, given the nature of natural hazards 
and the innate unpredictability of dealing with them, there will be things that go wrong, so 
long as those working within the sphere are learning from these, progress moves forward. 






 This sentiment was reflected through a number of the key informants, particularly 
those working around the science of natural hazards and the processes that are involved in 
shaping and creating them where there was the sincere feeling that, while acknowledging that 
there is still much work to be done, progress is steady, and what information is coming to light 
is helping to inform best practice and influence better management decisions in the future, 
from the policy level to implementation on the ground. K8 and K10 also affirm that the 
earthquakes that occurred in Christchurch and Kaikōura have had major implications on the 
understanding and scientific knowledge for not only earthquakes, but for landslides, tsunami, 
liquefaction and a huge amount of other risk related processes right across the framework. K8 
identifies that, with specific reference to the Christchurch earthquake, a mountain of 
knowledge was gained when looking at earthquake sequences within low seismicity areas, and 
the potential for essentially all areas of New Zealand could experience similar events 
considering our proximity to the Pacific and Australian plate boundary. The immense and 
frequent aftershock sequence also redefined how these events are looked at, as K8 states ‘It’s 
no longer just a scientific thing to say ‘oh aftershocks decay’, it’s actually setting high hazard 
values while those aftershocks are there and building buildings that take that into account.’ K10 
further acknowledges the lessons that were learnt in regard to the psychosocial issues that 
persisted, and for some, still persist for earthquake survivors, particularly in the case of the 
2011 Christchurch earthquake with its’ widespread devastation to already weakened 
infrastructure and tragic loss of life;  
‘I think that in the last 10 years since the start of the Canterbury 
earthquake sequence, we’ve come a huge way in trying to tackle 
some of these big known risks that we have in New Zealand’ 
 
















Additionally, K8 states that the Kaikōura earthquake broadened the understanding of 
earthquake processes largely based around the complexity of the rupture sequence and the 
sheer volume of faults that were ruptured. This has forced a shift in the thinking and previous 
understanding of earthquakes and the nature of rupturing as a total of 20 faults ruptured 
during the one event, previously unheard of for earthquakes and has now required this to be 
considered when engaging in hazard and risk mapping for future events that have the potential 
to behave in a similar manner.  
A further development was communicated by the key informants surrounding the 
nature of hazard and emergency management planning in New Zealand through organisations 
such as NEMA are often only largely focussed with large urban areas and a disproportionate 
amount of planning and thinking is catered only for the very largest urban centres in New 
Zealand while more isolated areas receive comparatively very low attention. This has 
translated into the lessons that were learnt from the Christchurch earthquake sequence, which 
were then transferred to the Kaikōura scenario, which, while it has another large, destructive 
earthquake, the geographical conditions and population distributions were immensely 
different. As such, a number of the key informants shared concerns over the management of 









Furthermore, K7 states; ‘… the difference between Canterbury (Christchurch) and 
Kaikōura was that Christchurch was a big urban centre … it got a huge amount of government 
‘I think one of the things that didn’t work well was what happened 
for Christchurch, they tried to roll out for Kaikōura and 
Marlborough as well … and it doesn’t work that way. You’ve got to 
adjust to the circumstances and situations that you’re in.’ 
 








‘… from Christchurch we found that well-being and psychosocial 
stuff was massive, and we totally underestimated the outcomes 
for people, particularly around the aftershock sequence that just 
went on affecting people for two years or more…’ 
 









attention and money … Kaikōura, very small Council, very big district with pockets of damage 
… and not to put too fine a point on this, very little government attention and very little money 
… so at face value, I’m not sure if the immediate lessons from Christchurch were transferred to 
Kaikōura.’ The two quotes offered by the key informants in the contexts of lessons being 
transferred from the large urban areas to comparatively isolated rural regions help paint the 
picture of the disparity between large urban centres and the rest of New Zealand in regard to 
hazard and emergency management that this research has found.  
 
5.2.7 Concluding Remarks for Research Objective One 
 
 Research objective one has taken a very wide view of the hazard and emergency 
management framework currently in place in New Zealand and has analysed a range of areas 
that both have positive and negative aspects. These topics have ranged from the actual 
defining of hazards, and thereafter, hazard management, the interaction of legislation and the 
immense national and regional differences that affect the framework as a whole. This section 
has also touched on a number of areas that fell outside the initial scope of the research, 
particularly the role of insurance and the legacy issues of historical development in hazardous 
areas. In the course of examining the responses, research objective one and trying to 
understand the effectiveness and shortfalls of the current hazard and emergency management 
framework, the research has found that while there is evidence of substantial progress being 
made in areas such as hazard identification, hazard process and scientific knowledge, and 
therefore, enhanced information and ability to create effective and informative risk 
assessment to create better plans and management outcomes, there are also a range of 
concerns under the current framework. Legislative interactions and the clearly and repeatedly 
articulated disconnect between the main linking statutes, the RMA and the CDEMA result in 
the application of poor and ill-informed management decisions or outcomes and a slew of 
resourcing issues have acted to handcuff the development of effective local government 
hazard management resources and inhibiting the capacity for, and ability to engage in pre-
event recovery planning principles such as proactive planning and public participation. The 
information provided within the analysis of research objective one will interlink with research 
objectives two and three and will ultimately lead to the dissemination of the conclusion and 
recommendations.  
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5.3 Research Objective Two – Investigate the principles of pre-event recovery 
planning with an emphasis on public participation and MEK to understand how 
this can be assimilated into effective, long-term recovery 
 Research objective two builds on research objective one by examining public 
participation and community engagement and resilience in the hazard and planning 
framework. Additionally, research objective two analyses the potential role that MEK can play 
in the future of hazard and emergency management planning. Research objective two also 
addresses the findings that arose through the key informant interviews that did not previously 
fall within the scope of the research during the start of this project. This will be in the form of 
the observed community views to hazard and emergency management planning and the 
framework in general, as understood by the key informants, many of whom have been or are 
directly involved with engaging with the public, either during ‘peace time’ or within the context 
of an emergency.  
 
5.3.1 Pre-event recovery planning – Proactive Planning 
 
 As has been largely covered in the previous chapters of the research, particularly the 
literature review, the principles of pre-event recovery planning have formed the basis of this 
research, and as such, have had a major role in the direction and formulation for the key 
informant interviews and wider data collection process. As the title of this subsection suggests, 
pre-event recovery planning in the context of this research was specifically targeted to 
primarily consider the potential for, and the impacts of proactive planning, and the prospective 
role that a focus on this option can have to shape and guide hazard and emergency planning 
and the framework in general into the future. While discussing the possibility and viability of 
incorporating a culture that promotes proactive planning a range of different benefits and 
potentials were considered. Alongside these observed benefits and potentials, there were also 
a range of shortcomings and roadblocks argued by the key informants within the context of 
proactive planning. It is important to note that while these will be communicated as fully as 
the benefits and potentials for proactive planning, the majority of these shortcomings and 
roadblocks are directly associated with a number of the limitations to the current framework 
that were discussed as length during the analysis of research objective one, namely resourcing, 
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national and regional differences and the interaction of legislation. Therefore, where 
appropriate, much of the commentary surrounding the issues that relate the previously 
discussed weaknesses of the current hazard and emergency management framework will be 
related back to the findings and discussion provided in the analysis of research objective one.  
 A relatively clear consensus was provided through the discussion with the key 
informants participating in this research as to the role and potential benefits of proactive 
planning in the future of hazard and emergency management and implementation of best 
practice, these findings are shown below in Figure 5.6. 
   
  
Figure 5.6 displays a selection of the responses gathered form the key informants regarding 
the potential role and capacity for proactive planning to retrofit the current hazard and 
emergency management framework. The overwhelming majority of responses regarding this 
Figure 5.6 – A selection of the responses offered from the key informants regarding the 
role of proactive planning in the future of hazard and emergency management planning 
Source – Author 
• 'It's well worth spending the time thinking about it and 
planning for it before hand ... for every dollar invested in pre-
planning, gives you seven dollars when it all turns to crap.'
K1
• 'I think actually that planinng is never wasted, particularly pre-
planning. So you know, no matter what gets done, it will some 
effect, positive effect.'
K3
• 'I would say you're better off to front load the process and have 
more information at the start.'K4
• 'An earthquake is probably one of the things that we can, in 
terms of a hazard ... something we can really do a lot to say, 
reduce risk of actual death of infrastructure loss ... I think it 
really demonstrates how much proactive mitigation can help.'
K5
• '... a more holistical look at all kinds of hazards, geological and 
meteorlogical hazards ... thinking in multi-hazard ways, and 
thinking proactively is the way to go.'
K8
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were positive, with the acknowledgement that proactive planning provides information, 
options and guidance for hazard and emergency planning if and when required alongside the 
occurrence of a disaster. Key informants commonly responded stating that proactive planning 
and the principles of pre-event recovery planning were very valuable options that can and 
should be used more fully, especially when considering the range of limitations regarding the 
current framework, specifically in regard to assisting in the development and availability of 
information for hazard and risk assessment. The concept of proactive planning in and around 
the hazard and emergency management sector has long been theorised and supported in 
literature, as well as in New Zealand’s own NRDS which is, in part, informed through the SFDRR 
which also promotes strongly the principles of pre-event recovery planning to implement best 
practice hazard and emergency management. The SFDRR has identified ‘Understanding 
disaster risk’ as the first priority for enhanced global management of, and resilience and 
sustainability to natural hazards, to achieve this the framework has clearly targeted risk 
knowledge and an in-depth understanding of natural processes and hazards to achieve this. 
‘Policies and practices for disaster risk management should be based on an understanding of 
disaster risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, 
hazard characteristics and the environment. Such knowledge can be leveraged for the purpose 
of pre-disaster risk assessment (pre-event recovery planning), for prevention and mitigation 
and for the development and implementation of appropriate preparedness and effective 
response to disasters’ (United Nations, 2015: p. 14). The level of understanding that is targeted 
and required by the SFDRR can only be achieved by implementing principles of pre-event 
recovery planning and making a concerted effort to proactively seek out knowledge for the 
risks that threaten humans, livelihoods and property. Glavovic (2010) argues that proactive 
planning with regard to natural hazards has an immense impact on the ability for individuals, 
groups and communities to feel safe, and become more resilient and sustainable through an 
increased understanding and knowledge of hazards and an appreciation for risk. Furthermore, 
Glavovic, Saunders and Becker (2010b) concluded 10 years ago that both international and 
local experience demonstrated that pre-event recovery planning plays a vital role in the 
development and implementation of reduction measures. This research has shown that 
reduction, one of the 4R’s has been rather neglected in the wider New Zealand framework for 
some time as the full potential for aiding in setting direction and context for recovery to ensure 
that communities are able to cope with, and bounce back from significant disasters is left 
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unrealised. While there are a wide range of examples of isolated locations implementing the 
principles of pre-event recovery planning and acting proactively to reduce the risk that is being 
exposed to residents, such as the example provided by King et al. (2016) for beach front 
communities in Tully Heads and Hull Heads in Australia, widespread implementation is yet ti 
be achieved. In this case, local government acted proactively to rezone land that was 
inappropriate for development due to coastal inundation and erosion in order to reduce 
liability for local government pertaining to the failings of infrastructure due to natural 
processes, and to help inform and consult communities on risk and becoming more risk 
resilient. King et al. (2016) state ‘local government have taken a more proactive stance in the 
way in which they undertake planning by restricting the settling of constrained lands through 
identifying more appropriate future locations’ (King et al., 2016: p. 165). In doing so, the local 
government in these localities have exercised the ‘duty-of-care’ K8 has observed to be a 
necessity for those within land use and hazard and emergency management and have taken 
clear proactive steps for the reduction of hazard risk for communities while also reducing the 
contingent liability potentially facing local government in these areas. As explained through 
King et al. (2016), pre-event recovery planning measures and principles can have exceedingly 
positive effects in isolated events, however, this research argues that these principles must be 
applied at a much larger scale in order for widespread benefits to be felt at a national scale. 
While discussed within the context of research objective one, a major hinderance to 
widespread implementation of proactive planning within the scope of better land use decision 
making is the legacy issues of development that afflict New Zealand. This research has helped 
show that applying pre-event recovery planning principles for new developments is not only 
more than viable, it is necessary to produce better land use management outcomes from now 
and into the future.  
Moreover, as discussed within research objective one, many of the key informants that 
participated in this research called for a more restrictive system when considering tolerance 
and acceptance of risk. An adoption of a system that draws a clear line at risk thresholds in 
favour of appropriate, resilient and sustainable development requires an comprehensive 
understanding of the localised risks and hazards that can or do impact a specific area, this can 
be done methodically by upholding the principles of pre-event recovery planning and making 
a concerted effort to produce reliable risk assessment and identification data. March and 
Henry (2007) claim that ‘forward planning’, essentially proactive planning, is necessary to 
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significantly reduce the impacts of natural hazards, the authors further state that proactive 
planning for natural hazards exists as a complementary process for land use planning and will 
allow communities and decision makers to ‘determine that areas are too risky to be built upon 
or used for certain purposes’ (March and Henry, 2007; p. 19). In order for a land-use and 
resource management framework to endorse the restriction of developable land based on an 
assessment of hazards and the risks they pose, comprehensive evaluation and information 
must be provided to ensure that ill-fated development does not take place, once again calling 
for the necessity of pre-event recovery planning, with specific reference to proactive planning. 
 However, despite Figure 5.6 and the associated commentary advocating for the 
implementation of proactive planning, the key informants have also communicated a range of 
concerns regarding the widespread uptake of proactive planning to supplement and drive the 
hazard and emergency management framework in the future. There were a number of 
concerns that were raised by the key informants regarding the widespread uptake of proactive 
planning, a number of these issues were directly related to the resourcing issues exist as a 
major constraint of the growth of hazard and emergency management practice. Figure 5.7 
shows common themes concerning the capacity of many agencies, particularly local 
government, to engage in proactive planning when they already struggle to perform tasks that 
need to be done day to day with the staff and resources they are currently afforded. 
 
  Figure 5.7 – Concerns of the key informants regarding the ability to implement proactive 
planning practices under resourcing and capacity issues 
Source - Author 
 
• 'It's difficult because like everyone else (other councils / local 
government) we're under resourced ... dont necessarily have 
the people with the skills ... giving the sector more capacity 
and capability would be really useful.'
K3
• '... I suppose the difficulty becomes what may or may not 
happen, the scale of potential events and how much resources 
you can put into pre-planning.'
K4
• '... risk assessment is expensive. It takes a lot of complex 
science with a lot of theoretical underpinning models, and 
people with the expertise to implement them.'
K9
• '... response and planning to different events really relies on 
the team that you have available.'K10
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  Figure 5.7 shows a range of concerns the key informants hold in regard to being able 
to actually implement principles of pre-event recovery planning and proactive planning on the 
ground as resourcing and capacity issues constrain the growth of this mode of planning. The 
respondents who were currently, or have in some capacity in the past been employed by local 
government and working with hazard and emergency management clearly stated that general 
resourcing, capacity and capability issues prevented them from doing an array of desired 
activities within the hazard management sphere, proactive planning was identified as being 






 The above quote from K1 clearly shows just how much smaller agencies and local 
government struggle when attempting to engage in practices when handcuffed through 
resourcing issues. A further problem communicated by the key informants with regard to 
proactive planning was the inherent unpredictability of natural hazards and the notion that; 
‘you can never plan for every eventuality’ (K6), and ‘it’s very hard to plan for all activities, 
because you don’t know exactly what could happen (K4). The message conveyed was that on 
top of the resourcing issues inhibiting the application of proactive planning, there are serious 
concerns regarding the scope of boundaries that proactive planning could have, and the 
enormity of the task to try and characterise and map the effects and risk values for all hazards. 
Despite this feeling, K8 and K10 suggest that while this task was mammoth in of itself, there 
can be, or currently are, pathways for other agencies to provide information and guidance for 
local government. K10 stated that it is only logical for the starting area for gathering 
information and getting the ball rolling for proactive planning is to address the largest hazards 
that have the potential to cause serious damage and impact large proportions of the 
population, such as AF8; ‘I think it’s only natural that we start, first of all dealing with the big 
known risks that we have, and that’s the Alpine Fault, the Hikurangi Trench and Wellington … 
those are the big 3 in New Zealand … I don’t think it’s a great surprise that we are focussing a 
lot of energy in these areas.’ Additionally, K8 acknowledged that despite the clear focus on the 
‘big 3’ in New Zealand, research was starting to spread out to other areas of the country that 
‘I could put one person working on that for the next 12 months 
(proactive planning), that’s what I would really like to do. It’s just 
for small groups, that’s really not an option. But that’s the level of 
planning that’s required, I think.’ 
 









are currently considered as ‘low seismicity areas’ in order to further develop a comprehensive 
knowledge base of earthquake hazard in New Zealand. However, K8 also states that more work 








 Although, considering the expertise of both K8 and K10 being heavily involved in 
earthquake hazard and science, K8 points out that while earthquake science is moving forward, 
different hazards are being treated differently across the country, with earthquake hazard and 
flood hazards leading the way; ‘I think flood is being treated appropriately, I think earthquake 
is getting there, landslide, I don’t think there is the same level of work, but it is different with 
every locality … it’s patchy, some places just haven’t had anything’ (K8). This reflects the 
resourcing issues that afflict the entire framework and suggest that while progress is being 
made with many hazards, such as flooding and earthquakes, there is still substantial amounts 
of room for improvement to assist the development of the national hazard and emergency 
framework and assist the future application of proactive planning.  
 Another issue that they key informants have conveyed around the potential 
widespread adoption of proactive planning lies with the irregularity of natural processes and 
hazards both in size and frequency of the hazard, and in the effects observed on the ground. 
K4 states that while they believe that there is immense value in planning proactively, it is hard 
to foresee what will happen and plan for it, especially when considering low frequency high 
impact events.  Similar concerns appear in literature, specifically when attempting to calculate 
risk and vulnerability values. Tsakiris (2007) states there are a range of factors that make these 
calculations difficult and inherently variable, such as human intervention and the global 
variations through navigating the continually developing effects of climate change. Within the 
scope of climate change, considering the immense changes that will likely result due to this 
phenomenon, the viability of long-term pre-planning in particular may be questioned. Under 
section 93 of the LGA, councils are required to create Long Term Plans (LTP) every three years 
‘I think we do best in the high hazard areas, like Wellington area … 
Alpine Fault and the AF8 project. But we don’t do so well for 
thinking about earthquake hazards in low seismicity areas … 
results in reactionary responses … but I’ve managed to make a 
point enough so that now we do get quite significant funding.’ 
 









to set out the direction and priorities of cities, districts and regions over the next 10 years 
(Quality Planning, 2017). Considering this relatively short time frame of 10 years and the 
comparatively much longer intervals of recurrences for natural events, compounded by the 
unknown and uneven effects of climate change, the life cycle of pre-plans may become 
irrelevant. Despite this, K2 indicates that regardless; ‘It’s very hard to write a plan that’s not 
going to need some tweaking … but the fact that you’ve been through that process, what the 
plan needs to have, what you need to understand and who you engage with is a real positive.’ 
The benefits of the process of plan making will be discussed further in this section.  
In addition, K4 observes that the effects of the Kaikōura earthquake had major 
implications that were not fully foreseen before the event; ‘Did we foresee that all the roads 
to the district would be closed, and that we’d lose all internet and broadband? The answer 
would probably be no. So that planning comes to a bit of a scale and depending on the scale, it 
has some fairly significant changes.’  Considering these difficulties around quantifying the 
potential effects and the size and frequencies of natural events that may happen at a time 
relatively unknown to all until the event actually eventuates, the caution conveyed by the key 
informants around the viability and sensibility of creating widespread pre plans is 
understandable, despite the clear benefits they have spoken to in this research and what is 
reflected in the literature. It is clear that the key informants through this research reflect much 
of the same sentiment that appears in contemporary literature around best practice natural 
hazard and emergency management planning in the advocation for proactive planning, 
however, the current framework in New Zealand through resourcing, capacity and capability 
issues is hindering the development of these practices that will act to benefit the entire 
framework moving forward. 
 Acknowledging the factors that obstruct the widespread development of proactive 
planning by the key informants as stated above, further affirmation for the development of 
pre-plans and the action of proactive planning was clearly stated by a number of the key 
informants. While recognising that, especially with the current state of the hazard and 
emergency management framework, the ability to comprehensively plan for all situations, and 
have all pertinent information readily available for risk identification and assessment is limited, 
the processes that are followed and the relationships built when constructing pre-plans are all 
extremely beneficial and make the process worthwhile. This is communicated in the two 












Schusler, Decker and Pfeffer (2003) identify that plan making and other deliberative 
processes, ‘can be designed to foster social learning among agencies and stakeholders’ 
(Schusler, Decker and Pfeffer, 2003: p. 324). This directly reflects the findings from this 
research, as displayed in the two above quotes, potentially the biggest benefit to formulating 
pre-plans lies in engaging with a range of different stakeholders and agencies can bring greater 
cohesion and create better development and planning outcomes in the long run. The key 
informants further stated that during emergency events, such as the Kaikōura earthquake, the 
relationships that had been built during the plan making process, interactions within and 
between CDEM Groups directly transferred into more engaged and efficient management 
wherein staff and resources were lent across the country, being delivered through the 










‘What we’ve found as well with pre-event recovery planning in 
particular, it’s often not the outcome of that pre-event plan that 
you may have that’s the most valuable. It’s actually those 
relationships that have been built up over time.’ 
 








‘One of the things that has become blatantly obvious … is that 
actually, it’s not about the plans, there is value in doing the plan, 
of course, but actually, it’s the relationships that you develop 
during the development of a plan that are important.’ 
 








‘We’ve got extremely good relationships with all our emergency 
response agencies here and that’s how we cope with such a small 
team … we’re all on a first name basis … and give each other a 
hard time. But, when it all tips upside down we’re all heads down 
bum up and we all trust one another.’ 
 








‘We tend to involve everyone in our planning anyway, we have a 
strong network of lifeline groups who work into our structure and 
we are able to get pretty good results using these relationships.’ 
 









Furthermore, the relationships being built within the plan making process and other 
interactions is likely to help bridge the divide that exists within the disconnect between the 
major legislation in the hazard and emergency management framework, namely the RMA and 
CDEMA, where in spite of the observed ‘silo-ing’ among persons exercising functions and 
duties under each Act (Saunders et al., 2007), meaningful relationships can be built to help 
overcome the institutional disengagement of each Act. The key informants have clearly 
displayed the benefits and opportunities when considering proactive planning, in both the 
outcomes of these plans as well as the process of plan making in creating links within and 
between agencies that are realised in better management decisions and outcomes when 
dealing with the fallout of natural disasters.  
 
5.3.2 Public Participation and Community Resilience and Sustainability 
 
 The following section is centred around another principle of pre-event recovery 
planning, the role of public participation in the planning process. This will be examined from a 
number of perspectives. Firstly, with the data provided by the key informants, this section will 
investigate what role public participation has currently in the hazard and emergency 
management framework and then to what capacity this role is being fulfilled. Additionally, the 
barriers to implementing and making public participation worthwhile will be examined.  
 As communicated within the literature review, meaningful public participation in the 
planning sphere is not only an immensely effective way to facilitate growth and increased 
knowledge, Coles and Buckle (2004) affirm that sincere engagement with the public within the 
scope of the hazard and emergency management planning, is often considered a necessity for 
effective recovery. This was reflected by the key informants who expressed their views on the 
role that public participation can have on the hazard and emergency management planning 
and the impact it can have on community resilience and sustainability. However, the key 
informants were quick to state that for multiple reasons the current framework produced 
obstructions for the potential benefits of public participation to be met, similar to the way that 
the implementation of proactive planning was being hindered. Chief among these were 
resourcing and capacity issues where issues lay in the ability to facilitate meaningful and lasting 
public participation where the messages being conveyed were sufficiently penetrative and long 






 Figure 5.8 captures the conflict that was conveyed by the key informants wherein they 
expressed their beliefs that meaningful public participation and community engagement could 
and should play a strong role in the overall hazard and emergency management sector, 
however the development of this is being hindered through a range of issues. As stated above, 
resourcing and capacity issues exist as the main barrier to the development of public 
participation, drawing direct comparisons to the earlier discussion on the barriers for proactive 
planning. All of the key informants stated that there is the desire and need for increased levels 
of public participation in the hazard and emergency framework, as with proactive planning, 
but often times this need goes against more pressing and immediate priorities, and as a result, 
the hope to engage in these types of activities is superseded by other tasks. K9 states that 
although public participation is challenging, being that it takes significant amounts of time, 
money and community cooperation, the hazard space must better inform the wider New 
Zealand public of risks and get them involved in the process, but at the moment we are not 
doing enough in this regard;  
• 'Good community engagement is really key, but its really 
tricky ... good engagement takes time and it takes money, but 
you get a much better outcome putting these in.'
K2
• 'Public participation is really effective if you can get the 
community to attend. But how dfo you get the community 
engaged? You know, it's a really interesteding question.'
K4
• 'I think some of the most important things to do in plamnning 
is to do that upskilling of the community and listening to the 
community about what they think and want, instead of 
telling community what you think they want.'
K5
• '... you really need to engage with communities early, or as 
early as you can, rather than just coming to them with a 
predetermined sort of set of solutions ... because it's their 
problem, right? It's their risk, they're the ones who live with 
it.'
K6
Figure 5.8 – Conflicting views of key informants regarding the role and capacity of 
public participation against obstructions to meaningful engagement 








This reinforces the resourcing issues that were identified within research objective one and 
shows that at its’ core, the hazard and emergency management framework is underpinned by 
a lack of resources. Without this being addressed, practices that will lead to the development 
of the entire hazard and emergency management sector, such as proactive planning and 
increased public participation will continue to be underdelivered and under prioritised. King 
(2008) identifies, that in the context of Australia, similar issues are being found, in an analysis 
of a number of communities in Australia, progress was being made in the hazard sphere in 
regard to creating good development and management decisions but ‘strengthening 
stakeholder community involvement is the strongest need in the next steps of risk reduction and 
mitigation’ (King, 2008: p. 506). Furthermore, the ability for emergency management agencies 
to engage with communities about hazards is critical as, Paton (2007) asserts, collective 
commitment to confront hazard consequences increases when agencies take a more involved 
role. These are very similar findings to what has been brought to light by this study, where 
adherence to the SFDRR, the continued development of CDEM Group Plans and content of the 
NDRS highlight the forward steps the sector is making, but is being held back by limitations in  
other areas, such as the endorsement and facilitation of effective and meaningful public 
participation through resourcing and capacity issues. Both the key informants and King (2008) 
acknowledge that public participation and outreach to the wider community is difficult, but 
the author argues that when an appropriately representative cross-section of a population is 
involved, the process works well. In addition to the benefits that enhanced community 
engagement and interaction has for the hazard and emergency management sector as a 
whole, empirical evidence gathered from after the Christchurch earthquakes informed the 
country that while these events can and do threaten and take lives, and cause widespread 
destruction to areas immediately, they can also have long-lasting psychosocial effects that 
have serious detrimental effects for individuals, groups and communities. K10 recognised this 
and conveyed the severity of the psychosocial implications for those that lived through not 
‘We know that we need to better communicate hazards and risks 
to communities, and it is quite hard, but we need to get them 
involved in the process, because if you don’t get the community 
buy-in, it’s never going to work.’ 
 









only the initial Christchurch earthquake of 2010, but the long and dangerous aftershock 
sequence that followed, including the devastating aftershock in 2011, now known as the 2011 
Christchurch earthquake. K10 states; ‘… we totally underestimated the (psychosocial) 
outcomes for people’ and that the framework could do a lot better in providing support for 
those who were affected. Gluckman (2011) identified, in a review of the psychosocial 
consequences of the Canterbury earthquakes, one major area available in order to minimise 
these issues is the ‘promotion of local empowerment and engagement by working closely in a 
collaborative way with the affected population in co-ordinating and co-leading the response 
effort’ (Gluckman, 2011: p. 5). While there is no doubt that the psychosocial issues of an 
affected population must be addressed in the times after an event, within the context of 
climate change, contemporary literature suggests that we must start considering the 
psychosocial impacts of the effects of climate change as it affects us now, and as these effects 
will change into the future (Chowdhury, Haque and Smith, 2011; Doherty and Clayton, 2011; 
Luís et al., 2018). Considering this is effectively proactively planning for psychosocial issues for 
those adversely affected by climate change, it is conceivable that the same can and should be 
done for natural hazards, albeit, in a relatively more unknown context. Christchurch has taught 
us that psychosocial issues are an immense problem, and while the real extent of these can 
only be measured when an event has already occurred, taking proactive steps to help educate 
and inform communities on what risks they are exposed to and what a natural disaster could 
result in for them and their communities could go a long way in alleviating some of these 
pressures when an event does occur. 
Considering the above stated challenges to the development and realisation of public 
participation within the scope of hazard and emergency management, the key informants 
provided a range of suggestions that could be put in place to help enhance the levels of 
engagement within communities, thereby increasing public participation on natural hazards 
and the risks they pose. The concept of spontaneous volunteerism appeared in a number of 
the interviews with key informants specifically in the context of the Christchurch earthquakes. 
Lewis (2013) states that during disaster situations, social structures and norms are completely 
shaken and do not functions as they usually do or are supposed to do, therefore ‘individuals 
look for individual agency to overcome this void’ (Lewis, 2013: p. 827). This results in the 
occurrence of spontaneous volunteerism, this was experienced in Christchurch after the 
earthquake in many forms, most notably, through the ‘Farmy Army’ and the Student Volunteer 
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Army (SVA). In a review of the CDEM response, (McLean et al., 2012) highlighted that the role 
of ‘volunteer participation was vastly under-estimated’ (McLean et al., 2012; p.184) and that 
they can and should be included in future CDEM developments and structures. Simons (2016) 
states there is inadequate planning for large numbers of spontaneous volunteers and that this 
must be addressed in the future, as volunteers are going to play major roles in the CDEM 
structure in the future. The role of spontaneous volunteers appeared in the discussions with a 
handful of key informants, the views held by the respondents mirrored that of the literature 
cited above which perceived volunteerism in hazard and emergency management should hold 
a more direct role in the future. This was shown in the case of the Christchurch earthquake, 
where the volunteerism that manifested after the earthquakes was initially mishandled and 
despite the immense positive contributions that organisations such as the Farmy Army and 
SVA made in the end, this could have been more collaborative and facilitated more effectively. 
K1 states that spontaneous volunteers are naturally going to be active within their 
communities when an event happens, because they want to anything they can to help, and as 
long as what they are doing is being done safely, then local government should support them 
and let them help service their own communities; 
  




 Similarly, K5 coined the term ‘sneaky civil defence’ and stated that activity and identity 
within a community is not just something to strive for, but is essential for achieving positive 







 Vallance and Carlton (2015) identify in the context of the Christchurch earthquakes, 
the multiple roles that were taken by volunteers such as earthquake clean-up, resulted in 
‘We’ve just done a spontaneous volunteer two-pager to give to our 
controllers, saying, look, let them do their thing, so long as their 
doing it reasonably safely and they’re not putting themselves in 
danger … then let them do their thing.’ 
 








‘In terms of the community, you need what I call ‘sneaky civil 
defence’ … you need a community with a strong sense of who they 
are. If you don’t have a strong sense of who you are, it’s harder to 
recovery, and communities play a vital role in recovery.’ 
 









heightened levels of community engagement and for many structured organisations, provided 
the catalyst for local government and the wider community, increased levels of communication 
and trust. However, Dionisio and Pawson (2016) state that conflict between community-led 
initiatives and spontaneous volunteerism with government-led decision making inhibited the 
effectiveness of the actions taken by volunteers, and that while the actions of community and 
volunteer groups were ‘fundamental in helping people cope with repetitive disturbances 
caused by the shakes, and in providing care and connecting people in recovery (Dionisio and 
Pawson, 2016; p. 109), linkages and relationships must be strengthened between local and 
central government and community and volunteer based agencies in order for the sector to 
grow and capitalise on the volume of support that comes through these avenues.  
 Additional to increasing the engagement between government and community and 
volunteer groups, the key informants communicated a range of different possible actions to 
take in regard to increasing overall public participation in the hazard and emergency 
management sector. At the national level, a number of the key informants made reference to 
mainstream media as having a significant role to play creating more awareness of hazard and 
emergency management to the wider public. K3 and K10 state that the national messaging 
that is promoted through organisations such as EQC are effective in continually promoting the 
message around being aware and preparing individually for natural disasters, however, K3 
further comments; ‘… the best thing is members of the public passing on by word of mouth, it’s 
faster than the education system that we can put in. But, also, multiple messaging from 
different sources is really important, and some of the national messaging is really good.’ 
Despite this, many of the key informants expressed the view that localised messaging was one 
of the most efficient and successful ways to convey hazard and emergency management 
notices and education. As alluded to earlier, the key informants have highlighted the positive 
impact that word of mouth can and has had on creating and raising awareness, K8 provided 
some anecdotal evidence of the passing knowledge through the word of mouth concept in 
Dunedin. ‘…the satisfying thing is when I talk to someone, you know, at the pub or something 
like that, and they say, ‘I’ve heard you know, we’ve got real earthquake faults close to Dunedin’ 
and they start talking about these real issues, and I think yes! It’s getting across.’ A further 
method that has been identified through the key informants is the value in starting 
conversations with the younger generations at schools and getting children interested in issues 
such as natural hazards and risks and then getting them to take that knowledge and those 
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conversations home and speaking about them to their parents, using children as the catalyst 
to begin and continue these conversations. Within the context of climate change, Monroe 
(2019) discusses the role of children in helping educate parents and from there, the wider 
communities on climate change related issues and getting those conversations started. 
Monroe (2019) presents the idea that interactive and engaging lessons, homework and 
activities, either within school or extra-curricular activities that children can take, learn from 
and bring home can help these conversations develop and continue into the future, influencing 
the thinking and importance that are placed on significant issues. The key informants have 
conveyed their feelings that this can and should be done within the context of natural hazards, 
being particularly effective in areas that are of high risk, and / or have just gone through a 
major event as this will be at the forefront of many people’s lives, but can also happen 
nationally, to ensure that awareness and appreciation for hazards and risks are increased on a 







 Workshops and other public events are commonly used within local government when 
attempting to gain outreach and educate and collaborate with wider populations, while these 
have been selected as one the primary modes of communication with communities, there are 
a number of issues and restraints that the key informants brought up in interviews. Following 
the common theme of this research and the hazard and emergency management sector, one 
of the largest shortfalls in creating and conducting successful workshopping events is a lack of 
resources. K2 states that in the context of workshopping and other engagement opportunities 
‘good engagement takes time and money…’ and for a lot of local government in New Zealand, 
particularly smaller councils, time and money, especially for hazard and emergency 
management, is not in abundance. The key informants suggested that a way to overcome these 
issues is to collaborate with outside facilitators such as Lions Clubs and other community-based 
groups and organisations to help with the funding of such events as well as to increase the 
participation and outreach to ensure that appropriate samples of the community were taking 
‘There is a programme reel running at EQC where we fund a bunch 
of children’s education, videos around earthquakes and also some 
exercises at Te Papa where the thinking is being that if you can get 
the children on board, they’ll go back and talk to the parents 
about it. And then hopefully get the parents interested.’ 
 









part in the events. K5 suggests that it’s the organisations such as the Lions Clubs that ‘make a 
community a community.’ K4 also stated that looking back at various workshopping events and 
activities that they had been a part of, collaborating more with organisations such as the Lions 
Club or Plunkett would have helped with the community outreach and made those 
programmes more effective and worthwhile, but also noted that it is a very difficult task firstly 
connecting with a community, and secondly getting a fair representation of the community 
and the values they hold because of the busy lives people lead.  
 Another major theme that emerged through this research was the constant struggle 
that local government and other agencies had when dealing with public awareness and 
appreciation for the risks that exist around them. The key informants offered views that there 
is often the added constraint of overcoming community views to incorporate them 
meaningfully in the planning process. While as previously stated, all the key informants offered 
the view that while engaging with the public was desirable, and in alignment with current 
literature, identified the benefits of doing so, a further constraint as per the key informants is 
the perception of hazards and risk and the ability for local government and other agencies to 
overcome this. The key informants presented the notion that engagement with the wider 
community, focussed on the effects of hazards as well as the hazards themselves are directly 
linked with the timeline in which they occur. Where awareness and acknowledgement are at 
all-time highs during and immediately after an event, this trends steadily downward the further 
away from an event and the effects it has produced onto a community it is. Figure 5.9 shows 
the common responses from the key informants that describe the challenges in keeping the 
occurrence and risks from hazards in the minds of communities and to raise awareness of the 
potential fallout from these events. Many of the key informants made the connection between 
the lack of prolonged awareness around the nature of hazards and the risks that they pose to 
the lack of attendance to natural hazards workshops and outlined that one of the largest 
barriers to connecting with the public and making them conscious and prepared for events 
outside of when an event has just recently occurred. This is an issue that falls outside the scope 
of resourcing and presents a much different problem to many of the others that afflict the 
hazard and emergency management sector, as previously discussed, the key informants 
outlined the role of national messaging and general education around natural hazards and risks 
to increase awareness, this research suggests that this is evidence that more work must be 






Figure 5.9 summarises the respondent’s views and conveys the concern around the 
level of awareness and appreciation for the risk and danger that natural hazards present for 
New Zealanders when an event has not occurred in a region for a period of time. These 
concerns are well founded as the wider Canterbury area and Christchurch were concerned low 
risk areas prior to the 2010 Christchurch earthquake and is evidence that while the knowledge 
around natural processes and hazards is always growing and developing, there are still very 







• '... it's interesting, unless it's reasonably shortly after an 
event, people don't have memories, they have 'forgetteries'. 
After a year or two, its like 'nope, I'm going to pretend that 
never happened.'
K2
• 'I think when things are calm and under control, and there is 
nothing happening, people are very quick to forget about the 
hazards around them.'
K3
• '... even a really catastrophic event with major impacts can 
be forgetten really quickly. People, as I say, they've just got 
other priorities in life, whether its the planner or just the 
everyday person in the street. So it's a constant struggle to 
try and raise awareness around these things.'
K6
• 'There's also an issue that I think homeowners maybe don't 
fully appreciate how hazardous parts of New Zealand are.'K7
Figure 5.9 – Key informants describing the difficulties in keeping hazards and the effects 
of these present within communities and issues with raising awareness 
Source - Author 
‘That’s part of the education job that all emergency management 
has, is for people to be prepared and keep in the back of their 
mind all those bigger all-encompassing hazards and risks we that 
know can happen with Mother Nature. We have no control over it, 
but we have to bounce back from it. 
 









In addition to this, K3 has outlined further concerns with not only public perception 
around hazards and risks, but also around the role and capacity of CDEM Groups at a local and 
national level. The notion that there is ‘no white stallion’ (K3), urges the wider public to have 
the means to be self-sufficient for a period of days if a disaster does strike, but in general, there 
is a constant battle with the education of the public and increasing awareness around the risk 
of hazards when in ‘peace-time.’ 
The current role and capacity for public participation and community engagement in 
the hazard and emergency management sector hold many similarities to situation of proactive 
planning as shown by the key informants. This research has shown that there is acceptance 
and endorsement of pre-event recovery planning principles by those working in and around 
the space of hazard and emergency management in New Zealand, however, the desire to 
implement these are not being supported at a national level and local governments who aspire 
to engage more meaningfully and actively with communities in order to better communicate 
hazard risk to enhance preparedness, resilience and sustainability when an event does occur 
are not being able to. 
 
5.3.3 The role of Māori Environmental Knowledge  
 This research has been largely centred around the principles of pre-event recovery 
planning, two major aspects of this have been analysed previously in this section in the form 
of proactive planning and the role of public participation and community engagement, the 
research will now look into the role of MEK. While accounting for and promoting MEK is not 
formally an objective of pre-event recovery planning as the 2007 document ‘Enhancing 
sustainability through pre-event recovery planning’ produced by Saunders and Becker (2007), 
this research has sought to understand and position the current and potential role for this in 
the future of hazard and emergency management in New Zealand. 
 Through discussing the current role of MEK in the hazard and emergency management 
framework, the key informants unanimously agreed that there was not enough recognition or 
support given for the role and capacity of MEK. While there was some acknowledgement that 
there are different levels of collaboration with Māori across the country with different councils, 
the respondents strongly conveyed the message that by in large, there is still huge room for 
improvement in this space and that the entire framework would benefit from it, this is shown 




Figure 5.10 – Key informants express their views on the current role of MEK in the hazard 
and emergency framework and highlight the lack of acknowledgement and collaboration. 
Source - Author 
• 'Yeah I think Iwi Management Plans (and MEK) play a critical 
role... Māori have been here a lot longer than we have, and we 
have a lot to learn from them.'
K2
• 'Yeah I think they should play a major part in hazard planning, 
definitely more than they do now, but again, it will be a capacity 
and resource issue... iwi organisations are lightly resourced, and 
their volunteers are already very stretched.'
K3
• 'I think it's a really excellent idea (collaborating more with 
Māori), but we need to make sure that it's backed up with 
sound funding. I fully support the idea but I think some serious 
thought needs to be placed on the funding side of things.'
K4
• 'I think there is a lot of work that needs to be done in that space 
(in regard to the use of IMPs and collaboration with iwi). It's 
also about capacity and resources.
K5
• 'I think there is a real role for Māori in some hazards ... (with 
regard to building in eastern Christchurch) maybe if they'd listen 
to some of the oral histories around that area we would have 
had a different outcome.'
K7
• 'There is a bit of an issue in Māori didn't have written records 
but I completely agree we need more collaboration ... the 
nature of the sorts of oral histories that have been passed down 
are probably not going to include that many errors.'
K8
• Iwi resoruce management plans are totally underutlised. Most 
people don't even know they exist ... they've got such a great 
source of knowledge on local communities and the values and 
sites of significance, all thta kind of thing.'
K9
• 'We have to get iwi involvement in civil defence strengthened ... 
we need to show we're respecting Te Tiriti and we're doing 
things the way we shoudl in partnership with Māori right 
throughout the whole process.'
K10
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 Figure 5.10 presents the strong views around the current role and capacity for MEK 
through the creation and uptake of IMPs as well as the current environment regarding the 
collaboration with Māori. Figure 5.10 shows there is widespread recognition of the value and 
potential for working closely with iwi groups and the implementation of the content of IMPs 
to benefit the hazard and emergency management framework, however, the key informants 
conveyed serious concerns around the level of engagement and collaboration that occurs in 
the space of MEK and how this is hindering the equity of work done in the hazard space. The 
complexities and tensions regarding the assimilation of IMPs in general and the wider practice 
and jurisdiction of local government is outside the scope of this research, rather the 
interactions, barriers and opportunities to further include IMPs and MEK into the hazard and 
emergency management framework will be discussed in this section. The issues discussed will 
involve constraints within the development of IMPs themselves, the uptake of knowledge and 
acknowledgement of IMPs and wider MEK into the current hazard and emergency 
management framework and the opportunities to the system that are yet to be realised but 
can be strived for. 
 Thompson-Fawcett, Ruru and Tipa (2017) emphasis that many iwi and hapū groups 
creating IMPs rely on an immense amount of the work to be done in many cases by volunteers, 
and that capacity issues within iwi and hapū groups regarding the development of IMPs 
remains a significant factor that is inhibiting the output and uptake of plans. Considering this 
however, the authors also affirm that while the iwi and hapū groups responsible for creating 
the IMPs are confident the content reflects their beliefs and values, the strength and value of 
IMPs relies heavily on the relationship and level of collaboration that is provided by local 
government, and if relationships between iwi and hapū groups and local government are 
strong, ‘IMPs remain one of the best tools for iwi and hapū to further their aspirations 
regarding resources and the environment (Thompson-Fawcett, Ruru and Tipa, 2017; p. 272). 
Affirming this, Saunders (2018) identified in a case study of the role and capacity of IMPs in the 
Bay of Plenty that strong relationships between iwi and hapū groups in the region and local 
government have resulted in the sincere uptake of IMPs in relation to resource management 
in general. However, Saunders (2018) also found that in many of the IMPs produced in the Bay 
of Plenty region, there was the noticeable absence of work done in the natural hazards space. 
This is likely a reflection of the resourcing issues that many iwi and hapū groups face that mirror 
the issues that are present within the entirety of the hazard and emergency management 
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sector in New Zealand. While there are resourcing and capacity issues linked to the 
development of IMPs and thus, the inclusion of MEK into the planning structure generally and 
for hazard and emergency management through the reliance on volunteers, and low funding, 
the key informants have stated that similar resourcing issues that are present within the local 
government structure are also inhibiting the uptake and acknowledge of MEK into the planning 
system.  
The key informants in this research have all displayed a strong desire for increased 
levels of collaboration between local government and iwi and hapū groups that are being 
hindered through resourcing, this in turn is blocking the assimilation of MEK and the benefits 
that an increased understanding and acceptance of can have in the context of hazard and 





The above statement from K10 highlights the tensions that exist between local 
government and iwi and hapū groups where the vast store of knowledge has yet to be 
acknowledged in the planning system in New Zealand, thus the opportunity for MEK to provide 
guidance for and to help shape the development of best practice in the hazard and emergency 
management sector is being obstructed. Additional to the comments of K10, other 
respondents (K2, K7 and K8) emphasise that Māori not only have a different worldview from 
the dominant ideology in New Zealand that dates back to the colonial period and the adoption 
of a ‘western’ way of thinking, but they have a rich history of centuries of knowledge of the 
New Zealand environment, including significant amounts of oral histories and learnings from 
living with natural hazards. King, Goff and Skipper (2007) assert that MEK exists as an untapped 
resource in New Zealand across resource management in general, and specifically for in the 
case of natural hazards the authors clearly state that Māori songs and narratives that are based 
off local experience, observation, recording and classification can provide significant learnings 
and lessons for the development of best practice for hazard and emergency management. King 
and Goff (2010) acknowledge that while there are undeniable similarities between the oral 
histories of Māori that have been passed from generation to generation, there are also 
differences that exist between these stories and the evidence that can be extracted through 
‘Mātauranga Māori is a powerful resource that we haven’t 
acknowledged and haven’t given due respect in my opinion 
 









archaeological and geological evidence, these resources should be used in partnership with 
current practices. The authors argue that MEK not only can and should help contribute to the 
way hazards are understood and managed, it is an opportunity for increased collaboration and 
understanding of Māori culture to penetrate into the western system that is firmly in place in 
New Zealand today. ‘Ways in which Mātauranga Taiao (MEK) and contemporary science can 
be combined to produce new narratives about extreme environmental disturbance will require 
not only acceptance of other ways of knowing but also open engagement with Māori that 
respects their rights to tell their own stories’ (King and Goff, 2010; p. 1938). K7 states that 
there was the opportunity for MEK and the oral histories that are embedded in Māori culture 
could have, if heeded and given proper weighting to in the past, reduced the mass of legacy 
development issues that we face in New Zealand. Speaking in the context of Christchurch and 
the evidence from the earthquake through the immense amounts of liquefaction and the 
damage that this caused, where evidence throughout Māori history would have shown that 






The interpretation from K7 is supported by a 2005 report produced through the 
Christchurch City Council that outlines the history of the wider Christchurch area from known 
records of the land before any human civilisation, during the pre-colonial time and then finally 
the post-colonial times. The report states that while Māori did inhabit the current site of the 
Christchurch city, with semi-permanent settlements on the margins of the estuary, while the 
permanent settlements were restricted to the drier and higher ground upstream from the 
rivers where they would be safe from flooding etc. (Christchurch City Council, 2005). This 
clearly exhibits the vital role that the appreciation and uptake of MEK could have had in the 
past to help alleviate current legacy issues New Zealand is facing, and that this is a resource 
that if it continues to be ignored is greatly reducing the capacity for best practice to emerge. 
King, Goff and Skipper (2007) assert that MEK is not just traditional knowledge, it is 
contemporary and represents the ‘totality of experiences of generations of Māori in New 
Zealand’ (King, Goff and Skipper, 2007; p. 60), as such, while these are oral ‘histories’ they 
‘My understanding is in historical times, Māori avoided that area 
(eastern Christchurch) apart from food gathering, they never lived 
there because it flooded all the time, and flooding and liquefaction 
often go hand in hand.’ 
 









provide valuable learnings that can be used to help facilitate better decision-making and 
development outcomes for us now and into the future, and to not utilise this, is a missed 
opportunity. 
 However, as alluded to earlier, MEK does not start and stop at the adherence to oral 
histories and the connection to the land practiced by Māori to help inform resource 
management. IMPs are tools that are being increasingly developed by iwi and hapū groups that 
provide excellent resources to help contribute to the hazard and emergency management 
sector. The areas of IMPs that are most directly related to the hazard and emergency 
management area are being developed largely in the context of climate change and the 
significant ramifications this will have on natural hazards as climate effects become more 









 The continual development of IMPs through the context of climate change acts to 
further promote the knowledge and contribution that these documents can play in the hazard 
and emergency management sector and open up pathways for increased collaboration and 
acceptance within the dominant western planning system and the recognition of the 
development of MEK. Furthermore, K6 observes that local government collaborative processes 
have a lot to learn from the processes of collaboration that are undertaken when creating 
IMPs. K6 provided anecdotal evidence from a collaborative process between various local 
government agencies and Ngāi Tahu with regard to climate change, K6 states that Ngāi Tahu 
had taken an approach to consider climate change that was common practice amongst local 
government and had received backlash from hapū who opposed this, and in the words of K6, 
‘got absolutely hammered’ in response. While this is all part of a healthy collaboration process, 
the highlight that was communicated by K6 was what followed, in the period of time after the 
backlash from hapū; ‘they took that (the response) on board and they went back and redesigned 
‘Some iwi and hapū are really leading the way in terms of trying to 
understand the risks and their exposure to sea level rise and other 
climate driven hazards, and their IMPs reflect that. So they’re 
working quite hard to try and understand risks, where they’re 
located and how they might mitigate those risks … so there is a 
huge amount of knowledge there that we need to respect and 
work alongside and interact with and interweave with what we’re 
doing as well.’ 
 









the whole approach and had some really in-depth discussions at a local level, which I thought 
was quite impressive. Well, I’d like to see that kind of process and outcome replicated 
elsewhere.’ The reflections of K6 and the desire stated for increased collaboration are reflective 
of not only the collaboration between local government and iwi and hapū groups, but 
collaboration in general, K2 states that often the requirements for consultation set out in the 
Local Government Act in Part 6 section 82, should be treated only as a minimum, and in actual 
practice, far more should be done in this space.  
 Another important factor to consider when seeking to align more equitably with MEK 
and recognising the role that IMPs have to play in the greater resource management sector, 
and specifically with natural hazards, is that many of the natural processes and consequent 
events that we consider hazards are in fact intrinsically linked to the connection of land for 
Māori, and are part of their culture and traditions. K2 spoke of the relationship between Mt 
Taranaki and the contestation that occurs when western science and knowledge attempts to 







 The above quote and the message within it succinctly conveys the findings of the this 
research with regard to the role and capacity of MEK currently in the hazard and emergency 
management sector. As Thompson-Fawcett, Ruru and Tipa (2017) affirm, IMPs are being 
produced widely across the country and efficiently conceptualise the values and beliefs of the 
iwi and hapū groups that produce them, but they still exist as a severely under-utilised resource 
in the current framework. MEK has the potential to greatly inform and advance the 
management of resources generally in New Zealand and has a major role to play in the 
development of best practice in the hazard and emergency management sphere. This research 
has portrayed that oral histories have not only been neglected in the past where they could 
have had, but still have the opportunity to, create better development decisions and alleviate 
the creation of more legacy in the future. Moreover, these histories and the knowledge that 
has been passed down from generation to generation in Māori culture accumulate, helping to 
‘… for a lot of iwi, a hazard isn’t a hazard, it’s taonga. So, (Mt) 
Taranaki is a volcano, the iwi would get really annoyed when 
scientists go and talk about the hazards of the volcano. When 
actually, that’s not a hazard but an ancestor, so it’s quite offensive 
to talk about it as a hazard.’ 
 









form the holistic world-view that underpins Māori culture and as such, should not be treated 
as historical knowledge but converge to produce the current and living knowledge base that 
must all be considered as Mātauranga Taiao. This research has shown that the entire hazard 
and emergency framework could be much better aligned with acknowledgement of Māori 
culture of ‘another way of knowing’ (King and Goff, 2010), and must endorse and participate 
in more meaningful and sincere collaboration to enhance the understanding of MEK and 
promote the assimilation of this immensely valuable resource into best practice. However, as 
is the theme with hazard and emergency management, resourcing issues present roadblocks 
to taking many desired steps, in this case, as with increasing public participation, collaboration 
is expensive and if this is to be increased in the future, the issues surrounding funding must be 
alleviated. 
 
5.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Research Objective Two 
 
 Research objective two has considered the current role and potential for enhanced 
public participation as a further principle of pre-event recovery planning in the hazard and 
emergency management framework. The research has found that while there is the 
acceptance of engaging with the public as a means to better inform the hazard planning 
process, and ultimately leads to better outcomes for development, the same issues are present 
here as with proactive planning. Meaningful engagement and consultation with the wider 
public is expensive and time consuming, this makes the implementation of such activities 
difficult considering the myriad of resourcing issues that hinder the development of the hazard 
and emergency management sector as laid out in research objective one. This clearly shows 
the work that needs to be done in the hazard planning space as both the key informants and 
contemporary literature regarding the role and effectiveness of public participation and 
community engagement state that in order for best practice to evolve, this must occur much 
more frequently and effectively than is currently being done. However, comprehensively 
addressing more fully and overcoming awareness and educational issues around the reality 
and severity of hazards and the impacts they can and will have on New Zealand and its 
inhabitants remains an issue. As previously stated, Coles and Buckle (2004) identify that 
‘effective recovery can only be when affected communities fully participate in recovery 
processes’ (Coles and Buckle, 2004; p. 6). As this research has shown, the previous statement 
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also relates directly the MEK and the inclusion and acknowledgement of Māori culture in the 
formal planning system, the lack of uptake of MEK has been identified as a significant negative 
of the current hazard and emergency management framework. MEK provides an excellent 
traditional and contemporary knowledge resource that can help inform best practice moving 
forward but is not being utilised properly. Resourcing issues have been a major source of the 
struggles to give MEK recognition in the past, despite progress being made in this regard, there 
is still a long way to go as IMPs, oral histories and the culture in general can provide many 
lessons for the development of the hazard and emergency management framework in the 











5.4 Research Objective Three – Analyse the options and recommendations 
observed through the research as ways to implement best practice in the hazard 
and emergency management framework 
 Research objective three will outline the key pathways identified by the key informants 
with regard to the continued development of the hazard and emergency management sector 
and the establishment of best practice. The following section is divided into the consideration 
of four main themes that have emerged through in order to achieve this as per the key 
informants, including addressing the resourcing issues in the sector and the benefits that this 
will have hazard planning outcomes, greater importance on the assimilation of MEK into the 
framework and targeting public participation and education, the potential for a national office 
to help guide hazard and emergency management and placing more importance on hazard 
and emergency management planning in the context of general resource management and 
land-use planning. It is important to note that this section outlines the common themes 
produced through the primary research and contemporary literature, the formal 
recommendations from the research as a whole will be presented within chapter six. 
 This section will firstly combine the vast number of resourcing issues that have been 
laid out in the previous two research objectives and intends to provide the overview of the 
desires of the key informants as to how to alleviate some of these pressures. Community 
engagement will then be addressed and will comment on how what changes can and should 
be made as per the key informants to ensure that public participation becomes more reliable 
and effective moving forward as a way to help achieve best practice. The key informants also 
outlined a desire for increased national direction and guidance in the hazard and emergency 
management sector to assist in equitable and nation-wide development of the sector into the 
future which will be discussed before finally commenting on the desire for greater recognition 
of hazard and emergency planning in general at a national level. 
 
5.4.1 The benefits of overcoming resourcing issues 
 
 The roadblocks that resourcing issues have had on the hazard and emergency 
management sector have been widely discussed within this chapter, specifically with research 
objective one, while the wide reaching effects of this have been discussed in a number of 
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different contexts, such as proactive planning, public participation and hazard identification. 
This section, however, will focus on the potential of the hazard and emergency management 
framework if the resourcing issues that have been analysed can be overcome, and how this 
will shape and influence the development of best practice into the future using the evidence 
provided by the key informants. This chapter has previously discussed the interaction between 
the 4R’s and common evaluation from key informants that not enough weight is given to the 
first two R’s of reduction and readiness and there is too much reliance on response and 
recovery measures. K5 queried the decision-making process regarding the funding of hazard 






 The statement above by K5 reflects very clearly the findings from the research which 
contends with the contestation around the equity of funding within the 4R’s. Many additional 
comments have been made by the key informants regarding the role of proactive planning and 
the potential an uptake of this has to create better planning and management outcomes. 
Creating emphasis at the opposite end of the hazard and emergency management sector has 
been a common theme throughout this research. K1 stated; ‘I’m very much hoping the National 
Emergency Management Agency can, or is given the ability to invest in this space given time,’ 
the overwhelming response from the key informants was that this investment would enable 
the desire to start looking directly at the ability to focus on the first two of the 4R’s and create 
environments that are built around remaining sustainable and resilient when a disaster strikes, 
rather than really only being able to focus on the ability to ‘bounce-back’ from an event after 
it occurs. K6 states that resourcing issues are inhibiting the ability of the sector to move 






‘Why don’t you (central government) pour that money (the money 
for response and recovery in the context of the Christchurch and 
Kaikōura earthquakes) into the community before there was an 
emergency so we could all just have better lives.’ 
 







‘I think it’s about providing a framework which within that can 
happen (being able to focus on reduction and readiness) … 
providing access to additional resources, whether it is central 
government or local government or whatever.’ 
 









It also highlights the previously identified disconnect between the RMA and the 
CDEMA, the research and the key informants have highlighted at some point there is a hand 
over between the RMA and CDEMA during the different stages of a disaster. RMA 
responsibilities are handed over to the CDEMA when a disaster occurs and during recovery, 
they are handed back over the RMA. The problems that arise due to this shift could be 
overcome by more collaboration and interaction between these two Acts in order to make 
better decisions, increased communication between the two Acts from the beginning of the 
process, for example, zoning and consenting would result a far greater understanding of hazard 
and risk overlays and would enable more far more informed decision-making and management 
outcomes. The benefits of this would be far-reaching, these effects will be discussed more fully 
throughout this section which include the ability to avoid some legacy issues with 
infrastructure before development and alleviate issues within the insurance sector. Chang et 
al. (2010) affirms that past events in the global context have ‘proven that obtaining adequate 
funding, and high quality physical and technical assistance is a primary issue for achieving a 
resilient post-disaster-built environment’ (Chang et al., 2010; p. 66). The battle in obtaining 
resourcing that can fulfil the needs and desires of communities through hazard and emergency 
management has characterised the sector for long enough states K5; ‘Give the people who 
working in emergency management and resource management in general the tools to actually 
do the work.’ This is a of vital importance, as presented by both the key informants and through 
contemporary literature regarding best practice for hazard and emergency management, 
Chang et al., (2010) states that much work in the space of hazard and emergency management 
at the global scale is often too focussed on the same things as in the New Zealand context, the 
immediate response and recovery from events, while the sector is at its most effective when 
these factors are considered prior to events occurring. ‘Comprehensive pre-event preparedness 
is this an integral element in the ultimate effectiveness of post-disaster recovery efforts’ (Chang 
et al., 2010; p. 66). 
One of the identified ways an influx of resourcing can drastically improve the outcomes 
of hazard and emergency management planning is for central government to facilitate the 
development of comprehensive and reliable data sets for hazard identification and risk 









The above quote from K7 highlights the need for councils to have access to accurate 
and informative hazard maps to make decisions with the best available information at hand. 
The quote also mentions the role of insurance and education of the public to support these 
decisions, these factors will be considered later on in the section. While current resourcing 
constraints obstruct councils from a range of activities that would benefit the hazard and 
emergency management framework, such as proactive planning and enhanced public 
participation, K9 notes that it is not the most viable option to expect councils to resource and 
deliver these hazard maps in house. This informant argues that rather this job is better suited 
for central government, not only for the resourcing issues that face councils already, but also 
there would be large benefits to creating nation-wide data sets regarding hazard identification 













Allowing the standardisation of hazard information and assessment at the national 
level through central government investment would enable consistent outcomes with regard 
to the management of land and the tolerance of risk that is deemed to be acceptable across 
regions. The ambiguity surrounding hazard and risk tolerances across different regions of New 
‘In a perfect world, councils would have very accurate hazard 
maps, councils would have strong powers about where people 
could build and then insurance would link in nicely. Also, 
homeowners would be really risk aware.’ 
 








‘… they (councils) don’t always have the capacity and the 
capability to do that (create hazard maps etc.) they don’t have the 
technical people in house … don’t always have enough money to 
go and do the research…’ 
 








‘… it’s very hard to get agreement on data … lets prioritise what 
are the top data sets … so that they can be shared at the local 
level … so that we’re all working to the same consistent set of 
data.’ 
 









Zealand has been commented on in this research in the context of the vast differences in RPS’s 
that play a vital role in the development of regional plans. The creation and adherence to 
national data sets would allow for consistent and well-informed decision making for the future, 
this would have a positive effect on reducing the immense amounts of legacy issues that 
require attention due to years of development without reliable hazard and risk information. 
However, the development and implementation of national level data sets that outline reliable 
hazard identification and risk assessment would have to be informed by widespread scientific 
analysis of the natural processes and hazards that are present within all areas of New Zealand 
and would require immense amounts of work to be done across the country. Despite this, the 
evidence from this research suggests that this is a necessary step to take to ensure that at the 
national level, sustainability and resilience is achieved. This is reinforced as many key 
informants have noted that Christchurch and the wider Canterbury area was considered ‘low 
risk’ prior to the 2010 earthquake (K2, K8, K10). This shows that while knowledge around 
natural hazards and processes is constantly growing, there is still much that is not fully 
understood. Acknowledging this, a more detailed understanding can be better achieved by 
undertaking more work to identify and quantify risk, and while this research has shown that 
different regions through local government lack the resourcing to reasonably undertake this, 
central government intervention is required to support the emergence of best practice. 
Saunders, Beban and Kilvington (2013) state that in order for sustainable risk reduction to be 
achieved, undertaking risk assessments is vital. Furthermore, Chen, Blong and Jacobson (2003) 
state that comprehensive risk assessment, through the use of tools such as GIS and spatial 
analysis allow both those directly involved in the hazard and risk sector and the general public 
to better understand and quantify the risk of natural hazards and the consequences they can 
have on vulnerable communities.  
Producing and incentivising the creation of more reliable and accessible data sets and 
hazard and risk identification, produces immense spill-over effects into other areas of the 
hazard and emergency management sector. Possibly the greatest advantage lies in the ability 
to then circulate this data to local government, especially to the smaller councils that have 
trouble funding the development of reliable and accurate data. In this way, local government 
will have the resources available in house to start making better management decisions prior 
to future development and can start applying more time and effort into ensuring that the 
reduction plans and processes, and the readiness of their communities are as prioritised as 
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response and recovery plans and procedures. Furthermore, the ability for more informed 
hazard identification and risk assessment has already been identified as a way to reduce future 
legacy issues relating to inappropriate development, meanwhile, this also has a significant role 
to play in bridging the insurance gap that has been alluded to in this research. While previously 
stated, the role of insurance for dealing with the effects of natural hazards was initially outside 
the scope of this research, the key informants have brought to light some of these issues. There 
is a gap in the insurance sector for dealing with natural hazards where, for example, the land 
around a house or other infrastructure may be severely compromised without damaging the 
actual structure while  making it unliveable, but  falls outside the cover of insurance, this then 
forces homeowners to rely on assistance from the government through EQC or otherwise to 
mitigate the financial impacts of the natural hazard. Without remediation to the insurance 
sector, making it more accessible and equitable, which this research has not been able to look 
into at any depth, the creation of more well-rounded and comprehensive data on hazards and 
the risks they pose can help to better inform developers and potential home-buyers of the 
risks that may be associated to a piece of land. This is reflected in a range of the statements 
made by the key informants that endorsed the increased education of the general public to 
the risks around them as to create better development and management decision-making and 
outcomes (K3, K6, K7, K8). This development of national data sets to be passed down for use 
at the local government level would enable what K8 describes at the ‘duty-of-care’ that those 
with the ability to and knowledge of natural hazards should pass down to the wider public, this 
concept was considered during the analysis of research objective one in the context of 
resourcing. Enhanced understand of natural processes also increased the ability to educate 
and inform wider populations of the risks that are around them, increased understanding and 
awareness of risk drastically improves a communities ability to withstand the long-lasting 
negative effects of natural hazards as well as helping prepare them for the immediate impacts 
such as property damage (King, 2000).  
Additional benefits to overcoming the resourcing issues that are currently restricting 
the development of best practice for hazard and emergency management include being able 
to give well-informed advice for those currently living in or looking to move to areas that are 






Considering the desire and benefits to live in innately hazard prone areas, being able 
to provide advice on where in these potential areas are the safest place to allow future 
development or give advice against development in certain areas would be a huge benefit for 
the hazard and emergency management sector. It would have positive implications on legacy 
issues and on the insurance sector where development with the most up-to-date knowledge 
is being done properly and safely. This may rely on the development and uptake of technical 
solutions to help promote sustainable and resilient communities in New Zealand currently 
built-up areas, this uptake of new knowledge and the role that technology can play would be 
enhanced if the resourcing issues on the sector can be addressed. As previously mentioned, 
K9 expressed concerns over the uptake of new technological solutions to improve the building 
and development practices in New Zealand particularly in the context of Christchurch where 
technical solutions for building foundations were created to specifically deal with liquefaction 
and were not implemented. K9 described this as problematic and stated that it is a ‘good 
example that can finance and develop guidance and solutions but then this is not necessarily 
picked up and taken to other locations around New Zealand.’  
 
5.4.2 Enhance Community Engagement and MEK uptake 
 
 As briefly alluded to during the previous section on overcoming the resourcing issues 
within the hazard and emergency framework, the ability for local government in particular to 
devote more time and energy in public participation and community engagement is directly 
linked to the amount of resources, or lack thereof, available for this work. Throughout this 
chapter as well chapter two, the benefits of engaging in meaningful and sincere public 
participation in the hazard and emergency management sector have been highlighted. The key 
informants have clearly conveyed the desire to engage in more public participation but have 
also noted that these desires are often superseded by other priorities, much in the same way 
as proactive planning has been inhibited. However, increased funding for councils to run more 
workshops, information nights etc. would lead to significantly higher levels of outreach to the 
‘… there is value in people being able to live by the coast and 
people value that or do things in certain places to live on 
floodplains and all of that…’ 
 









wider community. The key informants regularly voiced concerns over the current levels of 
outreach when running different activities to increase community engagement often 
commenting on the fact that people have busy lives, which makes it hard to accommodate the 
time spent participating in events, as well as being able to keep the potential occurrence of 





 Furthermore, as described within chapter two, the resilience and sustainability of 
communities are based on a range of categories, included within this are the economic factors 
of a community and their ability to recover after major disruptions such as natural disasters 
(Cutter, Burton and Emrich, 2010). The advancement of public participation and community 
engagement therefore exist as a vital role in ensuring that businesses can adapt and recover 
after a natural event. Increasing the ability for local government to be able to engage with 
communities and communicate hazard risk and vulnerabilities would not only greatly affect 
the physical safety of communities, their assets, but also of their livelihoods. King (2000) makes 
the clear point that lack of effective preparation for communities over the impact of hazards 
and the widespread impacts that they can have reduces the ability to safeguard lives and 
livelihoods. Although this can be increased through the educating vulnerable populations and 
providing meaningful and effective communication and interaction between governing bodies 
and communities and should be done so wherever possible (King, 2000). Once again, the main 
constraint blocking this from occurring in New Zealand, particularly in smaller areas where 
councils struggle with low rating bases is the lack of funding. The key informants through this 
study have noted the capacity and capability issues as well as the lack of time and competing 
priorities, an increase in funding would allow for the training of staff or allow for the hiring of 
additional staff to run these events to increase education, awareness and overall preparedness 
against natural hazards and their effects and result in better outcomes in the face of these 
events. 
 An issue inhibiting the effectiveness and engagement of public participation methods 
that are currently, or could be employed by local government in the future is what the key 
informants described as low levels of ‘neighbourhood engagement’ (K3) which those working 
‘… the thing with engagement is that you don’t just do it once and 
then tick the box and that’s it for 10 years, you need to keep some 
sort of underlying engagement going.’ 
 









in the hazard and emergency management sector regard as an increasingly important issue in 
modern times. Both K3 and K5 put significant emphasis on this fact as K5 described the current 
climate of both engaging the community and getting them to participate to realise the benefits 
that interactions with neighbours has for hazard and emergency management as ‘the hardest 
it’s ever been, which is a real problem that emergency management needs to address.’ Kwok 
et al. (2018) assert that neighbourhoods, and meaningful engagement within and between 
neighbours play a vital role in the realisation of resilience and the ability to bounce back from 
natural disasters, and McGee (2011) claims that building resilience through focussing on 
increasing the levels of neighbourhood engagement is an efficient way to build overall 
resilience within the scope of natural disasters. They key informants have also noted that of 
the various methods of messaging and education that exist within the hazard and emergency 
management framework, the passing of knowledge through ‘word of mouth’ is one of the most 
effective ways. Facilitating the growth of neighbourhood collaboration was identified through 
this research as a sure way to increase this, thus, increasing the overall education of 
communities. Moreover, as has been discussed within this chapter previously, the role and 
emergence of spontaneous volunteers play a huge role in the immediate response and 
recovery from natural disasters, with swaths of evidence from the Christchurch earthquake 
recording the work that was done by volunteers. Enhancing public participation and endorsing 
community engagement within the hazard and emergency management sector would serve 
to upskill members of communities that would become the ‘spontaneous volunteers’ when an 
event occurs in their community. Furthermore, K1 describes the initial criticism that was given 
to the volunteers in the Christchurch context where volunteers were rebuffed at first as their 
actions were not deemed to be in line with the goals and direction of the formal recovery 
efforts. However, an increase in public participation and community engagement where 
increased communication would occur would help to align the aspirations of both local 
government and the wider community who would, in a time of disaster, become volunteers 
and enable the efforts of both parties to be on the same page and greatly increase the cohesion 
during response and recovery. The benefits of this are wide ranging, volunteers that are 
informed and involved with the plans and vision for response and short-term recovery will be 
able to target their actions to be complimentary to the efforts of formal civil defence and 
emergency management and provide extra hands, which for a lot of small regions are often in 
short supply. 
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 Outside of community engagement and public participation, the key informants 
described the missed opportunity to date for increased levels of collaboration between CDEM 
Groups and persons exercising functions within the sphere of hazard and emergency 
management in general. The last decade in New Zealand history has been characterised by 
some of the largest, deadliest and most complex earthquakes known in this country, while 
these events have been an immense test of the resilience and sustainability of the country in 
general, it has also provided the opportunity to learn, and has presented the circumstance for 
best practice to be developed. K3 in particular made the call for increased levels of 
communication and collaboration within the hazard and emergency management sector, 
calling for more effective leadership to arise particularly when faced with natural disasters. K3 
believes that the past decade of serious natural hazards has, by necessity, built the knowledge 
in the sector, and if progress is to be continued to be made, then the knowledge and lessons 








 Using the experiences of the last decade to help inform best practice in the future will 
be further discussed within this section with regard to the potential role that a National Office 
for hazard and emergency management could have, as per the key informants.  
 Another instance in which information sharing is vital for the development of the 
hazard and emergency management sector is with Māori and MEK, ideally this would have 
already arisen organically, however, this research has shown that this sector must be more 
resourced to produce meaningful change. The increased uptake of MEK would relate to a 
sincere increase in the acknowledgement of MEK as a resource to help inform best practice for 
resource management in general, and in the context of hazard and emergency management 
would incorporate all mediums of MEK, such as oral histories and IMPS. K10 stated that one of 
the top priorities in the hazard and emergency management sector is to increase the 
collaboration, acknowledgement and acceptance of the role MEK can play in the future of 
‘… if everyone is willing to swap the information and the learnings, 
I think that not only is a really healthy thing that can happen in 
New Zealand, it’s necessary. If we can be not too precious to admit 
our mistake and pass on our knowledge, that really, really healthy 
in the wider New Zealand context.’ 
 









hazard management and realising more sincere integration with the values and beliefs of 
Māori culture. K10 states that there have been positive steps made recently in the hazard and 







   
  
 
 For K10 and the other key informants taking part in this research, building the role of 
MEK, acknowledging the potential to has to better inform best practice and acknowledging 
and accepting this in the current framework is of vital importance moving forward for hazard 
and emergency management in New Zealand. Reflecting on earlier statements made in this 
chapter as well as in chapter two this must start that understanding MEK does not start and 
stop with the IMPs that iwi and hapū groups create and lodge with councils to formalise them 
in the wider planning framework in New Zealand, all of Māori culture interacts to inform 
Mātauranga Taiao, and as this research has reflected, this includes more traditional knowledge 
such as oral histories which have a very important role to play in the future of hazard and 
emergency management if they are given proper acknowledgement. 
 
5.4.3 The Establishment of a National Office for Hazard and Emergency 
Management 
 
 The potential for establishing a national office for dealing with hazard and emergency 
management was not something that was initially considered when the research was being 
conceptualised. However, this idea came up in the first interview with the key informants, and 
for most of the rest of them, this was a topic that was offered as a way to address some of the 
issues that have characterised the sector in the past. The creation of a national office for 
emergency management was envisioned as having a large scope and significant role to play 
‘We have to get iwi involvement in civil defence strengthened, and 
it’s got to start right at the top. Right now, we have Penni Henare 
who is the Minister for Civil Defence & Emergency Management, 
that’s a huge symbolic thing you know, having a Māori leader of 
emergency management. But we have to follow that up and make 
sure the structures reflect that right the way down and then, I 
think, it shows the nation that we are respecting Te Tiriti and we’re 
doing things the way we should, in partnership with Māori right 
throughout the whole process.’  
 









with hazard and emergency management in general, and many of the key informants outlined 
different priorities that the establishment of such as office, such as resourcing, education, 
increasing collaboration and communication within the framework and the production of up-










The struggles with local government and in particular, small councils being adequately 
resourced in general has been well covered through this research, however, an area of real 
concern communicated by the key informants are the restrictions that are placed on smaller 
councils based on these resourcing issues when addressing medium and long-term recovery. 
While the CDEM Group system is extremely effective when a disaster strikes, and response 
and immediate recovery efforts are needed, in the case of the Kaikōura earthquake, staff and 
resources from other members of the Group and elsewhere in the country were provided for 
the Kaikōura District Council and the recovery efforts there, however, considering the tight 
budget of the hazard and emergency management sector, these resources and extra staff were 
quickly returned to the groups that provided them, effectively leaving Kaikōura alone to deal 
with the medium and long-term recovery while already underfunded. This is not aimed to be 
a critique of the CDEM Group system or the fact that other groups needed the extra resources 
and staff back after sending them to Kaikōura to assist in response, rather a point of emphasis 
for the underfunded nature of the hazard and emergency management system. Furthermore, 
K7 suggests there was a substantial difference in the amount of national funding and support 
that was given to the Christchurch earthquake after the 2010 earthquake and the long, 
damaging aftershock sequence that followed. While this is not to suggest that the support 
given to Christchurch was inappropriate, but rather illustrates the difficulty that smaller regions 
have when dealing with large, damaging natural events. The key informants have suggested 
‘… in a perfect world, what I would like would be that there was 
just a national emergency management agency or office that was 
operative all the time.’ 
 








‘… what I’ve always thought should be done is we need a 
permanent recovery office that’s always operating, even in peace 
time when we aren’t responding to any events.’ 
 









that a way to combat the inequity in resourcing and funding afforded to small areas when 
engaging in longer term recovery after the immediate and short-term response to an event 
exists within the establishment of a national office for hazard and emergency management. 
Rotimi, Le Masurier and Wilkinson (2006) highlight the in the past in New Zealand, such as the 
Matata debris flow in 2005, central government support and funding was slow in coming 
through delayed conducting of accurate cost analysis which put recovery efforts a step behind 
from the outset and ‘frustrated the local population’ (Rotimi, Le Masurier and Wilkinson, 2006; 
p. 7). Whitman et al. (2013) highlights how central government support for rural communities 
often comes in the form of tax subsidies and collaboration with agencies such as Federated 
Farmers. However, there is currently little support for local government and the injection of 
funding and support from central government in the longer-term recovery for small areas, 
where, as this research as suggested, is where smaller areas struggle the most substantially. 
However, it is not just in response and recovery, the key informants regularly commented on 
the lack of funding given to the hazard and emergency management sector stated that funding 





The establishment of a national office for hazard and emergency management would 
allow for these funding pathways to be opened up and inject the resources in the sector in 
both small, largely rural areas as well as large urban centres to commit to the work both prior 
to an event, and after an event has occurred, to produce the most effective results and ensure 
that full recovery can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe.  
Further benefits of the establishment of a national office for hazard and emergency 
management lie in the area of the public education mission. Several of the  key informants 
have identified the current form of national messaging as a medium for increasing education 
as an effective strategy, but this is primarily targeted, as most of the hazard and emergency 
management sector is, at response and recovery where it is largely based on education around 
what to do in the event of an emergency, for example, drop, cover, hold for an earthquake. 
The appointment of a national office of hazard and emergency management could provide a 
platform for a more diverse and well-rounded education regime to be transmitted at a national 
‘Why didn’t you (central government) pour that money into the 
community before there was an emergency so that we could all 
just have better lives?’ 
 









level. This would enable the broadcasting of education surrounding what the key informants 
have conveyed as a very important issue in the hazard and emergency management sector 
which is in the increased acknowledgement of the risks that people are exposed to (K3, K7, 
K8). Dunbar (2007) identifies that back in 2007, the internet was strongly emerging as a very 
effective way of distributing information around natural hazards and stated that ‘a better 
educated public and improvements in research could ultimately reduce the devastation and loss 
caused by natural disasters’ (Dunbar, 2007; p. 535). 
The development of an NPS for natural hazards has been a topic for discussion within 
this research, the implementation of such a statutory device will also be able to be facilitated 
effectively through the establishment of a national planning office. The key informants 
repeatedly called for more consistency on a national scale with regard to how risk is 
acknowledged, specifically aimed at risk tolerance and the attitudes towards risks and the 








 This research has previously covered the importance and the potential benefits of 
creating a framework that was more consistent in its approach to the perception of risks and 
vulnerability, in creating a more comprehensive framework and enabling best practice to 
emerge. A further impact that a national office for hazard and emergency management could 
act as a catalyst for increased collaboration within and between councils, CDEM Groups, iwi 
and hapū groups and more. This research has clearly outlined the need for local government 
to work more with iwi and hapū groups and promote the inclusion of MEK into the 
management and planning process for natural hazards. There is also the need for councils and 
CDEM groups to increase the current levels of collaboration. Information sharing for dealing 
with and recovering from natural hazards has been clearly identified as both a way to foster 
the development of best practice, but also an area that needs work in the current framework 
(K3).  
‘One of the things in New Zealand is there’s no national standard 
or no national direction, formal national direction on what is an 
acceptable risk or what is intolerable and what’s not okay … 
ideally there would be some sort of framework established that 
councils could work through to determine what the level of risk 
is…’  
 









 Alongside resourcing issues that characterise the hazard and emergency management 
sector in New Zealand for local government, the key informants have also raised concerns 
around the current capacity and capability of organisations such as NEMA with the current 
levels of funding and prioritisation they are afforded. K7 in particular articulated the potential 







 Combined with the communicated issues relating to the resourcing of organisations 
such as NEMA and GNS, there are concerns amongst the key informants that due to the 
funding constraints on these agencies, they were often forced to focus on the areas that would 
provide the most value for money, the big urban centres that are vulnerable to risks or that 
have just been through widely damaging events, such as Wellington and Christchurch. While 
many of the respondents in this research claimed that this was the logical thing to do, putting 
the most focus and resources into areas that have the most potential risk with high 
populations, this creates issues in areas that are considered ‘low risk’ or areas that have lower 
populations but high risk potential. There is another line of thinking that combats the defining 
of areas of the country as ‘low risk’ after the experiences of the past decade around Canterbury 
and the widely damaging events that have occurred in this region, but in regard to the focus 
on large urban centres for underfunded organisations, higher risk and lower population areas 
are often neglected. The tendency in New Zealand, as conveyed by the key informants, and as 
seen through the application of the lessons learnt from the Christchurch earthquakes to 
Kaikōura is to develop strategies and response plans in the large urban centres and try to 
implement these in other areas where hazards occur, despite a range of differences; 
‘More and more technical advisors are needed in government or at 
least employed by government to inform policy choices. I don’t 
think that is happening anywhere near as much as it should. I think 
organisations like NEMA and GNS are underfunded and not 
utilised as much as they should be.’ 
 
















Creating a national office for hazard and emergency management that can increase 
funding for organisations such as NEMA may enable the resolution of other problems that were 
identified through undertaking this research. During the interview with K1, through talking 
about the development of the NDRS that has been analysed through this research and the 
potential effectiveness of this for creating better management decisions and outcomes in the 
hazard space, K1 voiced concerns over the delays in producing the implementation plan 
through NEMA. K1 further stated that they understood that events in the hazard space act to 
delay the output of such resources however, they went on to state; ‘If our National Agency is 
spending all its resources on response activities to the detriment of getting that bloody 
implementation plan done, that’s not very good, But I think it also demonstrates how under 
resourced NEMA is, because that stuff really needs to happen … I think they need to have a 
separate organisation or separate department inside of NEMA that does other stuff. Because 
at the moment, it seems that every time they have an event, everybody is involved in the 
response to the detriment of some stuff that needs to keep going.’ The establishment of a 
national office for hazard and emergency management would be able to address some of the 
capacity and capability issues that the key informants attribute to the organisations such as 
NEMA. A national office also could help align priorities and bolster resourcing and ensure that 
there were no areas that were falling into the cracks such as the implementation plan for the 
NDRS and would significantly contribute to the development of best practice moving forward 
for hazard and emergency management. 
 However, while every one of the key informants that made comments the potential for 
a national office for hazard and emergency management, they all stipulated that the only way 
that it would work, especially in smaller more rural areas would be if it was collaborative and 
facilitative rather than directive and acted to impose rules and practices on areas by 
‘I think you’ve also got to be careful, and this is where you see 
NEMA getting into a few problems, and I can understand why, 
because they have to work on the basis of one size fits all, but their  
size is Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, and that doesn’t fit 
Nelson and Tasman, it won’t fit the West Coast, and it won’t fit the 
cultural differences in those areas, especially rural areas.’ 
 









superseding the work they already do. Figure 5.11 outlines some of the common responses to 




The clear takeaway message from the key informants, summarised in Figure 5.11 is that 
while more direction, guidance and funding  would come from the establishment of such an 
office, it is imperative that the agency of local government and CDEM Groups is not 
compromised, and that the relationships and local knowledge that is ingrained in regions is still 
able to play a prominent role in the hazard and emergency management of an area, whether 
that be in response and recovery, or prior to an event during the reduction and readiness 
phases.  
 
Figure 5.11 – Selection of comments from the key informants regarding the establishment 
of a national office for hazard and emergency management 
Source - Author 
• '... you got to be careful that those smaller areas wouldn't feel 
like they've been taken over, and you wouldn't want them 
handing over ... local knowledge and relationships are 
important. You've got to have that partnering aspect to make it 
work really well.'
K3
• 'As long as those national offices are actually providing 
informantion and support as opposed to requiring information 
and taking over while we are responding to events.'
K4
• '... if you have a national office who can actually listen to loal 
people, then yes, that would be very good. But if you have a 
national office that is  just going to come in and impose their 
will on people, that would be very bad.'
K5
• '... whether it's to do with a national office or an NPS or 
whatever, an informed decision needs to be made to ensure 
that this will work well, and will produce good outcomes, not 




5.4.4 Greater recognition and importance placed on hazard planning at a 
national level 
 
 The following section is centred around the information provided from the key 
informants which clearly indicates that hazard and emergency management planning in 
general should be given more recognition and importance placed on it at the national level. In 
doing so, it would increase the resources afforded to the sector, increase education and 
awareness around the risks and vulnerabilities placed on people through hazards, increase the 
consistency in hazard planning and risk tolerances and would help to better realise best 
practice in the future.  
 As previously discussed, recent RMA reforms have resulted in the increased recognition 
of the importance of hazard and emergency management planning in the general planning 
structure of New Zealand, the key informants believe that this needs to go further, where 
hazard and risk considerations must be taken more seriously within the scope of all land-use 
and resource management planning. However, as mentioned in chapter three, in the current 
political climate in New Zealand, with recommendations calling for the RMA to be fully 
repealed and replaced, this research sits in an uncertain position within the context of 
addressing the recognition and importance of hazard and emergency management planning 
in current legislative framework. However, this is also an opportunity for advocating for more 
consideration of hazards and risks to be afforded to the planning system in New Zealand. The 
idea of creating an NPS for natural hazards has been addressed throughout this chapter, this 
has been a method identified to bring more attention to hazard and emergency management 
planning. K2 suggests that despite the management of natural hazards now being considered 
a matter of national importance under the RMA. K9 further suggests that the development of 
an NPS for natural hazards is the next logical step for resource management and land-use 
planning, they state that considering the development of an NPS for urban development, a 
balancing provision must be made with regard to natural hazards to ensure that the future 
development of urban areas is giving adequate consideration for the risks and vulnerability 
borne of natural processes and events. Alongside promoting the recognition of natural hazards 
and the risks they pose through the creation of a high-level planning document; more direction 
will be set for local government as to the appropriate management of natural hazards. This 
research has previously recounted the ambiguity in RPSs and consequently plans around the 
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country with regard to the stances of different regions on hazards and risks, the development 
of an NPS would act to set standards across the country for how natural hazards should be 
considered as well as increasing the importance and recognition of dealing with the processes 
and effects of them in the safest and most sustainable way. 
 K8 also observes the need to ‘overcome the attitudes of councils’ with regard to natural 
hazards and the effects of these. The creation and establishment of an NPS for natural hazards 
would act as a way to formally require councils to consider the impacts of natural hazards 
within land use and general resource management planning. K8 states that this inclusion would 
help with the communication of science around natural processes and the risk they can have 
on the country and through this increased education and the platform for hazards to be talked 








 Furthermore, increasing the awareness of natural hazard science in general will 
increase education and more targeted restrictions within the planning system as natural 
hazards and risk are given more importance will force people to learn about it and take this 
more into account moving forward. A common statement from the key informants was that 
new developments in New Zealand must take the effects of hazards and the risks that they 
pose more seriously, both to create sustainable and resilient developments as well as reducing 
the future legacy issues that are already needing to be dealt with. This research has extensively 
covered the role of education and awareness with general populations and the correlation this 
has in outcomes for the occurrence of natural disasters, closing the gap between best practice 
and current practice requires effective communication (Steelman and McCaffrey, 2013). K8 
conveyed the hope that an increased acknowledgement of hazard science, and the application 
of this knowledge in the planning sphere will result in the development of best practice and 
will see sustainable and resilient development of urban areas and communities into the future. 
‘… the wrong thing about earthquake research is that it is often 
science funded, rather than by end users, so you were competing 
for work against different areas and the audience was sometimes 
limited … need to raise public awareness, that’s all part and parcel 
with getting that message out there … helps with overcoming the 
attitudes of some councils.’ 
 









 Increasing the acknowledgement and importance of hazard and emergency 
management in the land-use and resource management environment in general, and 
particularly through the development of an NPS for natural hazards could act as an effective 
way to strengthen the linkages between the RMA and the CDEMA that this research has shown 
to considerably fragmented. Creating national awareness and the requirement to consider 
natural processes and events, and consequently, the effects and risks of these would require 
increased communication between planners exercising powers under the RMA and those 
working under the CDEMA to ensure that decisions and outcomes are being made that does 
not contradict the purpose of both Acts. This research has clearly shown that there is a 
considerable amount of work that needs to be done to better connect these two Acts, the 
establishment of an NPS for natural hazards, and the increased acknowledgement and 
importance placed on this area in the general hazard and emergency management process 
would act to both create better outcomes and strengthen the connection between the main 
contributing legislation and promote better outcomes across the country, 
 
5.4.5 Concluding Remarks on Research Objective Three 
 
 This section has shared the recommended actions to improve the hazard and 
emergency management sector as per the key informants. Chief amongst the aspirations of 
the key informants, as has been a theme throughout this chapter is addressing the debilitating 
resourcing issues that afflict the sector. In doing so, the development of best practice can 
emerge through the production and distribution of reliable and comprehensive data on hazard 
and risk maps and will allow for the development of sustainable and resilient communities for 
the future. This section has also conveyed the importance of emphasising the education of 
hazards and the risks they can produce to produce better outcomes for both the general public 
but also for the increased collaboration within and between local government and CDEM 
Groups. Alongside this, the key informants state the current hazard and emergency 
management sector is failing to properly utilise all forms of MEK (IMPs, oral histories etc.) as 
an invaluable resource for the development of best practice and the acknowledgement and 
acceptance of the role that MEK can play in the framework must be achieved in order for 
meaningful relationships to be built and endure as well as respecting Te Tiriti. The potential 
establishment of a national office for emergency management was also covered in this section 
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as a way to help facilitate the growth and development of the sector in general. The majority 
of key informants believed that the creation of a centralised agency for hazard and emergency 
management would ensure that resourcing issues were addressed and remedied, increased 
collaboration and communication could occur, and more equitable outcomes would be made 
across all of New Zealand, not just the large urban centres. However, the key informants also 
very clearly stated that for such an idea to produce good outcomes, it would need to exist as 
a facilitative and collaborative agency, rather than a higher level authority that would eliminate 
autonomy of local governments and must respect and acknowledge local knowledge and the 
different cultures of different areas of New Zealand. Finally, the need for greater recognition 
and importance given to the hazard and emergency management sector in general was 
discussed, the key informants communicated their hope that if natural hazards and the 
potential effects of these were taken more seriously at a national level within general resource 
management and land-use planning, better outcomes would be produced to the benefit of all 




6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 This chapter presents the conclusions of the research and seeks to synthesise the key 
findings based on both the primary and secondary resources used and outlines 
recommendations for the continued development of the hazard and emergency management 
sector. Analysing the current application and outcomes of the hazard and emergency 
management framework, this research has found that in the tumultuous past decade New 
Zealand has had with regard to natural hazards, progress has been made to discover best 
practice. However, this progress is often overshadowed by a multitude of issues that need to 
be addressed before best practice can be truly implemented. However, it has also presented 
the opportunity for the re-evaluation of hazard and emergency management and the potential 
to attain and implement best practice. This research suggests that significant intervention is 
required in the hazard and emergency management space to ensure the maintenance and 
development of sustainable and resilient communities.  
 This research began by completing an extensive review of the current literature 
surrounding hazard and emergency management as well as an in-depth policy review of a 
range of the guiding legislation in this space in New Zealand. It is important to note that while 
this research looked into the RMA and the CDEMA, it acknowledges that there are other core 
legislative statutes that contribute to the development of the hazard and emergency 
management space (e.g. the Building Act, Local Government Act etc.), but for the scope of this 
research, the RMA and CDEMA were analysed. Existing literature acknowledges that the 
effects of natural hazards are immensely wide reaching and considering the continued 
urbanisation of the modern world as well as the impacts of climate change, these effects are 
predicted to become more severe in the future (Huppert and Sparks, 2006; Shi, Yang and Xu, 
2006). As such, this research has clearly shown that there is the increasing need to not only 
continue to build an understanding of natural events, processes and hazards, but also how 
these can be managed through planning, and through this, the creation of sustainable and 
resilient communities that can, if not avoid the impacts of natural hazards, can bounce-back 
from the negative effects of these. 
In the context of New Zealand, this research has been situated after an extremely 
tumultuous time, after a decade of extremely tragic and damaging natural events spearheaded 
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by the Christchurch 2010 and 2011 earthquake and the more recent 2016 Kaikōura 
earthquake. Considering this, the research has identified this as an important time for 
reflection on the management and planning outcomes that have arisen from living through, 
dealing with and continuing to evolve through these natural hazards and has realised many 
positive outcomes from the events, but has also revealed a number of failures and gaps in the 
hazard and emergency management sector and the planning system.  
 Outside of the secondary data research (literature review and policy and document 
analysis), key informant interviews were conducted totalling ten participants. The key 
informants were chosen for their expertise with the hazard and emergency management 
sector and were involved in open-ended interviews that in practice were more related to a 
conversation than an interview. The triangulation of these three data collection methods have 
been put together to produce the results and discussion found within chapter five and the 
conclusion and recommendations of which will be presented further within this chapter. 
 
6.1 Key Findings 
 
 Resourcing issues have been identified as the most restrictive factor in the hazard and 
emergency management sector, the effects of the resourcing constraints are wide reaching 
and have negative implications across the entire hazard and emergency management 
framework. Figure 5.2 (on page 108) has shown that the resourcing effects are felt from the 
top of the structure to the bottom, from central government to local government and have 
left substantial gaps in the framework that need addressing. Resourcing issues affect the ability 
to provide what K8 has described as the ‘duty-of-care’ that persons working in the sector must 
afford across the country for all New Zealanders. It is inhibiting the development of nation-
wide data sets that can establish consistent and reliable information regarding hazards and 
their effects across the country that the key informants suggested would drastically improve 
the outcomes for hazard and emergency management. While it is not feasible for these data 
sets to be developed at the local government level with the current financial constraints that 
hazard and emergency management departments already have to contend with, especially for 
smaller councils, this research has found that this is a gap that could be filled at the central 
government level, given enough funding. Furthermore, the resourcing issues that are inhibiting 
the development of national data sets for hazard and risk identification is also severely 
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restricting the ability for proactive planning to occur in the hazard space. Proactive planning is 
recognised as an effective method for addressing concerns relating to natural hazards both 
nationally, through the NRDS and internationally through the SFDRR. Proactive planning seeks 
to not only address the effects of hazards from a planning perspective before they eventuate, 
but also include communities in planning to ensure the most equitable and informed decisions 
are made (Berke and Campanella, 2006; Becker and Saunders, 2007). Although without the 
preparation being done to ensure reliable and accurate data is available, proactive planning in 
any heightened and significant capacity cannot occur to the detriment of the hazard and 
emergency management sector as a whole. 
A slew of regional difference characterises the hazard and emergency management 
framework that affect the delivery of best practice. The regional differences throughout New 
Zealand were a repeated talking point during the key informant interviews as they act to 
produce significant inconsistencies regarding the management of natural hazards and risks 
within different regions. This relates strongly to the above discussed idea of national data sets 
for local government to work through in order to start dealing with hazards and the risks they 
pose more uniformly throughout the country. Moreover, the issue surrounding regional 
differences also produced the idea of more centralisation within the hazard and emergency 
management framework through the creation of an NPS for natural hazards as well as the 
potential for a national office for hazard and emergency management to be set up. Alongside 
creating more consistency within the regions regarding the recognition of hazards and risk 
(NPS), resourcing issues would be able to be more fully addressed and equitable solutions 
could be devised (national office). However, there was no debate amongst the key informants 
that the establishment of such a central agency would have to be collaborative and facilitative 
at its core and recognise and acknowledge the role of local knowledge, the relationships that 
exist within regions, particularly smaller regions and the different cultures that exist and work 
within those parameters rather than take a directive role to impose the management ideals at 
a national level to regional localities.  
The acceptance and acknowledgement of the role of MEK was unanimously considered 
as one of the most pressing matters that must be addressed moving forward with regard to 
the hazard and emergency management framework, where the key informants clearly stated 
that this is a necessity for best practice. Consistent with the views of King, Goff and Skipper 
(2007), this research has shown that MEK is a severely underutilised resource in the entire 
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hazard and emergency management sector and alongside this, it is misunderstood. MEK is the 
culmination of all traditional and all contemporary knowledges which interlink to form the 
Māori worldview, it is informed through oral histories (which can be incredibly useful for 
hazard planning) and traditions as well as contemporary knowledge which is delivered through 
IMPs (King, Goff and Skipper, 2007; Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013). ‘Accepting other ways of 
knowing’ (King and Goff, 2010; p. 1938) is imperative if MEK is to be assimilated into the hazard 
and emergency management framework, and it is just imperative that it does, not only for the 
production of best practices and better decision making, but also a reflection of respect for Te 
Tiriti (K10). 
 The key linking legislation interrogated through this research is also an area of concern, 
the disconnected nature of the interactions between the RMA and CDEMA are hindering the 
ability for best practice to emerge and have had a negative impact on final decision-making 
and developmental outcomes (Saunders et al., 2007). Contemporary literature reviewed with 
chapter two and the findings from chapter five and the key informants all advocate for the two 
key pieces of legislation communicating better with one another and create a more meaningful 
link between people operating under the each Act to ensure that the requirements under the 
CDEMA for protecting against the negative effects of natural hazards are realised through 
general resource management and land-use planning to ensure that more appropriate 
developmental outcomes are realised. 
 Enhancing public participation within the hazard and emergency management sphere 
was also identified as a core requirement for developing best practice. Engaging in meaningful 
and sincere public participation has been identified through both the literature and the key 
informants’ interviews as necessary for developing a holistic and effective planning framework, 
this is also true when looking specifically at natural hazards and emergency management. Coles 
and Buckle (2004) state clearly that in order for effective recovery after a devastating natural 
event, public participation is a necessity. However, this research goes further to indicate that 
public participation and meaningful community engagement must occur throughout all stages 
of the planning process, not just with regard to response and recovery. This research has found 
that engagement and education of the wider public correlate very well with proactive planning 
and the creation of national wide data sets to be able to better communicate and understand 
risks and vulnerabilities. Learning the lessons from previous events has also been identified 
through this research as a way to develop best practice. A number of the key informants made 
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comments on the learnings taken from the Christchurch earthquake which were applied to the 
response and recovery processes in Kaikōura, they identified that work must be done in 
acknowledging and account for regional differences when attempting to apply learnings from 
one area of the country to another (K1, K7, K9), and further highlights the importance of 
working with local governments and communities and conducting informed and reliable risk 
and hazard assessments.  
 The role of insurance in the hazard and emergency management sector was initially 
outside the scope of the research but was identified early as a significant talking point amongst 
the key informant interviews. The research has suggested that there is a gap in the current role 
of insurance for natural hazards in New Zealand which has to be filled through central 
government intervention through such agencies as EQC. Again, the development of reliable 
hazard and risks maps would enable not only a more educated public when buying property as 
to the risks they are exposing themselves to, and need cover for, but would also provide the 
information for insurance companies to make appropriate estimates for cover for New 
Zealanders. 
 Finally, this research has identified that while progress may be made in many aspects 
of hazard and emergency management, through proactive planning, increased levels of public 
participation and meaningful community engagement and the sincere acknowledgement and 
uptake of MEK, ‘we’ve still got a legacy of 100 years or 150 years of really poor land use 
decisions’ (K7) to overcome. While this seems a daunting task that is impossible to achieve, it 
emphasises the need to not only ensure that preventative and proactive measures are taken 
to make at risk buildings safe, but to achieve best practice so that the legacy issues that are 
present are not exacerbated by continuing to make decisions without the most up-to-date and 
reliable data. It also shows that the hazard and emergency management practices that have 
been identified in this research such as proactive planning with enhanced public participation 
and the implementation of MEK are vitally important in the creation and implementation of 
best practice.  
 
6.2 Recommendations  
 In order for best practice within the hazard and emergency management sector to be 
achieved in the future, and in order to address the issues that have been outlined within this 
research, the following recommendations have been made: 
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• Increase the funding afforded to the hazard and emergency management sector 
The funding issues that have been identified that exist within the hazard and emergency 
management sector have massive implications for almost every process that exists within the 
framework. The research has shown that the engaging in proactive planning, the development 
of accurate and reliable hazard and risk maps, increasing public participation and the 
meaningful collaboration with the public are all realistic options for developing and realising 
best practice for the future. All the interviews conducted stated they are all seriously hindered 
by a lack of funding that characterises the whole sector. In order for these actions to be taken, 
the entire hazard and emergency management sector must be afforded more importance and 
recognition. Some natural hazards and their effects are being exacerbated by the effects of 
climate change, considering current legacy issues in New Zealand, in all probabilities will be 
exacerbated in the future, and to prevent further detrimental effects, actions need to be taken 
now. Endorsing and funding the development of comprehensive and reliable hazard and risks 
maps would enable better, more informed decisions to be made across the country, but this 
requires significant buy-in from central government and the resources and capacity of local 
government to give effect to this data. It was clearly stated by the key informants that, 
especially in the case of smaller regions, resourcing issues were limiting the ability for passive 
work to be done in the hazard space let alone any additional work such as proactive planning 
and public participation. As such, resourcing must be increased at all levels, for central 
government and agencies such as NEMA and GNS to create hazard and risk maps and for local 
government to ensure that the work that needs to be done is completed and that extra 
activities such as proactive planning and more meaningful public participation can be achieved 
and best practice realised. 
 
• Increased acceptance and acknowledgement MEK into the hazard and emergency 
management sphere 
MEK in all its forms are severely underutilised resources in the resource management and land-
use planning sectors in New Zealand overall, despite the immense potential that these have to 
help inform planning decisions and outcomes, MEK remains largely excluded from the planning 
framework. Hazard and emergency management planning must integrate current practices 
and MEK to reflect the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and meaningful and sincere 
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collaboration with Māori and for the development of best practice. IMPs are being developed 
across the country that outline the values and beliefs of iwi and hapū groups with regard to 
the effects and management of natural hazards which must be given regard when developing 
plans for managing the impacts of natural hazards in the future. Furthermore, hazard and 
emergency management could learn a great deal from a heightened sense of appreciation and 
acceptance of the Māori worldview that regards all the processes of the world interacting to 
create an equilibrium, as many human interactions with the environment seek to exacerbate 
the effects and frequency of natural hazards, this equilibrium is compromised. Future 
development outcomes by humans that recognises more fully the effects that we have on the 
environment, with regard to natural hazards could lead to better outcomes and more 
sustainable and resilient communities.  
 
• The creation of a national office for hazard and emergency management 
More centralised support is needed in the hazard and emergency management space, outside 
of all the resourcing benefits that this could provide in the form of hazard and risk data as 
discussed above, the establishment of a centralised office or agency could provide support for 
local government when disasters strike and they go through response and recovery. This 
research has highlighted the struggles that the framework puts on local government, especially 
smaller councils when they are tasked with recovering from natural disasters, particularly when 
considering long-term recovery efforts. There are the well-documented resourcing issues that 
must be addressed, the isolation from organisations such as with the CDEM group structure 
who try but cannot always meaningfully support other councils for longer term recovery which 
places stress on communities that have just been through disasters. The recovery process is a 
long and challenging one, to ensure that the best outcomes are made for individuals, groups 
and communities, more support must be given to local government throughout the process, 
not just for response and short-term recovery. 
 
• Address the disconnect between the RMA and CDEMA  
The CDEMA administers the response and short-term recovery sequences after an event 
occurs and at some point, the responsibility for the long-term recovery efforts are handed back 
over to resource management planners who exercise functions and powers under the RMA, 
where communication between the Acts is minimal. There should be more collaboration 
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between these two Acts to ensure that resource management planners are consenting and 
regarding decisions on land-use that align with the principles of the CDEMA to ensure that the 
best outcomes are being made. The previous recommendations seek to bolster the role of the 
hazard and emergency management by providing resourcing and direction, but this needs to 
be communicated to resource management in general as to best utilise funding and come to 
the most appropriate decisions that lead to better outcomes and resilient and sustainable 
communities.  
 
6.3 Limitations of the Research 
 
 Unfortunately, this research was affected considerably due to the unfolding Covid-19 
pandemic, this limited the ability to undertake work in the field and significantly reduced the 
opportunities to reach out to key informants in the CDEM space as they were working with the 
pandemic response. Further, the initial scope of the research accounted on conducting 
stakeholder interviews with community groups, specifically those that were involved in the 
response and recovery events for the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes, however, these 
were unable to be fulfilled due to Covid-19, similar issues were faced with reaching out to iwi 
and hapū groups for their views. Furthermore, this research took a targeted look at one hazard 
through the lens of the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquake. Considering this, the research 
was unable to analyse the hazard and emergency management framework more holistically 
and interrogate the relationships between it and other hazards, as such there remains some 
uncertainty with the applicability of the results from this research and a broad scope to hazards 
in general as it is heavily focussed on earthquakes. This is however, addressed within section 
6.4 as a potential future research opportunity.  
 
6.4 Future Research Opportunities  
 
 This research has looked in depth at the current hazard and emergency management 
framework at the link between the RMA and CDEMA and contemporary international and 
national literature on what is considered best practice in the form of proactive planning and 
greater inclusion of public participation and community engagement, also specifically with 
New Zealand, the role of MEK in the hazard planning sphere. However, due to the length and 
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scope of the research being limited to one year, there are a number of additional pathways 
that similar research could go down to give a more holistic view of hazard and emergency 
management in New Zealand; this research has focussed mainly on earthquake hazard using 
the data from the past decade of significant earthquakes in the country through the 
Christchurch 2010 earthquake and aftershock sequence and the Kaikōura 2016 earthquake, as 
such, an evaluation of other major hazards such as flooding and landslide have not been 
covered in as much detail. Additionally, due to the locality of the earthquake events in 
Canterbury, many of the key informants and topics of conversations were focussed on this area 
where a more in-depth analysis of other areas of the country could contribute to a fuller view 
of hazard management.  
 As stated earlier, this research has focussed on the link between the RMA and CDEMA 
in particular, due to the disconnect that exists between them. Future research could look into 
the other linking legislation that interacts with hazard and emergency management such as 
the Building Act and Local Government Act. Alongside this, a deeper examination into the 
relationship between insurance and the hazard and emergency management sector would be 
able to fill a gap this research did not have the time or scope of address.  
 Considering the immense changes on the horizon for resource management in general 
in New Zealand with the current RMA reforms and the impending widespread reforms or 
repeal of the RMA, there is the future opportunity to revisit this work and related research in 
order to assess the changes that may occur in this space in the future and the effectiveness of 
this. 
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 To conclude, the hazard and emergency management sector in New Zealand has the 
potential to be highly revolutionised by the principles of pre-event recovery planning. Proactive 
planning, enhanced community engagement and the acceptance and acknowledgement of 
MEK as an immensely valuable resource can be assimilated into the current framework to help 
achieve best practice. However, there are a range of issues that must be addressed before 
hand such as the debilitating resourcing issues that characterise the sector and increasing the 
implementation of public participation and MEK. The investigation into the past decade of 
significant earthquake events in New Zealand has helped establish the areas that must be 
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addressed in the hazard and emergency management framework for best practice to be 
achieved to create sustainable and resilient communities for the future.  
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Rethinking Hazard Management in New Zealand 
INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR  PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully before 
deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we thank you.  If you decide not to 
take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for Rory Vernon’s Master of Planning 
course. The research will seek to evaluate the current planning framework for hazard and disaster 
management in New Zealand using the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake as a working case study to assess 
the effectiveness of the system. The primary focus will be on the current framework’s capacity to 
promote sustainable and resilient processes and outcomes and to what extent the principles of pre-
event recovery planning can be used to retrofit current disaster management thinking. The role of 
public participation and MEK will also feature in the research to assess the potential scope and 
appropriateness of these mediums for the future of hazard / disaster management for New Zealand. 
 
What Types of Participants are being sought? 
The research seeks to speak to key stakeholders in the recovery and management process in the 
Kaikōura area during the aftermath of the 2016 earthquake. This could include members of local and 
central government, civil defence group members and experts within the hazard management field. 
The research also seeks to speak to local iwi and community members in the Kaikōura area as to 
assess the role they have taken or wish to take in the future with regard to hazard management. 
 
You are being requested to participate, and we also ask whether you can recommend other potential 
participants that would provide further insights into the research. Through this research, it is intended 
to document recommendations for the future of disaster management in New Zealand, and where 
possible, assess the current framework’s suitability against evidence from national examples. 
 
What will Participants be asked to do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to undertake a semi-structured 
interview. No reward or compensation will be offered for your participation; it is purely voluntary. 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to provide your views in an interview 
at a location and at a time that is convenient to you, via zoom, of up to an hour in duration. Since this 
interview is semi-structured in nature it will be based more on a discussion of relevant themes. You 
will be asked to reflect on several broad topics related to the current state of the hazard management 
framework in New Zealand, the feasibility for pre-event revoery planning to inform this framework, 
and the scope for public participation and MEK to compliment these processes.  
 
If at any stage you feel uncomfortable, you may decline to answer any question, or request that the 
interview be terminated. The information gathered from the research will be made available to 
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participants on request. Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without 
any disadvantage to yourself. 
 
What Data or Information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
Interviews will be audio recorded, and subsequently transcribed for use in the research. Only the 
supervisor and the individual undertaking the research will have access to the identifiable data/ Once 
the interview data are transcribed, the audio files will be deleted. Aliases and pseudonyms will be 
used to protect your identity, unless you prefer otherwise. On the Consent Form you will be given 
options regarding your anonymity. Please be aware that should you wish, we will make every attempt 
to preserve your anonymity. However, with your consent, there are some cases where it would be 
preferable to attribute your contributions made to individual participants. It is absolutely up to you 
which of these options you prefer. 
 
The final research will be made available to the School of Geography. Direct quotations may be used 
to provide evidence supporting key points made in the report. Every effort will be made to ensure that 
individual identities are not revealed through these quotations, unless you have chosen not to remain 
anonymous. Data obtained as a result of the research and personal information held on the participant 
will be destroyed at the completion of the research. You have the right to withdraw part of all of the 
provided information before 1st October 2020. 
 
Upon your request, the results will be made available to you through email. If you are hesitant or 
uncomfortable about answering any question, you are reminded of your right to decline to answer and 
also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any 
kind. 
 
This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes topics 
such as, the effectiveness of the current framework surrounding hazard management in New Zealand, 
the opportunity for pre-event recovery planning to be implemented and the role of public participation 
and MEK within these processes. The precise nature of the questions that will be asked have not been 
determined in advance, rather it will depend on the way in which each interview develops. In the 
event that a line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable 
you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s).  
 
Can Participants change their mind and withdraw from the project? 
If you are hesitant or uncomfortable about answering any questions, you have the right to decline to 
answer. If at any time you feel uncomfortable with the interview, you are free to ask for the interview 
to discontinue without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. You may withdraw the information 
provided at any stage up to the 1st of October 2020. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:- 
 
Rory Vernon and  Prof. Sean Fitzsimons 
School of Geography   School of Geography 
Phone Number: 027 833 9254   Phone Number: +61 279 8786 
Email: roryvernon98@gmail.com   Email: sjf@geography.otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any concerns 
about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and 
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I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project before its completion, 1st October 2020. 
 
3. Personal identifying information, such as audio-tapes from interviews, will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be 
retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning focuses on 
the disaster management framework of New Zealand. The precise nature of the questions which 
will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the 
interview develops and that in the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I 
feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may 
withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind. 
 
5.  The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.   
 




.............................................................................   ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)     (Date) 
 
............................................................................. 
       (Printed Name) 
 
[6. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research,   OR;  
 
  b) would rather remain anonymous. 
 
 
 
 
